

WARID: Zaire/DR Congo (AFDL) 1996-1997
STARDATE: 18 October 1996
ENDDATE: 16 May 1997
Related Cases: DR Congo (RCD) 1998-2004
DR Congo (MLC) 1998-2002
DR Congo (CNDP) 2006-2009
Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002
Angola (UNITA) 1975-1995
Angola (UNITA) 1998-2002
Burundi (CNDD, CNDD-FDD) 1994-2004
Burundi (Palipehutu, FNL) 1997-2008
Uganda (ADF) 1996-2002
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Conflict overview

The First Congo War was a rebellion by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and backed by the governments of Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda against the Zairian president and longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The armed struggle against Mobutu was a revolution and an invasion at the same time. Its revolutionary character stems from the involvement of two Congolese movements that were fighting a ‘war of liberation’: a group of Tutsi from South Kivu (Banyamulenge), who took up arms after years of ethnic discrimination, and a heterogeneous rebel alliance (AFDL), which barely commanded any troops at first but emerged as a stalking horse for the Rwandan invasion. The First Congo War was likewise an invasion to the extent that several neighboring countries invaded Zaire, each for their own reason¹.

The anti-Mobutu war was directly linked to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. After the Rwandan Tutsi rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), had seized power in Kigali, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu fled into neighboring Zaire. Among them were the perpetrators of the genocide: former Rwandan government soldiers (ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises/ex-

1 Rwanda saw a chance to finally eliminate the perpetrators of the genocide. Uganda’s invasion in Zaire has its roots in the proxy war between Sudan and Museveni in the Congo, and Angola’s involvement resulted from Mobutu’s backing of the Angolan rebel group UNITA.

FAR) and extremist Hutu militias ('Interahamwe').² They soon established control over the refugee camps in Zaire and used them as rear bases to launch raids into Rwanda. Apart from the Rwandan ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias, Ugandan, Burundian and Angolan rebels also operated from Congolese soil, posing a threat to their respective governments. Due to the advanced disintegration of the Zairian state, Mobutu barely held physical control over the eastern provinces. He did not merely tolerate and support the presence of these rebel groups, he was unable to disarm them and to control the borders. In light of this, neighboring countries sought to moderate the security threat by supporting Congolese rebels in their armed struggle to oust Mobutu.

The rebellion by Tutsi in the Kivu provinces was likewise influenced by the repercussions of the Rwandan genocide; first and foremost, however, it resulted from Mobutu's discriminatory policies. Prior to the war, the Tutsi population in the eastern Kivu provinces faced increased repression, being deprived of citizenship in April 1995 (Reed 1998: 147) and finally called upon to leave the country in early October 1996. When anti-Tutsi violence by ex-FAR/Interahamwe, soldiers from Mobutu's army, the 'Forces Armées Zaïroises' (FAZ), and local Hutu intensified, the Tutsi in South Kivu revolted. Along with soldiers from the Rwandan government forces, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), they launched attacks against the refugee camps to dismantle the ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias.

On 18 October 1996, the AFDL emerged as an official rebel movement in Lemera (South Kivu) and Kabila became the spokesman for the rebels, becoming their military leader in early 1997. The rebel movement was an alliance composed of four political parties, solely united in their goal of overthrowing Mobutu.³ In the course of the rebellion, Congolese Mayi-Mayi⁴ militias and thousands of young child soldiers ('Kadogos') joined the rebels. In early 1997, warriors returning from Angolan exile, the so-called Katangan Tigers, fought alongside the rebel forces. Their sole common denominator was the aim to topple Mobutu. Whereas the Tutsi's objective had at first been to dismantle and annihilate the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the refugee camps, the AFDL aimed to overthrow Mobutu in order to assume power in Kinshasa. Thus, the whole country is considered the disputed territory.

2 Zaire hosted an estimated 1.2 million Hutu refugees (Kisangani 2000b: 173) who were used as a 'human shield' by the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide (altogether around 30,000 ex-FAR soldiers and 20,000 to 40,000 Interahamwe and other Rwandan militias (Kisangani 2003: 263; Quinn 2004: 122; Stearns 2011: 15, 51).

3 Alliance Démocratique des Peuples, Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Zaire, Conseil National de Résistance pour la Démocratie, and the People's Progressive Party (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004: 13).

4 The term 'Mayi-Mayi' or 'Mai-Mai' refers to groups of ethnic militias in eastern Congo (Kisangani/Bobb 2010: 328f.)

Negotiation attempts were most prominently fostered by the USA and South African President Nelson Mandela. The last conference, in May 1996, failed primarily because the AFDL expected a military victory.⁵ Kabila declared that the AFDL would not enter any kind of power-sharing or ceasefire agreement with the Zairian government. When military defeat seemed inevitable, Mobutu fled Kinshasa on 16 May 1997. One day later, AFDL rebels and their allied forces captured the capital and Kabila declared himself president, proclaiming the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁶ The armed struggle terminated after seven months of fighting with a military victory for the rebel side [**WARENDUC=4; WARENDOS=4; WARDUR=7**].⁷

According to estimates by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 46,290 people were killed due to armed struggle, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence against civilians between 1996 and 1997 [**FATALUC=46000**].⁸ However, other sources indicate a much higher death toll. There is strong evidence of systematic killings of Hutu refugees (civilians and ex-FAR/Interahamwe) by the AFDL and RPA.⁹ Various sources estimate the total number of Hutu refugees killed during the rebellion to be between 60,000 and 300,000.¹⁰ Kisangani (2000: 178-179) provides the most detailed calculation, concluding that 233,000 people were killed in the massacres alone. Thus, we estimate a total death toll of at least 233,000 [**FATALOS=233000**].

According to World Bank estimates, the population of Zaire prior to the outbreak of the war in 1995 amounted to 42,012,000 [**PREWARPO=42000000**].¹¹ Thus, the armed struggle led to the death of 0.11% of the Zairian population, according to UCDP estimates [**INTENSUC=0.11**], or around 0.55% according to other sources [**INTENSOS=0.55**].

The military balance at the end of the war

The military balance in the DRC in 1997 was largely marked by the rebels' military victory. Mobutu's army had refused to fight, retreating westwards before the rebels arrived or deserted

5 Auteserre 2008: 99; Kisangani 2012: 126; Prunier 2009: 136; Reyntjens 1999: 242; Stearns 2012: 52 ff.

6 For a conflict overview, see: Adelman/Rao 2004; Auteserre 2010; Kisangani 2012; Marriage 2013; Prunier 2004; Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009; Reyntjens 2011; Stearns 2011.

7 Kisangani 2012: 132; Turner 2003: 83; UCDP Conflict Termination dataset 2010, dyad version, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/ (23 Apr 2014).

8 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=38®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa# (22 Apr 2014).

9 Dunn 2002: 58; Prunier 2009: 124-125; Reyntjens 2009: 87-93; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/26/un-report-rwanda-congo-hutus> (2 Apr 2014).

10 Kisangani 2000b: 178-179; Kisangani 2012: 2; Ndikumana/Kisangani 2003: 38; Prunier 2009: 148; Reyntjens 2009: 93; Reyntjens 2011: 136; Stearns 2011: 136-137; Stearns/Borello 2011: 154; Young 2002: 13.

11 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/cod?downloadformat=excel> (26 Aug 2014). We must bear in mind that population estimates only serve as an approximation due to the country's size and the lack of a census.

to AFDL troops. Since spring 1997, no noteworthy military existed. The presidential guard in Kinshasa surrendered¹² and AFDL forces captured the city largely unchallenged.¹³ Hence, the UCDP and case-specific literature define the AFDL as the clear victor of the war [VICTORY=1].¹⁴

According to Cunningham et al. (2009), the AFDL exerted control over much of eastern Zaire. The rebels initially controlled around 600 to 700 square kilometers in the east by December 1996 (Prunier 2009: 131-136) and quickly expanded their control thereafter (Dunn 2002: 56; Quinn 2004: 125). On their way to Kinshasa, the rebels recruited soldiers and occupied several resource-rich areas.¹⁵ The AFDL began “to behave like a state” (Reed 1998: 148) and established administrative structures. The rebels seized the whole country and, by the end of the war, were clearly in control of the larger part of the territory previously held [REBTERR=1]. The rebel side controlled all of the disputed territory by the end of the war. Mobutu’s regime collapsed entirely [MORETERR=1].

Cunningham et al. (2009) classify the rebels’ relative fighting capacity as ‘moderate’. This is questioned by case-specific literature which points out that the AFDL’s fighting capabilities substantially exceeded those of the Zairian governmental forces (FAZ) and that “in fact, the AFDL mostly saw it [the FAZ] running away” (Prunier 2009: 128).¹⁶ Given that the majority of Mobutu’s soldiers were far from being operational, the FAZ was in a very poor state since soldiers were unpaid, undisciplined, badly equipped and, above all, unwilling to fight.¹⁷ Military confrontation primarily occurred between the rebel alliance including Rwandan soldiers and foreign forces fighting for Mobutu.¹⁸ In total, the number of troops fighting for each warring party was more or less equal.¹⁹ The Rwandan soldiers in particular, led by James Kabarebe, were highly efficient.²⁰ The pace of the rebels’ advance was remarkable, taking the

12 Those remaining in Kinshasa were executed after the capture of the capital (Strizek 1998: 190).

13 Carayannis 2003: 240; Prunier 2009: 126; Strizek 1998: 189-190.

14 Stearns 2011: 163; Marriage 2013: 47; Prunier 2009: 149.

15 Control of the gold mines in Kisangani, the diamond-rich areas in Mbuji-Mayi, and copper-producing areas around Lubumbashi guaranteed financing for the rebellion (Dunn 2002: 57; Kisangani 2012: 118; Prunier 2009: 134; Quinn 2004: 126).

16 McNulty 1999: 75; Marriage 2013: 43; Turner 2013: 17.

17 Kisangani 2000a: 222; Marriage 2013: 43; Thom 1999: 103-104; Young 2002: 47.

18 These included Serb mercenaries, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, and rebel groups from Angola, Burundi and Uganda, which constituted the only organized military opposition to the rebels (Carayannis 2003: 240; Prunier 2009: 129; Quinn 2004: 122, 126; Reed 1998: 140; Turner 2002: 82).

19 10,000 to 15,000 untrained young Kadogos, up to 25,000 Mayi-Mayi militias, 2,000 Katangan Tigers, and 20,000 Rwandan forces were fighting for the rebel side. 25,000 FAZ, up to 50,000 ex-FAR/Interahamwe, 80 Serb mercenaries, and 6,000 Angolan UNITA rebels fought for Mobutu (Carayannis 2003: 240; ICG 1998a: 5, 8; Marriage 2013: 43; Prunier 2009: 129, 252; Quinn 2004: 122, 126; Reed 1998: 140; Turner 2002: 82).

20 Given their significance for the rebels’ victory over Mobutu, we consider the Rwandan contingent in the AFDL as part of the rebel side (Dunn 2002: 56-57; Prunier 2004: 375).

AFDL and the Rwandan troops only seven months to conquer a country of the size of two-thirds of Western Europe. Whereas Kabila and his Kadogos mostly profited from fleeing Mobutu soldiers rather than their own military strength, the Rwandan troops and later the Katangan Tigers – who joined the rebellion in 1997 – had a clear militarily superior position to Mobutu’s forces (Turner 2002: 83). Thus, we assess the rebels’ relative fighting capacity as ‘high’ [**REBFIGHT=1**].

Case-specific literature portrays Mobutu’s forces as weak and “a mockery of itself” (Prunier 2009: 130; Stearns 2011: 55). As the AFDL advanced without significant hindrance towards Kinshasa, and Mobutu’s forces completely dissolved when the rebels took the capital (IISS 1997; Marriage 2013:43), only the side rebelling at the beginning of war would have been able to continue fighting in more than a few areas of the country in more than a sporadic manner [**CONFIGHT=1**].

Former president Mobutu died in Moroccan exile in September 1997 and Kabila was killed by one of his bodyguards in January 2001.²¹ However, neither of the warring parties’ leaders was killed or captured by the opponent’s side [**LEADER=0**].²²

In sum, the military balance at the end of the war was to the clear advantage of the rebels [**WARBAL=0.83**].

The military balance in the post-war period

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 1997/1998 and 1998/1999) and Marriage (2013: 43), Mobutu’s army disbanded when AFDL took over Kinshasa, leaving the rebel movement as the main element for the new state forces. Given the incoherent nature of the AFDL and the fact that Kabila did not have any troops specifically loyal to him – except for the Kadogos he recruited on his way to Kinshasa –, he faced great difficulties creating a new army (ICG 2000: 17; Prunier 2009: 251). His ‘Forces Armées Congolaises’ (FAC) were basically composed of Banyamulenge Tutsi fighters, Kadogo child soldiers, Katangan Tigers²³ and Mayi-Mayi militias.²⁴

Case-specific literature does not provide a consensus on the exact number of integrated Mobutu soldiers within the FAC. Some “dashes” (Prunier 2009: 176) of former FAZ soldiers also joined the ranks of the FAC, but there was no planned or organized integration of former Mo-

21 De Villers/Omasombo Tshonda 2002: 403; Reyntjens 2009: 252-254; Strizek 1998: 190.

22 The first military commander of the AFDL, Kisase Ngandu, was assassinated on 4 January 1997, not, however, by Mobutu’s forces but by the RPA (Kisangani/Bobb 2010: 20; Prunier 2009: 130).

23 The Katangan Tigers were originally sent by the Angolan Government to support the AFDL rebellion. The Diablos had fought for the secession of the province of Katanga in the 1960s. After being defeated, they fled to Angola (Stearns 2011: 54).

24 Kisangani 2012: 131; Ngolet 2011: 4; Prunier 2009: 176; Stearns 2011: 171.

butu soldiers²⁵, who were scattered throughout the DRC, subjected to a mandatory ‘re-education program’²⁶ or had fled to neighboring countries.²⁷ This leads us to the conclusion that the former government side did not participate in the new army with at least 3,000 soldiers; only the rebels contributed substantially to the state’s military forces [**STATEFOR 1997-1998=1**].²⁸ Overall, Kabila’s efforts to create a new army failed. By 1998, there were 16,000 FAC soldiers with uncertain loyalties in the Kivus²⁹; this is supported by the assessment that, even in the Second Congo War, “there was no army to speak of” (Prunier 2009: 210). In early 1998, Banyamulenge Tutsi soldiers within the FAC began to mutiny (Prunier 2009: 176). Moreover, other armed groups once fighting against Mobutu – especially the Mayi-Mayi militias – refused to join the new army and retained a separate identity. In 1997, they turned against Kabila and attacked the FAC in the Kivus.³⁰

Assuming former Mobutu soldiers did not participate with at least 1,500 troops in the state’s armed forces, Kabila’s military and police is considered a separate armed force. Ngolet (2011: 13) also lists three separate armed forces at Kabila’s disposal: the National Police (NP), the ‘Police d’Intervention Rapide’ (PIR) and the ‘Agence Nationale de Renseignement’ (ANC). As Mobutu’s military structures collapsed once he had fled into exile, we do not assess the remaining non-integrated FAZ soldiers and DSP forces in the Congo (whose number is impossible to pinpoint) as a separate armed force.³¹ It is rather unlikely that there was any remaining command structure that could have organized them as a unified force.³² Hence, only the former rebels had separate armed forces at their disposal [**SEPFORCE 1997-1998=1; TROOPS 1997-1998=n.r.; ARMS 1997-1998=n.r.**].

Shortly after the end of the war, Mayi-Mayi forces, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and ex-FAZ soldiers launched attacks on government positions in the east (Kisangani 2012: 135, 138-139, Prunier 2009: 173, 175).³³ Thus, we assume that Kabila’s control over the eastern DRC van-

25 On paper, Zairian government soldiers numbered between 50,000 and 80,000 depending on the source (Prunier 2009: 128; Reyntjens 2009: 108; Thom 1999: 103). This figure includes the FAZ, Mobutu’s Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) (15,000), the Garde Civile (10,000) and a special elite corps of 3,000. However, in total, only 25,000 men were operational.

26 Afoaku 2002: 115; ICG 1999a: 18; Ngolet 2011: 14; Prunier 2009: 176; Weiss 2000: 14.

27 ICG 1999b: 23; Kisangani 2003: 264; Kisangani 2012: 146; Prunier 2009: 168, 201, 376, 379.

28 ICG 2000: 51; Prunier 2009: 176.

29 Carayannis 2003: 242; Prunier 2009: 177. This led to confrontations between troops loyal to different commanders with different ethnic backgrounds (ICG 1999a: 19-20).

30 Afoaku 2002: 121; ICG 1998a: 4; Prunier 2009: 130, 175.

31 IISS 1997/1998 and 1998/1999; Marriage 2013, Prunier 2009; Stearns 2011.

32 In May 1997, the regime’s military structure, “organized around [...] Mobutu” collapsed (Prunier 2009: 128).

33 The Mayi-Mayi militias were opposed to any kind of foreign presence in the Kivus. They deemed Kabila a ‘puppet’ of Rwanda (Dunn 2002: 61; Kisangani/Bobb 2010: 85; Reyntjens 2009: 167).

ished after 1997.³⁴ However, he still controlled important territory in other parts of the country (representing the majority of the DRC expanse), where he was able to extract resources, recruit soldiers and establish his authoritarian rule [**TERRCON 1997-1998=1**].³⁵

Despite Kabila's diminishing control in the eastern provinces, the codebook codes in favor of the former rebel side, which theoretically controlled the (entire) territory – the former government not controlling any territory after the end of the war [**TERRWIN 1997-1998=1**]. This also applies to the vulnerability of the former warring parties. Being that the Mobutu government collapsed, the rebel side is considered less vulnerable [**VULNERAB 1997-1998=1**]. However, we must take into account that territorial control was relative due to the DRC's immense state territory; this leads ICG (1998: 8) to note that Kabila's troops were "spread thin given the size of the DRC" and at times unable to "properly police the hinterland and areas bordering Rwanda and Uganda".

There were no peacekeeping forces in the DRC after the rebels' victory over Mobutu until the renewed outbreak of the war [**PEACKEEP 1997-1998=n.r.**].³⁶

Against the backdrop of the refugee crisis in the Kivus, France pushed for a military intervention to protect the Rwandan refugees. Ultimately, French efforts to convince a coalition of states to intervene in Zaire remained unsuccessful (Thom 1999: 117).³⁷ Ngolet (2011: 10) characterizes the USA as generally being in favor of the rebellion against Mobutu, initially; however, there was no official US commitment, either. As such, none of the permanent members of the UN Security Council would have intervened on behalf of either of the warring parties to prevent its ally from defeat [**P5ALLY 1997-1998=n.r.**].

In sum, the post-war military balance was clearly to the advantage of the former rebels, as the AFDL managed to increase the military balance in their favor [**POSTBAL 1997-1998=1**].

The post-war period began with a substantial military imbalance to the benefit of President Kabila and the AFDL, which increased throughout the post-war years and put the AFDL in a definitively superior position militarily [**BALANCE 1997-1998=0.92**].

34 After the outbreak of the Second Congo War in 1998, the 'Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie' (RCD), took control of this area, whereas Mayi-Mayi elements sided with Kabila, against whom they had previously fought (Kisangani 2012: 138, 140; Prunier 2009: 175, 178). Since all key cities in the Kivus were captured within 48 hours in the Second Congo War, it is highly unlikely that the Kabila exerted effective control over these provinces in the first half of 1998 (Prunier 2009: 181).

35 Dunn 2002: 60-61; Reyntjens 2009: 158-159; Weiss 2000: 8.

36 Fortna 2008.

37 Bonner, Raymond: France linked to Defense of Mobutu, *The New York Times*, 2 May 1997, online edition; Fitchett, Joseph: France Paints U.S. Role As Crucial In Zaire Crisis, *The New York Times*, 8 Nov 1996, online edition.

Economy

Kisangani (2012: 128) and Stearns (2011: 165) stress that the post-war economic situation in the DRC was devastated: the overall economy shrank to one third of its level in the 1960s.

Table 1: The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in current USD³⁸

Year	Population (total)	GDP per capita
1997	44,078,397	138
1998	44,960,941	138

The scale of compromise after the war

On 1 July 1997, Kabila announced a new cabinet (Prunier 2009: 149). It was mainly composed of individuals who had been in exile for many years.³⁹ Kabila was neither willing to share power with former Mobutists nor with members of the rebellion (Afoaku 2002: 109). Representatives from Equateur Province, a former Mobutu stronghold, were largely excluded from power; some were even not permitted to operate as a political party. Consequently, political opposition was restricted, opposition supporters and civil society harassed and imprisoned.⁴⁰ High AFDL leaders were either purged or sidelined (Weiss 2000: 9). “Kabila became the only ‘survivor’ of the four founders of the AFDL” (Reyntjens 2009: 161). In May 1998, Kabila dissolved the parliament. Ruling by decree, he established a new constitutional order, conferring almost absolute power to the presidency.⁴¹

Kabila’s authoritative leadership was no surprise turn but rather a continuation of his war-time rhetoric: in March 1997, the rebel leader announced that all political parties would be banned once the AFDL took power: “[T]he provisional government would be formed exclusively by the AFDL” (HRW 1997). Though large parts of the former rebels did not participate in the new government, former Mobutists were likewise excluded. The fact that Kabila turned into an authoritarian president is sufficient evidence to conclude that the side rebelling at the beginning of the war constituted the post-war government [**GOVERN 1997-1998=1**].

As Kabila restricted participation in the transitional government to “those people who never worked with Mobutu’s regime” (HRW 1997; Ngolet 2011: 6), any actor or party connected to the latter had no possibility of participating in the government or any other political activity (Schatzberg 1997: 70). Eventually, Kabila installed a highly centralized governmental system, combining all decision-making power and governing the country in a dictatorial manner simi-

38 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/cod?downloadformat=excel> (22 Apr 2014).

39 ICG 1999: 7; ICG 2000: 52; Kisangani 2003: 264-265; Prunier 2009: 150.

40 Dunn 2002: 57, 60-61; ICG 1999a: 3, 13-15; ICG 2000: 53; Reyntjens 2009: 158-160.

41 Dunn 2002: 60; Ngolet 2011: 79; Reyntjens 2009: 158-159.

lar to his predecessor [**VETO 1997-1998=1; VETOSAT 1997-1998=n.r.**].⁴² Despite Kabila's promise to hold elections in 1998 and to adopt a new constitution in 1999, the first elections in the DRC did not take place until 2006.⁴³ This favored the self-proclaimed president as he could not be challenged by the unarmed political opposition, which was far better organized throughout the country given its long existence compared to the AFDL's recent emergence as a political party [**ELECT 1997-1998=1**].⁴⁴

The warring parties fought over the entire country and over access to governmental power. Neither the secession of a certain territory nor conflict over borders between federal or sub-state units or the allocation of competences among different were the root of the armed struggle [**EXBORDER 1997-1998=n.r.; INBORDER 1997-1998=n.r.; COMPETEN 1997-1998=n.r.**].

Although the kleptocratic economic system under Mobutu precipitated a severe deterioration of living conditions for the vast majority of the Zairian population, changing the economic 'order' was not on the agenda of the warring parties [**ECONOMY 1997-1998=n.r.**].

One main reason for the Banyamulenge Tutsi in South Kivu to embark on the rebellion against Mobutu was the dire situation in the eastern provinces (Kisangani 2012: 120, 125-126; Reyntjens 1999: 242). They had been deprived of their citizenship, called upon to leave the country and were attacked by ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Mobutu's forces.⁴⁵ When Kabila dismissed the Tutsi from government in 1998 – replacing them with members of his clan from Katanga and people from Kasai who were granted key positions in the army, police and in the political arena –, the Banyamulenge felt betrayed since they had contributed to the victory over the old regime and demanded to be rewarded (ICG 1999a: 4; Ngolet 2011: 15).⁴⁶ Kabila did not address the question of Banyamulenge citizenship nor did he embark on measures against their discrimination in the eastern provinces.⁴⁷ Thus, no rebel demands (more precisely, the Banyamulenge Tutsi contingent in the alliance) were realized despite the military victory. In order to take this into account, we code this item in favor of the former government, even though it no longer existed [**SPECPRO 1997-1998= -1**].⁴⁸

42 ICG 1999a: 7; Reyntjens 2009: 158-159; Weiss 2000: 9.

43 Freedom House 1998; HRW 1997; ICG 1999: 7; Marriage 2013: 48; Schatzberg 1997: 70.

44 Kisangani 2003: 265, Prunier 2009: 154. Unarmed political opposition leader Tshisekedi enjoyed greater popularity than Kabila (ICG 1999a: 11ff.).

45 Kisangani 2012: 120, 124-126; McCalpin 2002: 46; Ngolet 2011: 17; Reyntjens 1999: 144.

46 Subsequently, conflict emerged between Katangan and Banyamulenge troops (ICG 1998b: 14).

47 Dunn 2002: 62; Kisangani 2003: 264; Kisangani 2012: 138; Marriage 2013: 48.

48 The Banyamulenge claimed the victory as theirs, envisioning themselves as liberators (Kisangani 2012: 134).

Rwanda had supported the rebellion in order to find a solution (Prunier 2009: 155) to the Hutu refugee problem. Spearheading the anti-Mobutu war, Rwanda nonetheless failed to achieve its initial aim – the complete dismantling of ex-FAR/Interahamwe militias – since the latter group continued to be present in the Kivus. When Kabila began collaborating with the radical Hutu militias after the war, including them in the new army, Rwanda increasingly became antagonized by his actions (Weiss 2000: 10). Moreover, the Banyamulenge Tutsi felt abandoned and left to attacks by Rwandan Hutu rebels, refusing to join the FAC alongside their former foes.⁴⁹ As this was central to the renewed outbreak of war in 1998, we code this item as though the former government (which no longer existed) had prevailed on this issue. This takes into account that Kabila's foreign backers were strongly dissatisfied by the performance of the person they had installed as President since he continued Mobutu's policy in this issue. This ultimately led to a new Rwandan invasion aimed at toppling Kabila [**ISSUE 1997-1998= -1; ISSUE2 1997-1998=n.r.**].

There were no further central issues that emerged in the post-war period. It is, however, noteworthy that access to natural resources, especially in the eastern provinces, soon gained in importance, particularly in the Second Congo War [**NEWCON 1997-1998=n.r.; NEWCON2 1997-1998=n.r.**].

The former warring parties did not compromise on any issue until the outbreak of the new war [**BENEFIT 1997-1998=n.r.; BENEFIT2 1997-1998=n.r.**].

Core demands made by the majority of the rebel factions were not fulfilled as Kabila turned against almost all his former partners. The rebel alliance broke up into its various parties, with varying and sometimes competing interests, in the post-war order – their one common concern (the end of Mobutu's dictatorship) no longer existed.⁵⁰ When Kabila turned into an authoritarian leader and excluded those who had contributed to the ousting of his predecessor from power, various rebel blocs turned against each other⁵¹ and eventually against Kabila (Weiss 2000: 9). The post-war order did not reflect a clear military dominance of the former rebel side after the end of the war [**COMPROM 1997-1998=0.2**].

49 ICG 1998b: 4, 16; ICG 2000: 12; Prunier 2009: 176-177, Reyntjens 2009: 162.

50 Afoaku 2002: 110-111; Dunn 2002: 63; Marriage 2013: 45.

51 Mayi-Mayi militias in eastern Congo felt disregarded shortly after the end of the war when Kabila replaced local authorities with Tutsi from the Kivus, whom the Mayi-Mayi militias perceived as Rwandan foreigners. They accused Kabila of selling the Kivus to Rwanda. Henceforth, they launched attacks against the RPA and Tutsi, starting several insurrections shortly after the end of the war in 1997 (Kisangani 2012: 135-140).

The stability of peace

With several Mayi-Mayi insurrections aimed at fighting Tutsi influence in the east and widespread discontent over the presence of foreign soldiers, Kabila faced the dilemma of evaporating domestic support and dependence on his Rwandan and Ugandan backers. In order to liberate himself from his ‘kingmakers’, Kabila demanded that all foreign troops leave the DRC in late July 1998 (Stearns 2011: 183). Tutsi in the Kivus feared to fall at the mercy of Mayi-Mayi militias and remaining ex-FAR/Interahamwe once their foreign protectors had left the DRC. In early August 1998, Tutsi brigades of the FAC mutinied and Rwandan troops who were headed by Kabarebe invaded the DRC, triggering the outbreak of the Second Congo War.⁵² Some aspects of the conflict constellation remained the same: a rebel side consisting of Banyamulenge Tutsi along with a Congolese rebel alliance, ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie’ (RCD) – there latter included Tutsi from North Kivu who were backed by Rwanda and Uganda and played a decisive role in fighting the new government. The latter was again supported by ex-FAR and Interahamwe (Stearns 2011: 183) as Mobutu had been in the first war; however unlike Mobutu, Kabila was able to draw on his newly created army.⁵³ Against this backdrop, we categorize the Second Congo War as a relapse into civil war according to the strict definition [**SAMEWAR=1; DATESAME=3 Aug 1998; ANYWAR=1; DATEANY=3 Aug 1998**]. Despite ongoing skirmishes between local militias and former rebels in the eastern DRC, we assess a 15-month period of peace [**PEACMON1=15; PEACMON2=15**].

52 Afoaku 2002: 114, 120; Dunn 2002: 57, 62, 64; ICG 1998b: 1; ICG 1999a: 22; Kisangani 2012: 141; Mariage 2013: 54; Prunier 2009: 178, 181; Reyntjens 2009: 144, 194; Tull 2007: 117.

53 Kisangani 2012: 131, Ngolet 2011: 14; Stearns 2011: 171.

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