

WARID: Uganda (ADF) 1996-2002
STARDATE: 16 Nov 1996
ENDDATE: 30 Nov 2002
Related cases: Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo (AFDL) 1996-1997
Democratic Republic (DR) of the Congo (RCD) 1998-2004
DR Congo (MLC) 1998-2002
DR Congo (CNDP) 2006-2009
Sudan (SPLA, NDA) 1983-2004
Uganda (LRA) 1988-1991
Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR) 1990-2002
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Conflict overview

The armed struggle between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Ugandan military forces (UPDF) was a guerrilla war between a heterogeneous rebel organization and the Ugandan Government. President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) had seized power after fighting a five-year civil war (1981-1986) against the governments of Milton Obote and Tito Okello. Soon after Museveni became president in January 1986, various rebel movements took up arms against the new government.¹

In 1996, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) emerged as another rebel alliance. The ADF were a conglomerate of several anti-Museveni movements; its creation was sponsored and initiated by Sudan. Formed on Congolese territory, the establishment of the rebel group must be understood against the backdrop of the proxy war between Uganda and Sudan in Zaire.² The ADF were not a coherent movement: they did not have a clear ethnic base, a common political agenda or any prior ideological links. The movement never voiced a coherent set of grievances. Apart from these dissimilarities, the various factions within the ADF were united in their vague objective to overthrow the government. The ADF was composed of the Nation-

1 Rebel groups fighting against Museveni included the Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA), the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Uganda People's Army (UPA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF).
2 Ugandan rebels had taken refuge in Zaire and were supported by the Zairian and Sudanese governments. Uganda backed the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was fighting against Khartoum.

al Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)³, the Allied Democratic Movement (ADM)⁴, the Uganda Muslim Liberation Army (UMLA) and a radical Muslim movement, known as the Tabliq sect⁵ that claimed to fight for an Islamic state. In 1996, these disparate rebel groups fused into the ADF under the auspices of Khartoum.⁶

Although the ADF are widely regarded as an Islamist terror group that receives funding from Al Qaeda, their allegiance to Islamism seems to be rather superficial and instrumental (Hovil/Werker 2005: 13, ICG 2012: 1). The ADF do not declare themselves to be a fundamentalist organization and Islam seems to play a minor role among them. They do not demand the establishment of a Caliphate or the introduction of Islam as the state religion (ICG 2012: 10). Hence, the ADF are widely seen as a rebellion without a cause.

The Ugandan military started its counter-insurgency campaign (Operation Mountain Sweep) in November 1999. It managed to reduce the rebels in number and to push them back into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While the UPDF never managed to fully neutralize the ADF, by 2002, the rebel organization no longer posed a military threat to Uganda.⁷ Thus, we assess that the war ended with a military victory for the Ugandan Government [WARENDUC=4; WARENDOS=4; WARDUR=72].⁸ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) best estimates indicate 1,752 battle-related deaths between 1996 and 2002. Fatalities attributed to one-sided violence by both the ADF and the government have to be added to this figure. The UCDP does not record any one-sided violence by government forces for the dyad under investigation. Considering this, the UCDP estimates that a total of 2,450

3 The NALU rebels are deemed to be a revival of the Rwenzururu movement, which had fought for an independent Bakonjo Kingdom in western Uganda between 1962 and 1982.

4 The ADM was created by ultra-monarchists in London exile in 1995. The movement aimed at re-establishing the Kingdom of Buganda, which had been disbanded when Obote took over power in the mid-1960s.

5 The Tabliq movement is an evangelistic Muslim sect that has its origins in India and Pakistan. It was founded in the 1920s. Tabliq means 'to deliver (the message of Islam)'. While the Indian-Pakistani Tabliq movement is usually non-political, the Ugandan Tabliqis claimed political persecution after they opposed the appointment of a new national mufti. This triggered a period of street-clashes and arrests in 1991 and ultimately led to the formation of the Uganda Muslim Freedom Fighters (UMFF). In 1995, the UMFF was defeated and forced to flee to Zaire where they were supported by both Sudan and Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and collaborated with other rebel groups, including NALU and Rwandese Interahamwe.

6 For a conflict overview, see Day 2011; ICG 2012; Prunier 2004; Prunier 2009; Romkema 2007; Think Security Africa 2012; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012.

7 Nonetheless, President Museveni reiterated the terrorist threat posed by the ADF mainly to receive US funds for the fight against terrorism.

8 This military victory, however, should not be understood as the annihilation of the rebel force, nor does it imply that the group laid down its arms. The ADF was merely pushed back into its safe havens in the DRC where it continued to pose a serious threat to the Congolese civilian population. Due to the design of our study, we only consider dyadic constellations, in this case the Government of Uganda vs. the ADF. As the ADF was deterred from launching further attacks in Uganda, we assess that, for the dyad under investigation, the Government of Uganda could secure a military victory and end the confrontation in 2002. Any actions by the ADF in the DRC belong to a different and active dyad (Government of the DRC vs. ADF) that is outside the time frame of our research (i.e. any civil war that ended between 1990 and 2009) and does not meet our definition of a civil war (a total of 1,000 battle-related deaths with at least 25 deaths per year).

people were killed in the civil war between the Government of Uganda and the ADF [FATALUC=2000].⁹ However, case-specific literature indicates that between 1,500 and 2,000 rebels fell in battle during ‘Operation Mountain Sweep’ in 1999.¹⁰ Replacing UCDP’s estimate for this year (355) with the higher number of 1,500 while adopting UCDP figures for the remainder of the years (1,402), we conclude that at least 2,902 people were killed in direct military confrontation. Moreover, several sources indicate a higher number of fatalities caused by one-sided violence by the ADF. Violent attacks against civilians are said to have resulted in more than 1,000 deaths between 1998 and 2001.¹¹ Adding UCDP’s estimates on one-sided violence for 1997 (144) to this number, we conclude that approximately 1,144 civilians were killed by the rebels. Hence, based on case-specific literature, we calculate a total death toll of 4,046 [FATALOS=4000]. World Bank estimates put Uganda’s population in 1995 to 20.7 million [PREWARPO=20700000].¹² Thus, the death toll amounts to 0.01% or 0.02% of the pre-war population, depending on the estimate used [INTENSUC=0.01; INTENSOS=0.02].

The military balance at the end of the war

The UPDF’s counter-insurgency campaign seriously destabilized the ADF (Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 159). By 2001, the ADF were decisively weakened and reduced to a few hundred in number. Several of their arms deposits were discovered. Furthermore, the blanket amnesty offered by the Ugandan state in the Amnesty Act induced a large number to surrender (Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 159–160). The rebel force was pushed out of Uganda into neighboring DRC, where it continued its operations but refrained from launching attacks against Uganda. Hence, the Ugandan army was able to secure a military victory [VICTORY=-1].¹³

The ADF were never able to gain a foothold in Uganda; instead they exploited the rough territory and the weakness of state power in the porous Uganda-DRC borderlands, namely the Rwenzori Mountains. Reportedly, the ADF had established a network of support in Kampala (African Rights 2001: 11), though it never controlled any populated area in Uganda through state-like structures. However, the ADF were able to gain control over parts of eastern Congo

9 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=160®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa# (18 Aug 2014)

10 HRW 2009: 23; Romkema 2007: 65; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 159.

11 African Rights 2001: 1; ICG 2012: 5; Muhereza 2011: 28; Romkema 2007: 65; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 159. Romkema (2007) cites a paper by Philip Lancaster: “The Allied Democratic Front versus the Ugandan People’s Defence Force, 1996-2001” presented in Winnipeg, 2006.

12 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/uga?downloadformat=excel> (2 Jun 2014).

13 See footnote 8 for a detailed justification.

in North Kivu, which served as a recruitment pool and source of revenue.¹⁴ Thus, the rebels controlled strategically important territory in their safe haven across the border [REBTERR=1].¹⁵ Despite that, the Ugandan Government was in control of the entire disputed territory at the end of the war, holding the entire Ugandan state [MORETERR= -1].

The ADF's strategy consisted of random terror and ruthless abuse. Clashes with the UPDF were mostly avoided and the civilian population was heavily targeted instead. The ADF abducted and forcibly recruited children, and also attacked schools and colleges. In 1999, it attacked Katojo prison in Uganda and liberated 360 detainees charged with terrorism. Understandably, the ADF never garnered popular support.¹⁶ At the outset, the ADF were poorly armed but they soon profited from Sudanese and Zairian/Congolese assistance. The rebels acquired all sorts of fire arms, hand grenades and land mines.¹⁷ Moreover, they were responsible for 43 bombings in Kampala and Jinja (McGregor 2007: 1–2). Largely owing to outside assistance, we concur with Cunningham et al. (2009) in assessing the rebels' fighting capacity as 'moderate' [REBFIGHT=0].

As we have highlighted above, the ADF were seriously reduced by the UPDF's counter-insurgency campaign and had to retreat to their DRC safe havens in order to avoid a complete annihilation. Consequently, only the Ugandan army could have continued fighting in more than a sporadic manner [CONFIGHT= -1].

Even though the Ugandan army never apprehended the political rebel leader Jamil Mukulu, the UPDF managed to kill and/or capture a large number of ADF commanders and leading figures, including the organization's secretary general, while others voluntarily surrendered. We therefore assume that the ADF's command structure was substantially weakened; we code in favor of the Ugandan government [LEADER= -1].

In sum, the military balance at the end of the war indicates a considerable advantage for the Ugandan government [WARBAL= -0.5].

The military balance in the post-war period

In 2000, the Ugandan parliament passed a new amnesty bill that guaranteed blanket amnesty to all persons involved in rebel activities that surrendered. Since 2000, a total of 2,040 ADF

14 Day 2011: 447; Romkema 2007: 68; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 155, 162-163.

15 ICG 2012: 2.

16 Hovil/Werker 2005: 12–13; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 156; Think Security Africa 2012: 3.

17 Candia, Steven (11 Apr 2013): Uganda: Allied Democratic Forces Recruiting in Kampala, Says Defector, in: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304111226.html?page=2> (18 Jul 2014).

rebels defected and embraced amnesty.¹⁸ Even though some ADF fighters were also offered a position within the UPDF, the amnesty statute did not aim at reintegrating fighters into the army but rather into civil life [STATEFOR 2003-2012=-1].¹⁹

Both the Ugandan Government and the ADF commanded separate forces. Apart from the UPDF, which should be considered a separate force, the Ugandan Government also supported a vast number of militias, referred to as ‘auxiliary forces’, and benefited from their actions – though it denied their very existence in some cases (Schlichte 2005: 93, 101). The ADF managed to rehabilitate themselves in their camps in the DRC and recruit heavily (McGregor 2007: 2).²⁰ They launched attacks in Uganda and the eastern DRC. The alliance with NALU only survived until 2007, when the last NALU commanders – attracted by the Ugandan amnesty statute and repeated military setbacks – surrendered. Nonetheless, the ADF-remnants continued the struggle on their own [SEPFORCE 2003-2012=0].²¹

There is no reliable information on the number and equipment of ADF troops. While The Military Balance (2002/2003-2013) only indicates 100-200 fighters, other sources indicate a significantly higher number, but differ widely.²² Lacking consistent data on the number of rebel forces in the respective post-war years or on their equipment and weaponry, we code ‘no data’ [TROOPS 2003-2012=n.d.; ARMS 2002-2012=n.d.].

Regardless of its expulsion from Ugandan territory, the ADF were able to gain territorial control in provinces of eastern Congo, especially North Kivu. The rebels’ territory was not vast, but comprised “a strategically important part of the Goma-Beni corridor” (Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 166). After the early 2000s, the ADF were well integrated into local Congolese communities and enjoyed local support.²³ Following setbacks in 2001 and 2005, the rebels managed to recruit new fighters.²⁴ The ADF occupied resource-rich areas and entered economic relations with local traders, even with Congolese and Ugandan government soldiers (ICG 2012: 11-12; UN 2011: para. 57). By engaging in the cross-border trade of timber, diamonds and minerals, including gold and coltan, the rebels were able to maintain their major funding

18 Candia, Steven (11 Apr 2013): Uganda: Allied Democratic Forces Recruiting in Kampala, Says Defector, in: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304111226.html?page=2> (18 Jul 2014).

19 Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 160.

20 Candia, Steven (11 Apr 2013): Uganda: Allied Democratic Forces Recruiting in Kampala, Says Defector, in: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201304111226.html?page=2> (18 July 2014).

21 ICG 2012: 2, 4-5.

22 McGregor 2007: 3; Romkema 2007: 67; UN OSAA 2007: 15; UN 2011: para. 44; UN 2012b: para. 104; Think Security Africa 2012: 2; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 161; <https://web.archive.org/web/20110510084258/http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=27> (17 Sep 2014); <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89844/drc-when-thousands-suddenly-take-flight> (17 Sep 2014).

23 Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 155, 162ff. In the territory of Beni, nearly half of the population allegedly supported the ADF (UN 2011: para. 63).

24 African Rights 2001: 8; Hovil/Werker 2005: 15; Romkema 2007: 67; UN 2012b: para. 108-109.

network in North Kivu, especially Beni and Butembu, throughout the entire post-war period.²⁵ The ADF additionally received financial support from abroad.²⁶ Overall, the ADF's successful integration into "the cross-border economy and corruption of security forces" (ICG 2012: 1) in the DRC enabled the rebels to survive even ten years after their initial defeat in 2002 (Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 170). Hence, notwithstanding the fact that the ADF did not control any territory in Uganda, we conclude that the rebels were still in considerable control of important territory in the DRC [**TERRCON 2003-2012=0**]. During the war, the Ugandan Government was in control of the whole disputed territory. In the post-war period, the rebels did not seize control of areas in Uganda but only maintained their presence in the DRC – which they had established in wartime. Neither of the former warring parties was in control of more important territory than at the end of the war or shortly thereafter [**TERRWIN 2003-2012=0**]. Thanks to the safe havens and resources in the DRC, the ADF was never eliminated, despite being attacked by the UPDF as well as by the 'Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo' (FARDC) and the 'Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo' (MONUC; since 2010 MONUSCO). We do not consider one side to be more vulnerable than the other [**VULNERAB 2003-2012=0**].

There were no armed peacekeeping forces deployed in Uganda in the post-war period. However, UN peacekeeping troops stationed in the DRC supported the Congolese government in its armed struggle against various rebel groups in the DRC, including the ADF.²⁷ In order to finally eliminate the latter, UN forces provided mainly logistical support and intelligence for two military offensives of the Congolese army.²⁸ However, all the campaigns failed: the ADF always managed to resurrect itself. Combatants still numbered between 800 and 1,200 by 2013 (UN 2013: para. 90). We consider that a peacekeeping force did not generally side with either one of the warring parties. Thus, in its fight against the ADF, the MONUC/MONUSCO cannot be considered a conciliatory power for the dyad under investigation [**PEACKEEP 2003-2012=n.r.**].²⁹ There were not any permanent members of the UN Security Council that would have intervened on behalf of either of the warring parties to prevent its ally from defeat [**P5ALLY 2003-2012=n.r.**].

25 The ADF controlled vast forests and several small gold mines. See ICG 2012: 11; Romkema 2007: 70; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 163-164; UN 2011: para. 57; UN 2012a: para. 107.

26 Hovil/Werker 2005: 13; UN 2010: para. 112; UN 2012b: 107.

27 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml> (17 Sep 2014).

28 During operation 'North Night Final' in 2005, major rebel camps were destroyed (ICG 2012: 6; Prunier 2009: 308; Romkema 2007: 66-67; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 160; UN 2007: para. 102). A second campaign ('Radi Strike') was conducted in 2012 (ICG 2012: 8; UN 2012a: para. 19). As MONUC/MONUSCO was preoccupied by other rebel groups, however, it failed to engage in serious action against the ADF.

29 Farhey, Daniel (19 Feb 2015): New Insights on Congo's Islamist rebels, in: The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/19/new-insights-on-congos-islamist-rebels/> (2 May 2015); Fortna 2008.

We conclude that the military balance between the Government of Uganda and the ADF shifted in favor of the rebels in the post-war period, although the government remained slightly dominant. The overall military balance confirms the government's advantageous position [POSTBAL 2003-2012= -0.2; BALANCE 2003-2012= -0.35].

Economy

Uganda's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita more than doubled from 2003 to 2012 but remained at a very low level.

Table 1: GDP per capita in Uganda in current USD³⁰

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
2003	26,838,428	236
2004	27,766,986	286
2005	28,724,869	314
2006	29,711,397	335
2007	30,728,747	400
2008	31,778,799	448
2009	32,864,328	451
2010	33,987,213	472
2011	35,148,064	441
2012	36,345,860	551

The scale of compromise after the war

Museveni and his NRM governed Uganda after 1986. The NRM abolished the multi-party system, replacing it with the Movement System, which understands itself as comprehensive, alleging to comprise all Ugandan factions. Competition took place only among candidates within the Movement, which is strictly controlled by President Museveni (Schlichte 2005: 89). There was hardly any broad-based inclusionary representation (regional, religious or ethnic), especially at the cabinet level (Dicklitch 2002: 209). There were, for example, no Muslims in Museveni's higher administration (McGregor 2007: 1). However, western Ugandans were the main beneficiaries of the NRM's ethnic favoritism. They were overrepresented in the Cabinet and dominated political decision-making. Most key positions were occupied by Banyankole, followed by Bakiga, Banyoro and Batoro. The Bakonjo and Baamba – who live at the foot of the Rwenzori Mountains and therefore suffered most from the ADF war – remained totally excluded (Bakonjo) or only marginally represented (Lindemann 2011: 395–398). ADF leaders never gained positions of influence within the Kampala government [GOVERN 2003-2012= -1].³¹ The Ugandan constitution does not provide a veto right for either of the warring parties (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995). As such, the

30 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/uga?downloadformat=excel> (2 Jun 2014).

31 Hovil/Werker 2005: 7.

government side has exclusive decision-making power [**VETO 2003-2012= -1; VETOSAT 2003-2012=n.r.**].

After the NRM assumed power in 1986, Legal Notice No 1, 1986 was passed to suspend the activities of political parties (Byaruhanga Rukooko 2005: 216–217). In 1996 and 2001, presidential elections were held under the Movement System, resulting in Museveni victory by a wide margin. There were also reports of election violence and unfair conditions in favor of the incumbent (Omach 2009: 10–11). In a referendum on the return to multi-party politics in 2000, Ugandans opted for a continuation of the Movement System. It was only when president Museveni spearheaded the pro-multi-party faction in the 2005 referendum that a formal return to multi-party politics was approved (Muhumuza 2009: 25).³² At the same time, the constitution was amended to remove the presidential term limit, allowing Yoweri Museveni to run again as candidate. The subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2011 were ranked as not free and fair by Freedom House (2014). They were overshadowed by accounts of election violence, harassment of the opposition and fraud. Moreover, the election commission proved itself to be partisan (Muhumuza 2009: 28). In 2002, the Museveni government passed the Anti-Terrorism Act³³, which criminalized the ADF; membership in and support for the group became illegal (African Rights 2001: 26; Omach 2009: 13). Against this backdrop, the rebels were officially prohibited from establishing a political party, running for the national parliament or nominating a candidate for the presidential elections [**ELECT 2003-2012= -1**].

The NALU faction within the ADF is deemed to be a revival of the Rwenzururu movement³⁴ and claimed to strive for the restoration of the autonomous Bakonjo Kingdom³⁵ along with the recognition of the authority of local chiefs.³⁶ After NALU combatants surrendered in 2007, the ADF ceased to exist as an alliance; in 2008, Museveni presented the prospect of recognizing the Bakonjo Kingdom. On 2 September 2009, the Ugandan president finally delivered on his promise. Thus, he was “meeting a key demand of the ex-Rwenzori combatants” (ICG 2012: 7) within the rebel movement [**SPECPRO 2003-2008= -1, SPECPRO 2009-2012=0**].

32 On 28 July 2005, the Ugandans approved the return to multi-party democracy in a referendum. Though 92.5% voted in favor of legalizing party activity, voter turn-out only amounted to 47% (Freedom House 2006).

33 <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6589> (11 Sep 2014).

34 The Rwenzururu movement demanded the restoration of the Bakonjo Kingdom when all regional kingdoms were abolished in 1967. The insurgents eventually signed an armistice with the Obote government in 1982 (ICG 2012: 2; Lindemann 2011: 413; Prunier 2004: 375; Prunier 2009: 82-83; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 156-157).

35 The Bakonjo tribe is also referred to as ‘Bakonzo’. The Bakonjo Kingdom is also called ‘Bakonzo Kingdom’ or ‘Rwenzori Kingdom’ due to its location in the Rwenzori Mountains.

36 ICG 2012: 2; Prunier 2004: 375; Romkema 2007: 64.

Neither the borders nor the economic system was not an issue in the ADF's struggle **[EXBORDER 2003-2012=n.r.; INBORDER 2003-2012=n.r.; ECONOMY 2003-2012=n.r.]**. As explained above, it is extremely hard to establish the ADF's precise demands. Upon creation of the ADF, the demands of its factions seem to have largely evaporated. Since these demands were never reiterated in later years – as has been the case with the ADM's demands for the re-establishment of a meaningful Buganda monarchy and the claim “to reintroduce multi-party politics in Uganda, stop Museveni's nepotism giving all the juicy jobs to the Westerners [meaning people from Ankole and Kigezi] and re-establish cordial relations with Uganda's neighbours” (Prunier 2004: 375) – we do not code these as compromises **[COMPETEN 2003-2012=n.r.; ISSUE 2003-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 2003-2012=n.r.]**.

The demands the ADF voiced in the 2008 peace negotiation attempts were solely linked to concrete socio-economic challenges, such as the repatriation of the families of their fighters to Uganda (Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 161). Despite facilitation by MONUC, peace negotiations never fully materialized (McGregor 2007: 4; Titeca/Vlassenroot 2012: 161). In January 2000, the government issued the Amnesty Act (AA), which was extended and amended twice but expired in 2012.³⁷ The AA offered blanket amnesty to all members of armed groups who would report for demobilization, renounce and abandon involvement in the war and armed rebellion, and surrender their weapons (AA 2000: II. 3-4). In order to convince the remaining combatants to lay down their arms and repatriate, the government promised the rebels a “civil starter kit and a small amount of cash” (Romkema 2007: 65). A Human Rights Watch (2009: 23) report states that, between 2000 and January 2009, almost 2,000 supposed ADF combatants had been granted amnesty.³⁸ However, those who were amnestied felt increasingly disgruntled given the “government's inability to deliver on its promises of assistance laid out in the AA” (Hovil/Lomo 2005: 15; Hovil/Werker 2005: 15). Despite these grievances, we conclude that the implementation of the AA can be considered a compromise that was mostly implemented **[NEWCON 2003-2007=n.r., NEWCON 2008-2012=0; NEWCON2 2003-2012=n.r.]**. None of the post-war compromises disproportionately benefitted either side **[BENEFIT 2003-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 2003-2012=n.r.]**.

Overall, the post-war order shifted from a complete dominance of the government in the first post-war years to a slightly more equitable value in 2009-2012 **[COMPROM 2003-2007= -1, COMPROM 2008= -0.8, COMPROM 2009-2012= -0.6]**.

37 Romkema 2007: 70; Sanz Pascual 2009: 116; <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95569/uganda-no-more-amnesty-certificates-for-rebels> (22 Sep 2012).

38 This number is confirmed in an article in the Ugandan newspaper; see Amnesty Commission boss meets ADF leaders, *New Vision*, 30 Nov 2010, online edition. Sanz Pascual (2009: 116) puts the number of amnestied ADF reporters between 2000 and 2008 at 1,793, Romkema (2007: 71) at 1,976.

Stability of peace

Despite not winning a battle in over fifteen years, the ADF was still existent in 2012 and both the Ugandan and the Congolese governments continued to grapple with them (ICG 2012: 1). It appears that the ADF returned to Uganda due to oil that was discovered and exploited in Bundibugyo district in western Uganda. In March 2007, at least 45 ADF fighters were killed in a battle with the UPDF. From April until June 2007, nine ADF commanders were killed by the Ugandan army (McGregor 2007: 3). However, these clashes were sufficiently sporadic that the threshold of a new civil war (1,000 battle-related deaths) was not passed again [SAMEWAR=0; DATESAME=n.r.; ANYWAR=0; DATEANY=n.r.].³⁹ We count 121 months of peace until the end of 2012 [PEACMON1=121; PEACMON2=121].

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39 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=160®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa# (4 May 2015). Military confrontations between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Kampala continued throughout the post-war years. Even so, this violent conflict started in 1994 and lasted until the end of the investigation period.

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