Spotlight 11/23: Scheitern in Afghanistan: Wenn es sich Ursachenforschung zu einfach macht

    von Thorsten Gromes | Zur Publikation

    1 S. z.B. Bacon, Tricia und Daniel Byman 2021: De-Talibanization and the Onset of Insurgency in Afghanistan, in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1872159, S. 16; Williams, Phil 2022: US intervention in Afghanistan and the failure of governance, in: Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33: 7, S. 1130–1151. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2022.2120299, S. 1133.

    2 S. z.B. Brooking, Steve 2022: Why Was a Negotiated Peace Always Out of Reach in Afghanistan? Opportunities and Obstacles, 2011–21, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/pw-184-why-negotiated-peace-always-out-of-reach-afghanistan.pdf, S. 4; Kilcullen, David und Greg Mills 2021: The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan, London, S. 225.

    3 Dodge, Toby 2021: Afghanistan and the Failure of Liberal Peacebuilding, in: Survival, 63: 5, S. 47–58, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2021.1982197, S. 47; Masala, Carlo 2022: Weltunordnung: Die globalen Krisen und die Illusionen des Westens, 4. Auflage, München, S. 28.

    4 Brick Murtazashvili, Jennifer 2022: The Collapse of Afghanistan, in: Journal of Democracy, 33: 1, S. 40–54, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0003, S: 42–43; Carey, John M. und Andrew Reynolds 2021: The U.S. helped design Afghanistan’s constitution. It was built to fail, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/09/08/afghanistan-constitution-failure/.

    5 Cassidy, Robert 2021: Reflections on Afghanistan: War is Folly for the Weak on Wisdom and Will, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/09/12/reflections-on-afghanistan-war-is-folly-for-the-weak-on-wisdom-and-will/, S. 3; Henriksen, Thomas H. 2022: America’s Wars: Interventions, Regime Change, and Insurgencies after the Cold War, Cambridge, S. 130.

    6 Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.

    7 Jamal, Ahmad Shuja und William Maley 2023: The Decline and Fall of Republican Afghanistan, London, S. 146, 196–197.

    8 Schroden, Jonathan 2021: Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces, in: CTC Sentinel, 14: 8, S. 45–61, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CTC-SENTINEL-082021.pdf, S. 46–47, 54–56.

    9 Jalali, Ali A. 2023: Reflections on the Fateful Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, in: The Great Power Competition Volume 4: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan: America’s Longest War, Hrsg. Adib Farhadi und Anthony Masys, S. 169–184, Cham, S. 180–181.

    10 Es sind knapp fünf Prozent, legt man den Zeitraum 1990–2020 und die dyadische Variante des Conflict Termination Dataset 3-2021 des Uppsala Conflict Data Program zugrunde: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/monadterm/ucdp-term-acd-3-2021.xlsx.

    11 Cunningham, James und Joseph Windrem 2022: What Happened to the Afghan Air Force?, in: Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2022: Januar-Februar, S. 40–48, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/06/2002918538/-1/-1/1/JIPA%20JANUARY-FEBRUARY%202022.PDF/JIPA%20JANUARY-FEBRUARY%202022.PDF?source=GovD, S. 40.

    12 Schroden, Jonathan 2021: Afghanistan’s Security Forces Versus the Taliban: A Net Assessment, in: CTC Sentinel, 14: 1, S. 20–29, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CTC-SENTINEL-012021.pdf, S. 20–24.

    13 Malkasian, Carter 2021: The American War in Afghanistan: A History, New York, 386–387.

    14 Murid Partaw, Ahmad 2023: The failure of democracy in Afghanistan, in: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2022.2164480, S. 9; Sharan, Timor 2023: Inside Afghanistan: Political Networks, Informal Order, and State Disruption, London & New York, S. 19.

    15 Guéhenno, Jean-Marie 2015: The Fog of Peace. A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century, Washington, DC, S. 87–88.

    16 Dobbins, James 2021: Afghanistan Was Lost Long Ago: Defeat Wasn’t Inevitable, but Early Mistakes Made Success Unlikely, in: Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-30/afghanistan-was-lost-long-ago.

    17 Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman und Megan Shannon 2013: United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War, in: American Journal of Political Science, 57: 4, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12036, S. 875–891.

    18 Weinbaum, Marvin G. 2023: From Emirate to Emirate: Afghanistan’s Twenty-Year War, in: Escaping the Conflict Trap: Toward Ending Civil War in the Middle East, Hrsg. Ross Harrison und Paul Salem, S. 153–175, London, S. 161.

    19 Preuß, Hans-Joachim 2022: 20 Jahre Afghanistan: Lehren für das deutsche Engagement in Krisenregionen, in: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 15: 1, S. 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-022-00886-9, S. 14.

    20 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2021: What we need to learn: Lessons from twenty years of Afghanistan reconstruction. Arlington, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf, S. 32.

    21 Hippler, Jochen 2020: Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert: Militärische Gewalt, Aufstandsbekämpfung und humanitäre Intervention, Bonn, S. 163–164, 186.

    22 Gromes, Thorsten 2021: Ausweglose Exit-Strategien: Beginn, Fortdauer und Ende von Auslandseinsätzen, https://blog.prif.org/2021/11/11/ausweglose-exit-strategien-beginn-fortdauer-und-ende-von-auslandseinsaetzen/.