Masood Al Hakari

In the summer of 2014, the jihadists of the Sunni Islamist terrorist organization Islamic State (IS/Da'esh) took control of predominantly Sunni regions of Iraq, including the megacity of Mosul, as well as large regions of eastern Syria in a sweeping offensive. As a result, regular Iraqi security forces collapsed in several regions and state actors were ousted in numerous regions of Syria. At times, the Islamists exercised de facto territorial control over large areas of Iraqi and Syrian territory. With the proclamation of a transnational caliphate, conceived as an Islamic “theocracy”, announced in June 2014, IS declared Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as caliph and thus laid claim to religious and political leadership over the Islamic community (Umma). The organization then established proto-state rule structures in the areas under its control, temporarily governing several million people. The emergence and development of IS marked a turning point in the history of jihadist terrorism to date.

The dissertation project aims to systematically analyse the structural, political and organizational factors that enabled the rapid rise of IS, its remarkable military power, its temporary territorial dominance and its subsequent collapse in Iraq and Syria. It focuses on the question of how a jihadist organization was able to carry out highly complex, coordinated military offensives within a very short space of time, overpower regular state security forces and, at the same time, establish functional administrative and security structures for exercising rule.

The project situates the development of IS in the context of long-term state and social transformation processes in Iraq since 2003 and the Syrian civil war from 2011 onwards. In particular, it examines – beyond purely ideological explanations – how the operational and institutional performance of this organization emerged under conditions such as state fragmentation and why it was ultimately lost again.

The dissertation follows a qualitative research design. Its empirical basis is the evaluation of around 90 interviews, most of which were conducted during two research visits to Iraq. The interview partners include high-ranking Iraqi military personnel, members of the Kurdish Peshmerga as well as members of local vigilante groups and other actors who were directly or indirectly involved in the military conflicts with the IS. The interview material is supplemented by discussions with international terrorism and Middle East experts. In addition, the analysis draws on the evaluation of relevant primary sources from the IS organization as well as on a broad range of secondary literature from the fields of terrorism, conflict and Middle East studies