Annex to PRIF Working Paper Understanding the Politics of Transparency: (Un)Making Security Futures with Security Sector Reform

Annex 1 and 2 to PRIF Working Paper No. 70: Understanding the Politics of Transparency: (Un)Making Security Futures with Security Sector Reform

by Adrian Barchet and Sophia Birchinger

Annex I: Analysis of global, continental, and regional policy frameworks

The Gambian SSR process is oriented by and embedded in global, continental, and regional documents, that informed and shaped the national strategic documents, as strong alignment in language and commonalities in the formulation of principles demonstrate. 

On a global-continental level, the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, adopted in 2017, highlights the need for a “predictable, systematic, and strategic” “close coordination and cooperation”, “based on their respective comparative advantage and complementarity in peace and security [... ]” (UN AU 2017, 1), SSR being one area where both organisations aim for aligned policy implementation. 

The last UN Report on Strengthening SSR (2022), reiterates the priority principles for SSR processes, including

  1. “inclusive national ownership
  2. the primacy of political solutions
  3. ensuring governance-focused approach at all stages of reform, including assessments, planning, programming and evaluation” (1).

According to the UN Report, national ownership shall “be reinforced through a complementary bottom-up approach, utilizing consultations with local communities and inclusive dialogue.” and “rather than singular events, such efforts need to be central mechanisms for security sector reform through which inclusive consensus can be enhanced over time” (3). The primacy of politics means is vital because “[s]ecurity sector reform should be understood as foremostly a political endeavour” (3) which requires “a more equitable distribution of power” (3), as the report states. The governance-focused approach highlights the importance of taking into account the contextual presence of norms while working towards “transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and responsiveness to the needs of the people at all levels of governance” (3). The report formulates recommendations, one advocating for more political rather than technical solutions (4) and another highlighting the leverage inclusive and trust-building initiatives have on advancing political dialogue (6). All of this is geared towards the aim to “strengthen security sector governance and develop security institutions that are accountable, professional, inclusive, representative, accessible and transparent, with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and responsive to the needs of their population, including minorities, women and girls” (2). These “can be built only on a bedrock of integrity, accountability and transparency” and “require sustained political buy-in” (2). The role of the UN in SSR processes is working “in close cooperation”, “closely coordinated”, based on “effective coordination” and “transparency, accountability and inclusivity of international support” and with “coordination mechanisms” (9). 

On a continental level, the African Union adopted its AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Policy in 2013 within the wider Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), adopted in 2006 and revised in 2024. The AU SSR Policy aligns itself with UN SG Reports of 2008, 2009, 2022, and the UNSC statement of 2010. Based on the deficit-oriented diagnosis of “weak institutional structures, lack of effective democratic control, weak democratic governance, lack of sufficient public awareness on gender issues, lack of effective and relevant training, inadequate equipment, lack of adequate funding and other resources” (3), in the preamble the AU formulates the desire of “democratic governance of a security sector that is effective, efficient and without prejudice to existing similar frameworks at national and regional levels” and recognizes “the need for African ownership” (3). Throughout the policy, there are several instances where the “peculiarities and specific requirements of security sector reform in Africa” (3), “customary security providers”, and “traditional justice actors” (10) are mentioned, pointing to the divergence from the liberal peacebuilding model from which the SSR norm cluster has emerged. The AU SSR Policy itself then goes on to define SSR and its goals as “the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people” (6). Importantly, it denotes ownership in a plural understanding, this is local (communities), national (AU member states), regional (Regional Economic Communities) and continental (AU) ownership (6). With a view to national ownership, the AU SSR Policy even provides a list with ideas and examples, whom to include and not to forget in the SSR Process (27) and provides a task list for civil society organizations to be involved in SSR matters (29). In this sense, the policy also refers to SSR as a matter of regional integration, inspired by the AU-REC coordinating mechanisms of 2008. Despite this continental and regional alignment, each SSR process is nationally started, owned, and coordinated (9–10). In turn, external support has to follow and adhere to the nationally defined vision (10) of a reformed security sector. Borrowing from good governance principles, the AU policy formulates accountability and transparency as equally important principles for any SSR process (11). Core elements of SSR processes among others include 

  1. “Security sector review and needs assessment;
  2. National security strategies;
  3. The existence of institutional, legal and security policy frameworks;
  4. Comprehensive capacity building and professionalization of the institutions of the security sector;
  5. Institutionalization of effective partnerships and coordination mechanisms;
  6. Ensuring that democratic control and oversight mechanisms are enhanced and functional;
  7. Ensuring adequate resource mobilization, funding and accountability;
  8. Appropriate monitoring and evaluation; and
  9. An effective communications strategy.” (13)

Each core element is then further elaborated (13–21). The AU SSR Policy reads very comprehensive, uses similar language compared to the UN SG Report (2022) but leaves comparatively more room for members states to spell out normative commitments underpinning the different core elements of SSR. 

The ECOWAS SSRG Policy Framework was formally adopted in 2016, three years after the AU SSR Policy, but it was only in 2021 that the ECOWAS SSRG Policy Framework was formally launched and disseminated. Similarly to the AU SSR Policy, the ECOWAS SSRG Policy Framework refers and reaffirms the respective UN SG Reports (2008, 2009, 2013) and acknowledges the AU SSR Policy Framework. In the ECOWAS SSRG Policy Framework, “SSR refers to the the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, accountable and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people” (8). While this formulation is almost identical with the wording in the AU SSR Policy, the ECOWAS SSRG Policy adds the adjective “accountable” to the wish list of a reformed security sector. For achieving these goals, the policy continues “[i]t requires separation of powers, a participatory and inclusive approach involving citizens through their legally and regularly chosen representatives in decision-making processes, management and control of State activities and function in the Security Sector” (8). In its understanding of democratic governance as a key component of conflict prevention, the ECOWAS SSRG Policy sees security sector reform as one key mechanism, with the objective to make the security sector “efficient, effective, responsive and responsible to democratic control” (9) and “accountable, transparent and participatory” (9) The policy highlights the importance of “African and West African solidarity and good neighbourhood” as well as “horizontal partnerships and South-South cooperation” (10) as core principles in support of “respect for national sovereignty” (10). The adoption of the policy is seen as “an expression of West African ownership” (11) and highlights that any SSRG activity must be “on the basis of a national decision” and “tailored to the needs, histories, culture, social and political context of the applicable States” (11), yet always adhering to “core principles of democratic governance, rule of law, gender equality and respect for human rights” (11). With these proclamations, the policy pronounces certain unnegotiable core principles while at the same time leaving the responsibility to the members states to spell out concrete reform agendas. In section III, the policy then spells out “the essential features”, comprising 

  1. “A National Security Policy;
  2. A periodic security sector review and needs assessment;
  3. A comprehensive professionalization and modernization of the security and justice sector;
  4. The involvement of customary authorities and community-based security and justice providers;
  5. The effective involvement of Civil Society Organizations and the media;
  6. The establishment of effective and accountable democratic control and oversight institutions including independent and effective judiciary/court systems;
  7. An effective resource mobilization strategy and financing of SSRG;
  8. A national framework for effective partnerships and cooperation arrangements;
  9. An effective communication strategy;
  10. A monitoring and evaluation mechanism” (13).

It remains unclear whether these building blocks that are subsequently spelled out in much detail are a proposal for SSR or mandatory elements for each member state undergoing a SSR reform process. The policy continues with sections on gender mainstreaming, the implementation mechanism of the ECOWAS SSRG policy framework, and relations with cooperating partners. What stands out is the language of support rather than a language of implementation, that is used in the section on the implementation mechanism. That very section spells out the roles of three actors, these are the ECOWAS Commission, the member states, and civil society organizations including the media. For the ECOWAS Commission, the policy seeks the roles “to build capacity”, “to undertake aggressive sensitization and communication”, “to coordinate”, “to assist”, “to contribute”, “to support”, “to partner” (23–4) – clear coordinating and assisting roles. For the member states, the policy rather uses language of obligation with wordings such as “to provide”, “to establish”, “to ensure”, “to design and implement” – putting member states under the obligation as “the primary providers of security and justice services for their citizens and States [...] for formulating, designing, implementing, monitoring, evaluating, leading and funding SSRG programmes” (24). For civil society organizations and the media, the policy “acknowledges the positive role played by CSOs and the media” and sets out to “engage CSOS and the media” to, among others, “promote transparency and accountability in SSRG pogrammes”, “promote and encourage dialogue”, and “contribute to the work of other institutions in charge of overseeing the controlling security sector institutions” (25–6). In sum, the distribution of responsibilities is clearly spelled out: The ECOWAS Commission is there to enable and make possible, the member states shall be those in the lead designing and implementing SSRs and the civil society organizations are there to participate, dialogue, and “promote transparency and accountability in SSRG programmes” (26).

Based on these global, continental, and regional documents, the imaginary of a reformed security sector appears to have two main foci that become apparent in two word clusters: The first word cluster that we call “PEOPLE” includes, national ownership, people-orientation as well as the adjectives “inclusive” and “responsive” as further descriptors of a reformed security sector. The second word cluster that we call “TRUST” includes the adjectives effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable.

Annex II: Analysis of national policies

This imaginary of a reformed security sector, namely based on citizens’ security needs and with the characteristics of being effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable, as stipulated in the global, continental and regional frameworks is continuously repeated in the various Gambian national documents – yet without providing more substance, and without spelling out concrete steps and action or communicating how these aims are to be achieved. 

The new government under President Adama Barrow embarked on an ambitious reform trajectory laid out in the National Development Plan (NDP, 2018–2021) which was later followed by the Recovery Focused National Development Plan (RF-NDP, 2023–2027). Focusing on the first NDP (2018–2021), security sector reform has been identified as one of the key priorities for the first two years in office. In the NDP with over 400 pages, security sector reform, however, appears only four times. In the Foreword, President Barrow declares to have “embarked upon a robust security sector reform process, aimed at bringing the security services fully under civilian democratic control, ensuring that the force’s structures and manpower are appropriate for our national security needs, and that the men and women in our armed and uniformed services can play a meaningful and positive role in national development” (7). In the introduction, the government thanks coordinated efforts: “Our partners are working closely, together with ECOWAS on security sector reform process and we deeply appreciate their efforts” (13). For the first two years in office, seven priorities are identified, among others “Security sector reforms and creating a security apparatus fully subordinate to civilian authority, respectful of human rights and attuned to international standards and conventions” (25; 200). More so and beyond a government priority, SSR is included in the Presidential M&E System, the Presidential Dashboard as well as the NDP High Level Executive Results/Outcomes, comprising all of his priorities (166; 339). The high priority is explained by the fact that “for the citizens the state was the foremost source of insecurity” (187, 195, and footnotes 28 and 31). The RF-NDP continues to emphasize SSR as “a top priority of Government”, acknowledging that “the security sector reform is still work in progress” (75). For the period between 2023 and 2027, the government sets out to 

  1. “1. Consolidate gains and finalize security sector reform
  2. Improve the policy and legal frameworks and enhance institutional capacity
  3. Strengthen coordination within the Armed and Security Services and strengthen partnerships and collaboration with stakeholders (both national and international)” (76).

All these three priorities are spelled out even further with sub-sections and detailed action, including enabling factors (79). 

The NDP and the subsequent RF-NDP serve as the main strategic reference frameworks for government action, hence clearly prioritizing security sector reform as one of few key priorities. The initial NDP limits itself to naming SSR as a broad priority without spelling out details at all, whereas the subsequent secondary RF-NDP provides considerably more substance, including white paper priority areas and roadmaps, even detailing planning on activity-level. This is a notable contrast but might point to the progressed reform processes and detailed work plans that have been developed since 2018 but have not been there yet at the onset of the new government in 2017 when the first NDP was developed. While in the NDPs, SSR is identified as a priority, an assessment followed to identify the needs for reform. 

In preparation of the SSR process, the new Gambian government together with UNDP started an assessment detailing the reform needs. For that purpose, the Steering Committee and Project Board, including government ministers (Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs), the chief justice, UN Resident Representative, the ECOWAS and EU ambassadors commissioned a 27-member Technical Working Group (TWG) to draft the SSR Assessment Report in 2017 (The Republic of The Gambia 2017). The report maps over 78 pages full of reform needs, including situational and contextual analyses, institutional assessments and security needs of different stakeholders. Most notably, this report serves as the basis of all future SSR related processes, activities, policies and documents. Bearing this crucial relevance of this document in mind, it is quite significant, that the report borrows from the UN definition on SSR and does not mention the AU and ECOWAS SSR policy frameworks at all (2). In line with the UN definition of SSR, the report aims “at making recommendations for the changes required to make them more professional, effective, accountable, and responsive to the security and justice needs of the citizenry and operating within the framework of good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights and international humanitarian laws.” (The Republic of The Gambia 2017, 3). The future reformed security sector is imagined to reflect “oversight and accountability” (40), “accountability and control measures” (69), “more transparency, dialogue and sensitization” (40, 56). It is on the basis of this assessment report that the National SSR Strategy, the National Security Strategy and the National Security Policy were developed to further spell out the future security sector.

One recommendation of the aforementioned report was to draft the first ever National Security Policy (NSP) that was eventually launched in May 2019. According to President Barrow, the policy “is an overarching policy document that aims at streamlining mandates, roles and responsibilities of Security Institutions [...] and will engender a clear division of labour” (iii). First of all, the NSP is rich in deficit analysis. In the NSP, for example, the security sector with its institutions is imagined as an opposite to the past: “[S]ecurity was designed to focus on the protection of the political and economic interests of the elite as opposed to meeting the needs of the citizenry” (11). Therefore, “crucial to the success of the Gambia’s new NSP, is popular ownership and changed perceptions that long gone are the days when the security sector was an instrument in the hands of political actors who utilized it to deny Gambians of their fundamental rights, and for self-aggrandizement of the highest order” (viii). It continues: “In the last two decades, The Gambia witnessed saw blatant abuse of Gambians and use of the state security apparatus primarily for political repression and self-interest” (1) – “a security apparatus that was not oriented to meet the needs of the people” (12). Instead, “a culture of impunity” persisted in the light of “widespread human rights abuse” (12). Beyond a more comprehensive formulation of the national security interest of prosperity and wellbeing of all Gambians including the socio-economic transformation of the country (17), how then does the National Security Policy imagine the country’s security institutions in the future instead? 

Aiming to “reverse negative public perceptions [...] and regain public trust”, the NSP refers to the SSR Assessment Report from 2017, when it sets out the aim for “a civilian-controlled security sector founded on democratic institutions, norms and processes to promote human rights and the rule of law” (1). SSR is “to ensure efficient and effective governance and oversight of the security system as well as to ensure the definition of mandates and delineation of competencies of security forces, services and institutions” (14). This shall be achieved with an NSP “predicated on popular participation, and international best practices” (1), “a transparent and accountable government” (1), as well as national core values (2). 

The 17 guiding principles (14–16) include, for instance, 

  • “national ownership, responsibility and commitment”;
  • “human security that is responsive to the security and justice needs of The Gambian people”
  • “democratic principles of good governance, accountability and the rule of law”
  • “civilian oversight and democratic control”
  • “goals and principles of international and regional organizations which The Gambia is a signatory”
  • “the adoption of international principles of transparency and inclusiveness”.

The NSP then provides an analysis of the major threats and vulnerabilities before introducing the governance structure of the security apparatus (23–25): 

  • National Security Council (NSC) – chaired by president, “highest authority for providing strategic guidance and direction in national security issues” (23)
  • Office of National Security (ONS) – responsible for managing the SSR process together with statutory organs

The eight main security institutions include (26–33):

  • The Gambia Armed Forces (GAF)
  • The Gambia Police Force (GPF)
  • State Intelligence Services (SIS)
  • The Gambia Immigration Department (GID)
  • Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG)
  • The Gambia Fire and Rescue Services (GFRS)
  • The Gambia Prison Services
  • The Gambia Revenue Authority

The NSP details an oversight and review mechanism to ensure “functional democratic control and enhanced oversight mechanisms that are effective and efficient through a legitimate governance framework or architecture. This will facilitate the creation of a highly professional and law-abiding security sector that is responsive to the security needs of the people and subordinate to civilian authority, by adhering to the principles of human rights and committed to the rule of law” (37). It tasks all branches (legislature, judiciary, and executive) but also independent bodies to oversee the security institutions. Referring to “the spirit of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”, the NSP “empowers the office of the ombudsman as a designated civil institution to investigate complaints from the public and service members, and to monitor compliance of the security sector” (38). Equally the NSP calls upon multiple partners to collaborate in the future, among others, the NSP “encourages CSOs to play a positive role in enhancing security sector responsiveness to the security and justice needs of the state and people within the ambit of the law” (40). To implement the NSP, the Office of National Security was tasked to develop a National Security Strategy (NSS).

The National Security Strategy (NSS, 2020) is seen as “the cardinal point of policy making” and “strategy to support the implementation of the National Security Policy (NSP), including national security and economic development as “closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing concepts” (1). In this role, the strategy “is intended to carry out in-depth systemic reforms in order to ensure that there is no vacuum which can be exploited to destabilize the country” (viii). In fact, the NSS mirrors in much length the NSP, when it identifies malfunctioning security sector as the reason for “eroded government capacity [...], slowed down economic development efforts, and affected core national values” (5). For security institutions to contribute to the implementation of the NSP, the NSS suggests to “enhance the capacity of security institutions” and aim for “properly structured institutions” (15). A key aspect is security sector reform (18–19): 

  • “SSR enables governments to restructure and properly manage the security sector. It provides a basis for clear delineations of competencies and mandates. It also ensures that security institutions are placed under democratic civilian control thus enhancing good governance and adherence to rule of law” (18).
  • “There is thus the need to conduct Security Sector Reform in order to ensure efficient and effective governance, management and oversight of the security sector” (18–19).

For SSR, six strategic actions are identified:

  • “Restructure line ministries, to enable them execute their oversight functions over their respective security institutions”.
  • “Strengthen and empower the Office of National Security to enable it adequately coordinate national security”.
  • “Develop synergy between security sector institutions through building and maintaining institutional and multi-agency cooperation”.
  • “Establish and strengthen a Joint Operations Centre to coordinate multi-agency operations”.
  • “Establish a framework to promote information and intelligence sharing among security sector institutions”.
  • “Ensure continuous training of security sector personnel and provision of resources/infrastructure/equipment” (19).

While all security related policies have so far remained mostly on a level of formulating lofty demands on a reformed security sector, the NSS for the first time breaks SSR process down into six strategic steps. 

On the basis of the 2017 SSR Assessment Report, the government adopted The Gambia’s Security Sector Reform Strategy (SSRS, 2020–2024). While all other documents portrayed so far serve as framework that guide the Gambian security sector reform process, the SSRS in fact is ‘the’ key reform document on a national level. On 37 pages, the Gambian government details its plans to reform its security sector. The document identifies five principles priority areas and spells out reform activities for the respective security institutions:

  • “Restore public trust and confidence by addressing post-authoritarian legacies.
  • Develop an overarching security governance framework.
  • Reform, empower and strengthen civilian management and oversight bodies.