

**WARID:** Tajikistan (UTO) 1992-1996  
**STARDATE:** 10 May 1992  
**ENDDATE:** 23 December 1996<sup>1</sup>  
Related cases: none  
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### **Conflict overview**

Tajikistan gained independence from the Soviet Union (SU) on 9 September 1991. At that time, the country was the poorest republic in the SU and structurally depended on Moscow. By 1991, the republic received 40% of its budget from the SU and maintained the largest inter-republic trade deficit. On 24 November 1991, Tajikistan held its first post-independence presidential elections. Rahmon Nabiev – a former first secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) and President of Tajikistan from 31 August to 6 October 1991 – defeated the joint opposition candidate Davlat Khudonazarov amidst accusations of fraud. Attempting to consolidate his power, Nabiev cracked down on the opposition both inside and outside the CPT in the wake of the elections. This triggered a series of large-scale demonstrations, both pro- and anti-government, in the capital Dushanbe. On 2 May 1992, President Nabiev formed a national guard under the command of crime-boss Sangak Safarov and armed his supporters. He distributed 1,800 automatic rifles to pro-government demonstrators who began attacking the opposition. By mid-May, the fighting had spread beyond the capital, marking the start of a five-year civil war that pitted the communist government<sup>2</sup> against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in their bid for power. The UTO was an alliance of diverse opposition parties, most importantly the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT). The UTO was led by IRP-chairman Said Abdullo Nuri.<sup>3</sup>

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1 According to official Tajik historiography, the war ended with the signing of the General Peace Accord on 27 July 1997. However, considering that the signature of the Moscow Agreement on 23 December 1996 had already put an end to the fighting, we regard this date as the end of the war.

2 During the 16th meeting of the Tajik Supreme Soviet from 16 November to 2 December 1992, Nabiev resigned and Emomali Rakhmonov (later Rakhmon, see footnote 4) was elected President of the country. He formed an exclusive government, banning all opposition parties and newspapers (Conciliation Resources 2001: 84).

3 For a conflict overview, see Akiner/Barnes 2001: 17, 20; Heathershaw 2009: 22–24; Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 278–279.

During a summit meeting in Moscow on 23 December 1996, President Nabiev's successor Emomali Rakhmon<sup>4</sup> and UTO-leader Nuri signed an agreement stipulating a cease-fire along with the installment, functions and powers of a Commission on National Reconciliation. This was followed by the signing of the comprehensive 'General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan' (GAT) in Moscow on 27 June 1997. Although the situation remained tense after 23 December 1996, there were no reports of any further large-scale fighting between the parties [**WARENDUC=1; WARENDOS=1**].<sup>5</sup> Thus, the war lasted for 55 months [**WARDUR=55**].

Best estimates provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) indicate 8,273 battle-related deaths between 1992 and 1996. Additionally, the UCDP records a further 96 fatalities in 1992 for the dyad under investigation from one-sided violence against civilians by government forces and the pro-government militia Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT); non-state conflict between the PFT and the UTO in 1992 resulted in another 482 deaths. Taken together, the UCDP estimates that 8,851 people were killed in the conflict [**FATALUC=9000**].<sup>6</sup> According to Conciliation Resources, approximately 50,000 people were killed from May to November 1992 alone (Akiner/Barnes 2001: 16; Conciliation Resources 2001: 84). Tunçer-Kilavuz (2011: 263) and the International Crisis Group (2001: i) claim that 60,000-100,000 people lost their lives during the entire war. We settle for a death toll of 80,000 [**FATALOS=80000**]. In 1991, Tajikistan's population was 5,418,000 [**PREWARPO=5400000**].<sup>7</sup> The war's intensity amounts to 0.17% to 1.48% of the pre-war population [**INTENSUC=0.17; INTENSOS=1.48**].

### **The military balance at the end of the war**

All warring factions in Tajikistan were dependent on outside assistance. This assistance was never enough to lead either side to a military victory [**VICTORY=0**].<sup>8</sup> The pro-government faction enjoyed the support of Russia and Central Asian countries. The UTO forces were assisted by the northern Afghan leaders and maintained safe havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, the UTO received financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, where several opposition politicians lived in exile; it reportedly may also have enjoyed support from militant Islamist factions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Akiner/Barnes 2001: 20–21).

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4 In 2007, Rakhmonov changed his name to Rahmon, dropping the Slavic suffix. He will be referred to as Rakhmon throughout this text.

5 UN Secretary-General 1997: 1-3.

6 [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=152&regionSelect=6-Central\\_and\\_Southern\\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=152&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#) (16 Jan 2015).

7 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/tjk?downloadformat=excel> (16 Jan 2015).

8 Iji 2010: 16; Olimov/Olimova 2001: 27.

According to Cunningham et al. (2009), the rebels at no point controlled any territory during wartime. The United Nations, on the other hand, report temporary UTO military control in certain areas. Ishiyama and Widmaier (2013: 542) ascertain that the rebels controlled certain areas in the Karategin Valley using data on rebel activity and the location of small arms caches. However, there is no indication that the rebels attempted to build lasting state-like structures or that they were able to hold territory for a long time [**REBTERR= -1**]. As the rebels did not control any territory, the territorial advantage of one side by the end of the war is irrelevant [**MORETERR=n.r.**].

Cunningham et al. (2009) rate the UTO's fighting capacity as 'low' [**REBFIGHT= -1**]. Considering that intense fighting between the government and the opposition continued until December 1996 (UN Secretary-General 1997: 2–3), both parties were able to continue fighting in more than a sporadic manner [**CONFIGHT=0**].

President Nabiev was intercepted by the opposition at Dushanbe airport on 7 September 1992 and forced to resign. He was quickly succeeded by Emomali Rakhmon, a CPT official from the Kulyab region. Neither presidents Nabiev or Rakhmon, nor Said Abdullo Nuri – the political leader of the UTO – were killed or captured during the war [**LEADER=0**].

All in all, the military balance at the end of the war indicates an advantage for the government [**WARBAL= -0.4**].

### **The military balance in the post-war period**

The Military Protocol of the GAT stipulated measures for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former UTO fighters. It called for their integration into the state's military, though they were to remain in separate units and quartered in separate barracks. Those found to be unfit were to return to civilian life (Protocol on Military Issues 1997: Para. 5, 6). As agreed on by the parties, a general amnesty was granted to all fighters; between July and November 1998, all UTO fighters in Afghanistan were relocated to Tajikistan. The UTO announced the closure of all its military training camps abroad at the end of 1998 (Abdullo 2001: 50; Protocol on Political Issues 1997: Para. 1). Disarmament took much longer than the envisaged two months; when the process was declared complete in August 1999, there were many indications that many fighters remained armed (Heathershaw 2009: 33-34). As early as September 1997, one unit of UTO fighters was deployed in Dushanbe as part of the state's armed forces (Abdullo 2001: 50). In August 1999, UTO leader Nuri announced that the UTO was no longer a military force: all fighters had officially been integrated into the national army, the forces of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the

Committee for the Guarding of State Borders, all representing Tajikistan's most experienced and effective military forces. Likewise, the Commission for National Reconciliation reported that 2,375 fighters had been assigned to regular military units by 1999, though they remained unpaid [**STATEFOR 1997-1998= -1, STATEFOR 1999-2001=0**].<sup>9</sup> As President Emomali Rakhmon consolidated his power, the opposition gradually became sidelined. While the International Crisis Group (2001: 2) stated that there were several thousand ex-UTO fighters in the army in March 2001, we lack specific information for the years 2002-2006. After the elections in November 2006, Minister for Emergency Situations Mirzo Ziyoev was the last opposition representative to leave his cabinet post, likely taking the roughly 2,000 ex-UTO troops that formed the ministry's paramilitary with him (Heathershaw 2009: 184; Markowitz 2013: 82). In 2008, Defense minister Sherali Kharulloyev stated that only seventeen or eighteen former UTO members remained under the ministry's jurisdiction (ICG 2009: 3). We can therefore conclude that, by 2007, the side governing at the beginning of war had regained exclusive control of Tajikistan's power apparatus. From 2002 to 2006, a gradual process of exclusion must have taken place. As we know that some UTO members remained in government and in the state's forces until 2006, we estimate that the UTO still participated in the army and paramilitary up to that year [**STATEFOR 2002-2006=0, STATEFOR 2007-2012= -1**].

The UTO formally dissolved in 1999/2000 with the suspension of the National Reconciliation Commission. Former UTO fighters were kept separate from other troops even while they were part of the state's military and police. "UTO formations donned police uniforms with little organizational change" (Markowitz 2013: 82). Additionally, due to a lack of financial resources, former UTO units were largely left to their own devices (Lynch 2001: 65). According to Driscoll (2012: 131), "[m]ost UTO field commanders were incorporated into state bureaucracies without even a token effort to disarm their militias" that they kept as bodyguards. For instance, in a 2008 interview, UTO veteran Akhmadov – then colonel in the Regional Directorate for the Fight against Organized Crime in Gharm – stated that his bodyguards were all ex-UTO commanders who could easily mobilize 50 to 60 fighters each in the case of a standoff with the government (ICG 2011: 3). We therefore conclude that both sides commanded separate forces throughout the post-war period [**SEPFORCE 1997-2012=0**].

We lack reliable information concerning troop strength and armaments. The IISS' 'The Military Balance' yearbooks (1996/97-2005/6) do not mention the UTO. Instead, they list an opposition movement called the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan (IMT), with an estimated

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9 Heathershaw 2009: 122; ICG 2001: 2; Lynch 2001: 62, UN Secretary-General 1999: 3.

strength of 5,000 troops until 2005. In the following years (IISS 2006-2013), the existence of such a movement was no longer reported.<sup>10</sup> Even if this IMT was actually the UTO, the data provided ignores the reintegration of fighters into the army in the first post-war years [**TROOPS 1997-2012=n.d.; ARMS 1997-2012=n.d.**].

In line with the GAT provisions, a power-sharing mechanism was applied in Tajikistan, granting the UTO participation in the government. Indeed, between 2000 and 2006, the UTO did part in governing the country. In our view, however, UTO's influence remained so weak that it did not imply effective control over territory [**TERRCON 1997-2006= -1; TERRWIN 1997-2006= -1**]. However, similar to the UTO's gradual exclusion from Tajikistan's army, the UTO was pushed out of the government again (for a detailed account, see below). By 2007 at the latest, there were no more UTO figures in the executive [**TERRCON 2007-2012= -1; TERRWIN 2007-2012= -1**].<sup>11</sup> Even during its years in government, the UTO must be considered more vulnerable [**VULNERAB 1997-2012= -1**].

In 1993, Russia initiated the formation of a 20,000 troop strong Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force, which was stationed in the country until June 2000 [**PEACEKEEP 1997-1999=0, PEACEKEEP 2000-2012=n.r.**].<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the unarmed UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) was present in Tajikistan after 1994.<sup>13</sup> It was replaced by the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding in 2000, which was finally terminated in July 2007 following heavy pressure from the Tajik Government (Heathershaw 2009: 35).

Russian president Yeltsin declared in 1993 that Tajikistan's southern border with Afghanistan was, "in effect, Russia's" (cited in Heathershaw 2001: 31), and rushed to sign an economic, political and military cooperation agreement. Russia thereafter maintained consistent political and financial support. During the war, Tajikistan came to be characterized as a protectorate and a garrison state (Heathershaw 2009: 31). About 25,000 Russian soldiers, mostly ethnic Tajiks, patrolled the country's border with Afghanistan until 2004. Moreover, some 12,000 troops from Russia's 201<sup>st</sup> Division were officially stationed in Qurghonteppa, Kulyab and

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10 Most observers consider the very existence of such an IMT to be fabricated by the government in order to fit into the international donor agenda on security.

11 The International Crisis Group (2009: 1) reports that Rakhmon was barely able to control his own territory. Indeed, the government's control of Gharm and the Karategin Valley in central Tajikistan has to be characterized as weak throughout the investigation period (ICG 2009: 6). These areas are controlled by renegade commanders who did not accept the 1997 peace deal and were plagued by the activities of armed bands (ICG 2001: i-ii). However, these commanders, having distanced themselves from the warring parties, are no longer seen as belonging to either faction. The fact that governmental control does not cover the whole Tajik territory is thus irrelevant for the present investigation.

12 Fortna 2008; Heathershaw 2009: 31.

13 <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/Unmot.htm> (12 Mar 2015).

Dushanbe (Heathershaw 2009: 127; ICG 2001: 28–29).<sup>14</sup> This presence declined to 5,000 troops in 2012 (IISS 2013) and a new agreement approved the presence of the 201<sup>st</sup> divisions in Tajikistan until 2042. Still, the Tajik regime’s dependence on Russia has recently decreased to an extent, as China moved in as a main source of financial support. China provided loans worth 605 million USD, exceeding the total volume of all other official development assistance (Heathershaw 2009: 38). As Russian troops remained present in the country, President Rakhmon could likely count on Russian support in the case of a renewed civil war. Whether China would provide such a guarantee, however, seemed highly doubtful [**P5ALLY 1997-2012= -1**].

All in all, the post-war military balance shows an advantage for the side governing at the beginning of the war. It was more balanced in the years that UTO was included in the government and in the state’s forces; otherwise, President Rakhmon’s dominance was nearly uncontested [**POSTBAL 1997-1998= -0.71, POSTBAL 1999= -0.57, POSTBAL 2000-2006= -0.67, POSTBAL 2007-2012= -0.83**].

This trend can also be seen in the overall military balance [**BALANCE 1997-1998= -0.56, BALANCE 1999= -0.49, BALANCE 2000-2006=-0.53, BALANCE 2007-2012= -0.62**].

## Economy

Even after the civil war ended, Tajikistan’s GDP proved volatile until 2000, when it started to steadily rise. However, Tajikistan continued to suffer from serious economic problems due to the country’s reliance on migrant worker remittances, over-consumption and under-investment (Heathershaw 2009: 36).

Table 1: The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Tajikistan in current USD<sup>15</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1997	5,937,177	155
1998	6,012,933	220
1999	6,094,661	178
2000	6,186,152	139
2001	6,289,340	172
2002	6,404,118	191
2003	6,529,609	238
2004	6,663,929	312
2005	6,805,655	340
2006	6,954,522	407
2007	7,111,025	523
2008	7,275,252	709

14 As our reviewer pointed out, the real number of soldiers might have been considerably less, as the outfit was reported to be severely understaffed.

15 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/tjk?downloadformat=excel> (16 Jan 2015).

2009	7,447,396	669
2010	7,627,326	740
2011	7,814,850	835
2012	8,008,990	953

### **The scale of compromise after the war**

Apart from the DDR provisions in the Military Protocol, the GAT included a Protocol on Refugees – designed to enable the return of those who had fled to Afghanistan – and a Political Protocol (Heathershaw 2009: 33). The Political Protocol provided for power-sharing mechanisms in local and national governments with a 70:30 ratio. Furthermore, it established the joint Central Elections Commission and promised lifting all restrictions that had been imposed on opposition parties once disarmament was completed (Protocol on Political Issues 1997: Para. 3). The implementation of the GAT provisions was to be coordinated and supervised by a Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR), to be jointly set up by the two parties and chaired by UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri. The CNR was to remain in office during the transition period, initially fixed to 12-18 months, and disbanded once the newly elected parliament was constituted through nationwide elections (Heathershaw 2009: 33; Moscow Meeting Agreement 1996). A great deal of progress was made concerning the return of refugees from Afghanistan. Tens of thousands were repatriated with the assistance of the UN and Russian forces. On all other fronts however, implementation was slow and patchy (Heathershaw 2009: 33–34). Implementing power-sharing and agreeing on government posts proved to be difficult. Finally, the UTO was allocated thirteen ministries and state committees, among them the Deputy Prime Minister, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. At the lower levels, however, the 30% share was not always kept (ICG 2001: 3, 6). Nevertheless, we concluded that executive power was shared between the parties during the transition period, though somewhat unequally [**GOVERN 1997= -1, GOVERN 1998-1999=0**]. After winning the fraudulent presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1999 and February 2000, Rakhmon increasingly displayed authoritarian tendencies, recruiting most government officials from his own Kulyab region (Freedom House 2014; Heathershaw 2009: 19; ICG 2001: i). “Most UTO representatives brought into government experienced pressure to adopt the government’s views if they wished to retain their appointments” (Zoir/Newton 2001: 59). The UTO and other opposition parties were increasingly marginalized and lost their influence (Heathershaw 2009: 34). Around 2003-2004, the political space for the opposition shrank even further while independent media and parties were closed down or denied registration (Heathershaw 2009: 36). Following the 2006 presidential elections, the last former opposition figure in the cabinet, Mirzo

Ziyoev, was removed from his post as Minister of Emergency Situations (Heathershaw 2009: 184). We can thus conclude that, after 6 November 2006, the former rebels were no longer present in executive structures [**GOVERN 2000-2006=0, GOVERN 2007-2012= -1**].

According to the constitution, parliamentary decisions are made by a majority vote. The constitution does not provide the opposition with veto rights. Due to the fact that the parliament is dominated by Rakhmon's party, majority voting is in favor of the president (BTI 2014: 9f). Additionally, the opposition was only granted 30% of government posts by the peace agreement, thus underlining the president side's superior position in decision making. We code the side governing as having exclusive decision-making powers at the beginning of the war [**VE-TO 1997-2012= -1; VETOSAT 1997-2012=n.r.**].

Upon disbandment of the UTO forces, the ban on opposition parties was lifted. To this effect, Article 28 of the Constitution of Tajikistan was amended in 1999 and stipulated the right of citizens "to participate in the creation of political parties, including parties of democratic, religious and atheistic character". However, the post-war presidential and parliamentary elections in 1999/2000 and 2006 were all severely flawed, with numerous reports of rigging and fraud (Freedom House 2014; Heathershaw 2009: 19). Rakhmon and his People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) won all elections without fail and secured improbable majorities. Additionally, the new election law, passed on 10 December 1999, conferred several strategic and tactical advantages to the governing authorities, thus hampering genuine multi-party competition. Several parties that had not been part of the UTO were denied registration by the Ministry of Justice [**ELECT 1997-2012= -1**].<sup>16</sup>

Although the war cannot be characterized as regional at the outset, it became increasingly regionalized as it wore on, forcing people to side with their region's affiliation. At the same time, militias targeted people on the basis of their regional identity (Tunçer-Kilavuz 2011: 269–270). Despite their strong regional bases, the warring parties in Tajikistan did not strive for secession or autonomy.<sup>17</sup> Instead, they contested the control of the state and its resources as well as the principles upon which the newly independent state should be based: secular or Islamic, authoritarian or democratic [**EXBORDER 1997-2012=n.r.; INBORDER 1997-2012=n.r.; COMPETEN 1997-2012=n.r.**].

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16 Heathershaw 2009:88, 186; Zoir/Newton 2001: 59.

17 Among the amendments to the national constitution that the Tajik parliament passed on 30 June 1999, the creation of an upper house to the parliament to represent the regions (Art. 48) stood out. The institution of the upper house might be considered a semi-federal compromise, however, the new chamber was not granted legislative powers, mainly serving the function of appointing the judiciary. Three quarters of the upper house are elected indirectly while the remaining quarter is appointed by the president (Art. 49). Additionally, the upper house only convenes on the president's request, thus stressing its dependence on the executive (Zoir/Newton 2001: 57–58).



Politics is a highly regionalized affair in Tajikistan, with elites from Kulyab and, to a lesser extent, Sughd (formally Leninabad) dominating the country. The UTO mainly mustered its following from the Gharm region and the Pamiris. Including the UTO into the government therefore also implied including a broader share of the Tajik regions. Apart from this, no other laws or programs were devised to support and promote people from the neglected parts of the country. As the UTO's mere integration into the government has already been coded under GOVERN, it will not be considered here. No further compromises on this issue can be identified [SPECPRO 1997-2012=n.r.].<sup>18</sup>

Ideological factors – especially Communism and Islam – acted as legitimizing and mobilizing factors for different groups (Roy 1993: 11). Despite the name of the governing party – the Communist Party of Tajikistan – the party changed its program in 1992. Ever since, it has strongly advocated secularism instead of Marxism-Leninism, though the latter continued to figure prominently in its charter (Akiner 2001: 41). The CPT mainly represented the interests of former powerful ‘apparatchiks’ who wanted to maintain their beneficial political and economic positions (Akiner/Barnes 2001: 17; Swanström et al 2005: 7). Thus, they did not support changes in the economic order (Roy 1993: 2). Although Communism, as such, was an irrelevant factor, the opposition fought for economic reforms towards a market economy (Iji 2010: 3; Tuncer-Kilavuz 2011: 264). After the war, legal and institutional frameworks for a market economy were formally created, though rules regulating competitiveness were largely ignored. Additionally, the government and its close supporters were the main monopolists, controlling most important companies that provide them with rents.<sup>19</sup> Besides these failed changes, economic agreements were neither part of the negotiations nor included into the General Agreement. Thus, no compromise regarding the economic order can be identified [ECONOMY 1997-2012= -1].

Religion was another important feature in the Tajik civil war. The government fought for a secular state (Iji 2010: 3); the IRP, the leading opposition party, on the other hand, strove for the inclusion of religion into politics (Iji 2010: 3; Roy 1993: 21; Tuncer-Kilavuz 264). Nonetheless, in order to achieve a stronger opposition force, the IRP's political practices were rather moderate (Akiner 2001: 53). The IRP never openly fought for the implementation of an Islamic state (Roy 1993: 21-22). After the civil war, the conflict parties debated over the inclusion of religion into the constitution. The opposition demanded the exclusion of the term ‘secular state’. At first glance, the negotiation between the former conflict factions resulted in

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18 Akiner/Barnes 2001: 17.

19 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/tajikistan#.UwxcH4V6R-w> (24 Feb 2014); BTI 2014: 3, 17f.; ICG 2009: 14; Swanström et al. 2005, 26.

a compromise: Article 100 that mentions secularism as one of the fundamentals of the state was included in the constitution. Reciprocally, Article 28 was changed to legalize religious parties. The IRP was legalized in 1999 (Asadullaev 2001: 25). Since the end of the civil war, there were, however, increasing restrictions regarding freedom of religion in order to control possible opposition forces. Religious politicians were eliminated while repressive laws on religious expression and education were introduced.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, even though the legalization of IRP was a compromise at the time, it was turned back by the imposition of restrictive laws upon religious life [**ISSUE 1997-1998= -1, ISSUE 1999-2006= 0, ISSUE 2007-2012= -1**].

The warring parties did not fight over other central issues [**ISSUE2 1997-2012=n.r.**].

Even after the end of the civil war, Tajikistan remained bedeviled by the activities of warlords and armed groups that had once been part of the government or UTO forces but continued to act independently. Prominent among them were Mullo Abdullo, Rahmon Sanginov (both killed in 2011) and Makhmud Khudoberdiyev with their respective forces (UN Secretary General 1997: 4). These commanders reneged on the peace agreement and were thus not considered part of the UTO or the side governing at the beginning of the war [**NEWCON 1997-2012=n.r.; NEWCON2 1997-2012=n.r.**]. Apart from the power-sharing arrangements in the GAT, the only compromise that could be identified between the warring parties was the legalization of religious parties. This compromise was, however, always in favor of the side governing at the beginning of war as it disposed of ample means to control the opposition and the exercise of religion [**BENEFIT 1997-1998=n.r.; BENEFIT 1999-2006= -1; BENEFIT 2007-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 1997-2012=n.r.**].

In sum, the scale of compromise clearly shows the predominance of the side governing at the beginning of war. During the UTO's years in government, the scale of compromise was slightly more equitable but the dominance of President Rakhmon became absolute as soon as all UTO members had been eliminated from the executive [**COMPROM 1997= -1, COMPROM 1998= -0.8, COMPROM 1999-2006= -0.67, COMPROM 2007-2012= -1**].

### **Stability of peace**

In addition to renegade warlords, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) repeatedly engaged in clashes with Tajik security forces after 2006.<sup>21</sup> However, neither of these confronta-

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20 <http://www.hrw.org/europecentral-asia/tajikistan> (7 March 2014); BTI 2014: 7; Human Rights Watch Country Report Tajikistan 1997-2013, Zainiddinov 2013: 467-477.

21 [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=152&regionSelect=6-Central\\_and\\_Southern\\_Asia#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=152&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#) (9 Mar 2015).

tions reached the threshold of a new civil war, set at 1,000 deaths [**SAMEWAR=0; DATESAME=n.r.; ANYWAR=0; DATEANY=n.r.**]. The country has thus been at peace for 192 months at the end of 2012 [**PEACMON1=192; PEACMON2=192**].

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