

**WARID:** Sri Lanka (LTTE) 1983-2001  
**STARDATE:** 21 June 1983<sup>1</sup>  
**ENDDATE:** 24 December 2001<sup>2</sup>  
Related cases: Sri Lanka (LTTE) 2005-2009  
Sri Lanka (JVP) 1989-1990  
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### **Conflict overview**

The civil war that broke out in Sri Lanka in 1983 was a secessionist conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Sri Lanka is characterized by its different ethnicities, the majority of the population being Sinhalese and the largest minority Tamils.<sup>3</sup> While the Government of Sri Lanka has always been dominated by Sinhalese, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed to be the sole representative of Tamil interests during the period of civil war.<sup>4</sup>

The country's transition from colonialism to democracy in 1948 took place on the basis of a constitution that lacked sufficient protection of minority rights. Gradually, different governments introduced measures that heightened discrimination, including the introduction of Sinhala as official language, the repatriation of Indian Tamils, the supremacy of Buddhism in the constitution, and an attempt to drive Tamils out of state employment and education (Weiberg 2003: 9; ICG 12: 3). As a consequence of the political and cultural exclusion, the Tamil population increasingly demanded autonomy of the mainly Tamil inhabited northern and eastern districts. In the early 1970s, the democratic party, Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), called for secession for the first time and for the establishment of the state of Tamil Eelam (Rotberg1999: 7).<sup>5</sup> However, the conflict intensity surpassed the bounds of democratic discourse. A radicalization of Tamil student organizations entailed the creation of guerrilla groups, the most effective being the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by

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1 Diverging from UCDP Data, the 1983 massacre against the Tamil population in Sri Lanka is considered as the beginning of the civil war. Case-specific literature indicates 300 to 3,000 Tamil victims (Samarasinghe 1984: 253; Sriskandarajah 2005: 493; Weiberg-Salzmann 2011: 74).

2 On 24 December 2001, the LTTE announced a unilateral ceasefire which led to the cessation of hostilities and the ceasefire agreement on 22 February 2002. For more information: Shastri Amita 2002: 182.

3 In 1981, the Sri Lankan Department of Census and Statistics indicates 73.9% of Sinhalese, 12.7% of Sri Lankan Tamils, 5.5% of Indian Tamils and 7.1% of Moors (CBSL 2013: 20).

4 ICG 2012: 7.

Velupillai Prabhakaran. In 1983, LTTE rebels killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers, an incident that triggered country-wide persecutions against the Tamil population, which were tolerated, if not supported, by the Government of Sri Lanka (Destradi 2009: 2; Rösel 1997: 173; Weiberg-Salzmann 2011:74). From these events onwards, the LTTE could rely on strong aid from the Tamil population and on important financial support from the Tamil diaspora (Sriskandarajah 2005: 492). Moreover, the LTTE received particular support from Indian Tamils in the state Tamil Nadu, which installed training camps and supplied the organization with a wide range of weapons (Rösel 1997: 136, Sriskandarajah 2005: 493).

From 1999 on, the LTTE was able to engage in conventional battle and successfully occupied major strategic military bases as well as the sole international airport in the country (Smith 2011: 76; Liyanage 2011: 26).<sup>6</sup>

However, a ceasefire agreement (CFA), supervised by Norway, could be reached on 22 February 2002 (CFA 2002: 1; ICG 2006: 8). This was mainly due to the LTTE losing international support after 11 September 2001 as several countries qualified it as terrorist group. The government needed to recover from major military setbacks and enforce the weakening economy (ICG 2006: 5; Moorcraft 2012: 38). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) equates the end of the war to the ceasefire with regulation of further military issues [WARENDUC=2]. Article 1 of the CFA stipulated the total cessation of military action between the LTTE and the GoSL. Furthermore, it defined the territorial separation of the armed forces and their movements. Case-specific literature confirms the ceasefire with regulation of further military issues [WARENDOS=2].<sup>7</sup>

For the 222 months of war [WARDUR=222], UCDP's best estimates indicate a death toll of 38,000 civilian and battle-related deaths [FATALUC= 41000].<sup>8</sup>

Data is difficult to assess as numbers often include the period after 2001. However, case-specific literature insinuates much higher fatality figures with estimates ranging from 60,000 to 90,000.<sup>9</sup> Most estimates tend towards the figure 70,000. This amount is also basically confirmed by the International Crises Group, with 70,000 as the minimum estimation of casualties [FATALOS=70000].<sup>10</sup>

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6 The attack on Colombo Airport, however, only lasted about one day.

7 Rupesinghe 2006: 42.

8 Following UCDP data, for the section 'one-sided' by the GoSL we counted the years from 1990 onwards. The death toll in 1989 was entirely attributed to the JVP insurrection.

9 Nadarajah 2005: 89; Seybolt 2002: 50; Sriskandarajah 2005: 49.

10 See ICG 2006: 3.

Due to the demand for secession, only the territory claimed by the LTTE will be considered as disputed territory.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, according to the Sri Lankan Census of Population and Housing, the pre-war population in the concerned districts was 2.1 million **[PREWARPO=2100000]**.<sup>12</sup>

Relying on the data provided by UCDP, the conflict caused the death of 1.95% of the population **[INTENSUC=1.95]**, whereas the estimates by case-specific literature lead to proportion of 3.33% **[INTENSOS=3.33]**.

### **The military balance at the end of the war**

By 2002, the LTTE was in control of large parts of the territory claimed for Tamil Eelam. Even if the GoSL had far more capacities, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) was not in the position to regain and to hold ground it had lost in both the north and the east concurrently (Weiberg-Salzman 2011: 98). Therefore, LTTE conquests led to a military deadlock. This situation, along with the economic crises and favorable international conditions, generated a ceasefire agreement. Thus, none of the former warring parties may be considered the military victor **[VICTORY=0]**.<sup>13</sup>

During wartime, the LTTE gained territory and created public structures that went beyond simple military control. The LTTE controlled police forces, created a proper legal system and a proper public administration (Mampilly 2011: 49). These institutions remained intact during the post-war period, as the CFA was grounded on mutual respect for the acquired territory. As such, the LTTE constituted the de facto administration in the acquired territories **[REBTERR=1]**.<sup>14</sup>

At the time of the CFA, the LTTE controlled significant parts of the disputed territory. Areas in eastern Sri Lanka were partially influenced by the GoSL. Furthermore, the area around Jaffna was not under control of the LTTE and the western parts of the territory claimed by Tamil Eelam were under the control of the GoSL (Stokke 2006: 4). Some public services were provided by the GoSL, while the LTTE established its proper administration apparatus (Mampilly 2011: 49). This interplay of former warring parties makes it difficult to define

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11 The Tamil claims go back to the medieval Tamil-speaking Jaffna Kingdom. However, there is no evidence as to how large the territory was. (ICG 2012: 10) Therefore, the northern and eastern provinces were claimed in their entirety. The following districts have been counted: Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mullaittivo, Vavuniya, Mannar, Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee.

12 See: Sri Lankan Census of Population and Housing 2006: 3.

13 Stokke 2006: 1022; Weiberg-Salzman 2011: 98.

14 BTI 2008: 5; CFA 2002: 2; Gerharz 2009: 39; Stokke 2006: 2; Cunningham et al. 2009 defines the periods of civil war in Sri Lanka differently (1984-1991; 1991- 2009) whereas this analysis adheres to the UCDP data (1984-2001 and 2005-2009). However, Cunningham et al. 2009 indicate that the rebels did control territory in the two given periods (terrcont: 'yes').

which party effectively controlled more of the disputed territory. Sarvananthan indicates that the LTTE administration effectively controlled 44% of the disputed territory whereas Nadarajah estimates 70% (Nadarajah 2005: 89; Saravananthan 2007: 1185).<sup>15</sup> However, the fact that the Sri Lankan census by the GoSL in 2001 – estimated for almost all of the north-eastern districts – indicates that the LTTE controlled more of the disputed territory **[MORETERR=1]**.<sup>16</sup>

Cunningham et al. (2009) assess the rebels to have had a ‘low’ relative fighting capacity. However, this applies to the year 1991. By 2001, the LTTE engaged in both guerilla tactics and conventional battle and possessed armed forces with naval capacities and heavy artillery (Eichorst 2003: 2; Liyanage 2011: 26; Smith 2011: 76; UNHCR 2002: 4). The military success of the LTTE against the GoSL proved that the LTTE was extraordinarily equipped for an insurgency group (Liyanage 2011: 26; Smith 2011: 76). In 2000, about 5,000 rebels victoriously engaged in a battle against about 35,000 SLA soldiers. Due to its superior tactics, the LTTE was in a realistic position to conquer Jaffna. (Taylor 2002: 41). Its efficient tactics enabled the organization to be militarily on par with the SLA, which clearly outnumbered the LTTE **[REBFIGHT=0]**.<sup>17</sup>

As such, both parties were in a situation to continue the war. However, the LTTE needed the assistance of the Tamil diaspora. This became difficult after 11 September 2001, as the LTTE was considered a terrorist organization in several counties that started to take action against its networks (Destradi 2009:4). Furthermore, trade embargoes worsened the prospects for the LTTE. However, the GoSL was under pressure as well. The SLA had fought ineffectively and was therefore demoralized (Hashim 2013: 132). Moreover, the country’s economy was in a poor state with constant military expenditure threatening financial stability (ICG 2006:5). Consequently, both warring parties were exhausted from years of civil war, which allowed for a ceasefire agreement to be reached **[CONFIGHT=0]**.

In 1991, the LTTE killed Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian prime minister in charge of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Moreover, Sri Lankan President Premadasawas killed by a Tamil suicide bomber in 1993. Both attacks were not in direct relation to the CFA in 2002 **[LEADER=0]**.<sup>18</sup>

In sum, the military balance at the end of war was in favor of the LTTE **[WARBAL=0.33]**.

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15 See divergence: Mampilly 2011: 108; Moorcraft 2012: Map 4.

16 See: <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/PDF/Population/p9p1%20Growth.pdf> (29 Jul 2014).

17 Taylor 2002: 31.

18 ICG 2006: 7.

## The post-war military balance

By mid-1983, the Tamils constituted less than 5% of all personnel within the military.<sup>19</sup> The reasons for this were that military training was suddenly restricted to English and Sinhala along with growing ethnic tensions that culminated in the use of military force against the Tamil population. Data from 2000 shows that the Sri Lankan army had an ethnically Sinhalese participation rate of 95%-98% (De Silva 2001: 18). The CFA stated that the two parties retained their positions, which meant that no integration took place. Only Tamil paramilitary were to be disarmed and offered integration in the armed force of the GoSL (CFA 2002: 2). However, there is no evidence of Tamils serving in the SLA in the period 2002-2005.<sup>20</sup> A sole possible exception may be LTTE combatants that defected with LTTE Colonel Karuna in 2004 and associated with the SLA for the 'Liberation of the East'. However, this was scarcely proven and rejected by the GoSL [**STATEFOR 2002-2005= -1**].<sup>21</sup>

As such, the Sri Lankan army can clearly be deemed as a separate armed force at the disposal of the party fighting against the LTTE. Furthermore, the civil war led to the establishment of special taskforces and militias along with extra-constitutional armies controlled by Sinhalese politicians (BTI 2003: 4). The LTTE combatants and police forces may also be considered a separate force. Both the GoSL and the LTTE commanded ground units, naval units and even air forces [**SEPFORCE 2002-2005=0**].<sup>22</sup>

During the entire post-war period, the SLA largely outnumbered the LTTE in troops. The relative numbers of active military personnel saw insignificant changes through 2004. In 2005, the LTTE recruited increasingly more soldiers whereas the GoSL lost in military strength [**TROOPS 2002-2004=0, TROOPS 2005=1**].<sup>23</sup> There is no precise data about the possession of relevant arms by the LTTE in the IISS 'Military Balance' yearbooks for a comparison in the ratio of battle tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery between the conflict parties for the post-war period [**ARMS 2002-2005=n.d.**].

The ceasefire agreement de facto recognized that the LTTE controlled large parts of the disputed territory; the military might of the LTTE was likewise recognized (Ropers 2011: 155). However, the GoSL remained present in the city of Jaffna, which was seen to be the capital of Tamil Eelam. Furthermore, the strategically important eastern city of Trincomalee was con-

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19 <http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/1ktoc.html> (3 Mar 2014).

20 Anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary forces that the LTTE requested be disarmed or integrated in the Sri Lankan army had been allies of the government before. They were more effective in the fight for the LTTE by staying outside of the state forces.

21 Sanchez-Meertens 2013: 141.

22 Radtke 2009: 104. The LTTE air force, however, consisted of a few light planes with small firepower.

23 See IISS Military Balance 2001-2005, see Annex. There is no evidence that the yearbooks take into account the defection of Colonel Karuna who was followed by at least 2000 LTTE fighters. Sanchez-Meertens (2013: 111-113) proposes a defection rate of about 40% of the entire LTTE army.

trolled by the Sri Lankan army. A large military complex was still in the hands of the GoSL and the best natural seaport in South Asia allowed troop and supply connections to encircle Jaffna (Hashim 2013: 133). The LTTE controlled mainly areas covered by jungle and rural parts of the eastern territories, whereas the GoSL often controlled populated areas (Sarvananthan 2007: 1186). Apart from the obscure situation in the northern and eastern districts, the GoSL unquestionably controlled the remaining seven districts of the island. Therefore, the GoSL was largely in control of the important territory [**TERRCON 2002-2005=0**].<sup>24</sup> During the post-war period, and due to the cease-fire agreement, neither party gained additional territorial control or possession – neither was driven out of certain territories or gave up on these due to concessions or an inability to hold these districts economically, militarily or politically (Nadarajah/Vimalarajah 2008: 25). However, in 2004, the eastern wing of the LTTE broke away under Vinayagamorthy Muralitharan (Colonel Karuna) and allied with the GoSL. The GoSL could probably have re-established control over the eastern districts; the CFA held and the northern wing of the LTTE took over the territory. Even if complete control could not be established – with inner tensions and power struggles leading to further destabilization of the east –, this situation cannot be regarded as a territorial gain for the GoSL but rather as an destabilization of the LTTE's [**TERRWIN 2002-2005=0**].<sup>25</sup>

None of the formerly warring parties may be regarded as strategically less vulnerable in the period from 2002 to 2004. The GoSL had an economic advantage and it controlled the city of Jaffna in the north, the LTTE's former stronghold, as well as all western and southern provinces. The LTTE therefore found itself surrounded by the enemy. However, it was in control of large areas in north and east Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it controlled the Elephant Pass, a narrow corridor which connected the Sri Lankan peninsula to Jaffna. This explicitly limited the army's mobility and supply lines (Bandarage 2009: 167; Weiberg-Salzman 2011: 98). This situation changed in 2004, when the eastern wing of the LTTE defected under the lead of Colonel Karuna. The LTTE, led by Prabhakaran, now faced attacks from Karuna's troops in the east, and intense battles were witnessed within the organization [**VULNERAB 2002-2003=0, VULNERAB 2004-2005= -1**].<sup>26</sup>

Since 1989, there were no armed peacekeeping missions in Sri Lanka after the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force) left the country as a result of unanticipated heavy military involvement in the conflict (Destradi 2009: 3; IISS 2002-2005). The CFA of 2001 led to the establishment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), supervised by Norway. However, as opposed

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24 Sarvananthan 2007: 3.

25 ICG 2006: 9; Weiberg-Salzman 2011: 125-126.

26 Hashim 2013: 133-134; Mampilly 2011: 123; Sarvananthan 2007: 11.

to the IPKF in 1987, the SLMM was not allowed to carry arms or weapons [PEACKEEP 2002-2005=n.r.].<sup>27</sup> None of the permanent members of the UN Security Council would have intervened in the case of a renewed armed conflict [P5ALLY 2002-2005=n.r.]

All in all, the post-war military balance favored the GoSL [POSTBAL 2002-2003= -0.17, POSTBAL 2004= -0.33, POSTBAL 2005= -0.17].

As a combined value of WARBAL and POSTBAL, the total military BALANCE in Sri Lanka indicates a slightly more favorable situation for the LTTE [BALANCE 2002-2003=0.08; BALANCE 2004=0, BALANCE 2005=0.08].

## Economy

Sri Lanka's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita constantly increased until 2005.

Table 1: GDP per capita in Sri Lanka in current USD<sup>28</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
2002	18,921,000	904
2003	19,173,000	985
2004	19,435,000	1063
2005	19,644,000	1242

## The scale of compromise after the war

It is quite difficult to assess which of the warring parties participated in the government within the formerly disputed territory. As the territory did not fall entirely into the hands of the LTTE, the GoSL differentiated between 'cleared areas' under control of the GoSL and 'uncleared areas' dominated by the rebels (Mampilly 2011: 170). The LTTE could rely on structures built during wartime in these areas. This included a central governing committee with a political branch, a political secretariat and several ministries. Furthermore, the LTTE also had influence over the GoSL, as the assignment of the district-level supervisors, for instance, was only possible with its approval (Mampilly 2011: 112). However, areas such as health and education continued to be provided by the GoSL and national elections were also held. The national government was always dominated by Sinhalese parties (Mampilly 2011: 112).<sup>29</sup> This situation lasted for the entire post-war period; divergent conceptions of an interim administration for the north and east prevented the establishment of a clear political structure [GOVERN 2002-2005=0].

27 SOMA 2001: 4.

28 <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/sp.pop.totl?downloadformat=excel>, (23 Jun 2014)

29 <http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pastElection.html> (23 Jun 2014).

As such, both sides shared power but a veto right did not exist, especially as there were neither joint decision-making processes nor a dual state structure in the disputed territory [**VETO 2002-2005=n.r.; VETOSAT 2002-2005=n.r.**].

In the territory occupied by the LTTE, only Tamil parties affiliated with the LTTE could run for election unimpeded. Other Tamil parties such as the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) also formally ran for election but the LTTE systematically hindered the election process of these parties (Weiberg-Salzmann 2011: 111). However, during negotiations in 2003, the LTTE held out on the prospect that other political parties would run for election in future campaigns (Weiberg 2003: 48). On the national level, the elections may be considered as basically free and fair.<sup>30</sup> Parliamentary elections took place in 2004, presidential elections in 2005.<sup>31</sup> The LTTE was indirectly represented by the National Tamil Alliance which was founded in 2001 on pressure from the LTTE. Its objective was the political quest for creating Tamil Eelam (ICG 2012: 6). In 2004, the TNA gained 22 seats in the north and east and was henceforth the third-largest faction in parliament [**ELECT 2002-2005=0**].<sup>32</sup>

For the entire war period, the LTTE demanded a separate Tamil state (Rotberg 2006: 7; Weiberg 2003: 24). However, at the end of war and in the post-war period, the state of Tamil Eelam did not come to exist. The LTTE had been able to occupy large areas of the requested territory. However, the GoSL maintained important influence in those territories and governmental control in important areas including Jaffna, the supposed capital of a separate Tamil state (Gerharz 2009: 38; Stokke 2006: 4; Uyangoda 2011: 31). In 2002, the LTTE agreed to discuss on a federal solution in the peace process in the Oslo Communiqué [**EXBORDER 2002-2005= -1; INBORDER 2002-2005=n.r.**].<sup>33</sup>

The LTTE withdrew from peace negotiations in 2003, stating that only government-controlled areas would profit from economic recovery.<sup>34</sup> However, the LTTE presented a proposal for an interim administrative structure, the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). The proposal respected the unity of the island but granted wide-reaching autonomy to the north and east territories (Goodhand/Korf 2011: 6). New elections that favored the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) worsened the stagnation of the peace process that had begun before (Becker 2004: 1-3). Thus, no solution for the allocation of competences could be found; competences

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30 In the period 2002-2005, Freedom House assesses political rights in Sri Lanka with a '3'. See Freedom House 2014: Freedom in the World Territory Rankings 1972-2013.

31 Data about elections in Sri Lanka at: <http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pastElection.html> (23 Jun 2014).

32 Data about elections in Sri Lanka at: <http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pastElection.html> (23 Jun 2014).

33 Höglund/Svensson 2002: 104.

34 Prior to that, international actors had insisted on LTTE's demilitarization and the USA had excluded the rebels from the donor conference.



remained, at least officially, with the GoSL [**COMPETEN 2002-2005= -1; ECONOMY 2002-2005=n.r.**].

In the interwar period, there was no improvement to the unequal guaranty of political and civil rights that had evoked the conflict (Nadarajah/Vimalarajah 2008: 16). The LTTE demanded that the government no longer discriminate against the Tamil minority in many political, cultural and social aspects (Nadarajah/Vimalarajah 2008: 17, 21, 30f). None of these demands were met by the government. The Tamil language was not implemented as an ‘official language’ of the Sri Lankan State – though it was added to the constitution via the thirteenth amendment (Art. 18.2)<sup>35</sup> – this situation still prevents Tamils from holding certain offices and from participating in society in general [**SPECPRO 2002-2005= -1; ISSUE 2002-2005=n.r.; ISSUE2 2002-2005=n.r.; NEWCON 2002-2005=n.r.; NEWCON2 2002-2005=n.r.**].

There is no evidence of any implemented compromises, as none of the parties made concessions [**BENEFIT 2002-2005=n.r.; BENEFIT2 2002-2005=n.r.**].

As there was no improvement in the discriminatory situation of the Tamil population, and secession was far from being reached, the post-war order clearly favored the GoSL [**COMPROM 2002-2005= -0.6**].

### **Stability of Peace**

The situation in Sri Lanka remained tense during the entire post-war period. A peace agreement could not be reached meaning that no satisfactory compromises could be negotiated. Thus, the CFA agreement successively became less relevant. As a consequence, the country fell back into a civil war that lasted from 2005 until 2009. [**SAMEWAR 2002-2005=1; DATESAME=2 Dec 2005; ANYWAR 2002-2005=1; DATEANY=2 Dec 2005**]. Sri Lanka witnessed a period of 47 month of relative peace. [**PEACMON1=47; PEACMON2=47**].

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35 [http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter\\_04\\_Amd.html](http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_04_Amd.html) (12 Mar 2014).

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**Annex:**

Table 2: Troops in post-war Sri Lanka (IISS 2001-2005):

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	
2001	SLA: 118-123000 Paramilitary: 88600 Police force: 60600 (reservists: 30400, 100 women, special task force, anti-guerilla unit: 3000) National Guard: 15000 Home Guards: 13000  SLA+Paramilitary without reservists: 148200	6000	24.7	1
2002	SLA: 157900 Paramilitary: 88600 Police Force: 60600 (reservists: 30400, 100 women, special task force, anti-guerilla unit: 3000) National Guard: 15000 Home Guards: 13000  SLA+Paramilitary without reservists: 188100	7000	26.87	1
2003	SLA: 152300 Paramilitary: 88600 Police Force: 60600 (reservists: 30400, 100 women, special task force, anti-guerilla unit: 3000) National Guard: 15000 Home Guards: 13000  SLA+Paramilitary without reservists: 182500	7000	26.07	1
2004	SLA: 151000 Paramilitary: 88600 Police Force: 60600 (reservists: 30400, 100 women, special task force, anti-guerilla unit: 3000) National Guard: 15000 Home Guards: 13000  SLA+Paramilitary without reservists: 181200	7000	25.89	1
2005	SLA: 111000 Paramilitary: 88600 Police Force: 60600 (reservists: 30400, 100 women, special task force, anti-guerilla unit: 3000) National Guard: 15000 Home Guards: 13000  SLA+Paramilitary without reservists: 141200	11000	12.84	1

*The paramilitary was included in the estimation of the government troops from 2002-2005, however, reservists were excluded. The direct dependence of the Home Guard on the government is documented on this government web-site: [http://www.csd.lk/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid=59](http://www.csd.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid=59)*