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Codebook

Dataset on Post-Civil War Power and Compromise, 1990-2012

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Acknowledgements

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Contents

Introduction

In the past decades, wars have been increasingly taking place not between but within states. Previous research has identified a civil war in the recent past as one causal factor for a relapse into violent conflict. Depending on the specific definition of war used and the post-war period examined 17%[1] to 50%[2] of the cases relapse into another civil war. Reasons for peace either to collapse or to last can be traced back to the characteristics of the terminated war, but also to the newly built post-war order. Whereas the characteristics of a war cannot be modified in its aftermath anymore, the post-war order is open for change by decisions. Therefore, insights into the post-war order's effects are of great relevance for peace policy.

A post-war order is substantially shaped by the military balance and the scale of compromise between the parties to the conflict. Thus, our project concentrates on these two dimensions. The military balance of power reflects both the situation at the end of the war (represented by six sub-variables) and in the post-war period (up to nine sub-variables). The number of sub-variables varies cross the cases, as some aspects are not relevant in all contexts. The scale of compromise results from up to 15 sub-categories that focus on non-military conflict issues. Additionally, our project considers the duration of the civil war, the number of fatalities, the type of war termination, and the economy.

Our project investigates to what extent durable peace depends on the convergence of the military balance and the scale of compromise. It examines 48 civil wars that were ended between 1990 and 2009. The post-war development in each case is observed until civil war recurrence or the end of the period under investigation (31 December 2012). As our data collection could be useful also for other projects, we publish our tabled data and 48 case descriptions that document and substantiate the coding decisions.

Information for coders

According to common scientific standards, we appoint two independent coders for each case. In order to maintain these standards, the coders may not talk with the other coder about their case while preparing their draft of the description. The final case description results from the

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1   Toft, Monica Duffy 2010: Securing the Peace. The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 9.
2   Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke 2002: On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46: 1, 13-28, 17.

following steps:

1. Two coders draft a separate description of a case.
2. The coders discuss the codes on which they disagreed.
3. One of the coders compiles a consolidated version of the case description that is sent to an expert for review.
4. The case description is revised.

The codes are integrated in the running text of the case description as follows: **[NAME year-year=Code]**, for example: **[GOVERN 1996-2000=0, GOVERN 2001-2005= -1]**. For variables whose value usually cannot change, the year is not reported. This holds for basic information, variables in the conflict overview, and variables concerning the military balance at the end of the war, for example, **[VICTORY=0]**.

For some variables, the answer is valid for the whole period of investigation, such as the characteristics of the terminated civil war (WARBAL). However, most aspects have to be evaluated separately for each post-war year. Usually, an event is only coded, if it was present at least in half of the calendar year. For instance, in case that an armed group has been disbanded in September 1999, only the codes for the succeeding years indicate this development. Nevertheless, the case description provides the information that the armed group has been dissolved in September 1999.

In general, the year in which the war ends already counts as the first post war-year. The data for the time after war (PEACKEEP, BALANCE, COMPROM) refers only to the months of peace in this year. If a war ends after 30 September of one year, we count the next year as first post war-year. Examples: The war about Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan ended in May 1994. Consequently, 1994 counts as first post war-year. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended in November 1995. In this case, 1996 is the first post war-year.

The last case-year is 2012 (the end of the investigation period) or the year with a renewed civil war according to the strict definition (s. SAMEWAR). If, for example, a relapse into such a war occurs in May 1994, code as well the case-year 1994. However, only events prior to the relapse in May 1994 are. The coding decision does not consider what happened only during the renewed war.

The post-war years of the conflicts in Ethiopia (Eritrean rebels ELF, ELF-PLF and EPLF), Yugoslavia (Kosovo) and Sudan (SPLA, NDA) are special cases as Eritrea, Kosovo and South-Sudan became independent states or at least declared themselves as such. Annex 2 explains how to proceed with these cases.

Definitions

Our project takes the definitions and data of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as a starting point. According to the UCDP, the definition for an armed conflict is met, if it entails the following three characteristics: First, two parties fight about territory and/or about governmental power and the design of the political system. Second, the government of a state forms at least one of the conflict parties. Third, there are at least 25 battle-related deaths during one calendar year. Within the same state, there can be several conflicts about the territory, but only one armed conflict about governmental power and the political system.[3]

We define a <u>civil war</u> as an intrastate armed conflict during which at least 1,000 people lose their life through battles or assaults. Apart from the number of battle-related deaths in an armed conflict, we take into consideration the victims of one-sided violence[4] and non-state conflicts[5], if these are related to the intrastate armed conflict and its actors. A civil war is ongoing, as long as in one calendar year there are at least

- 25 fatalities caused by the armed conflict *or*
- 25 people killed by one-sided violence against civilians committed by one of the parties to the related armed conflict *or*
- 25 deaths caused by battles of a non-state conflict related to the armed conflict.

A <u>civil war is ended</u> when in one calendar neither the armed conflict nor related one-sided violence nor related non-state conflicts results in 25 fatalities or more.

<u>Civil war recurrence</u> is given when a new armed conflict kills at least 1,000 people. Again, one-sided violence and non-state conflicts related to the armed conflict are also considered. The notion of "civil war recurrence" can be interpreted in a narrow or broad manner. Our project uses both interpretations (see the explanations for SAMEWAR and ANYWAR).

The UCDP offers two versions of its Conflict Termination Dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009. One version considers dyads that include the government on the one side and a rebel organization

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3   http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/
4   The UCDP lists one-sided violence, when at least 25 civilians are killed by assaults of armed groups or state organs during one year. Extra-legal executions in state institutions are not considered: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#One-sided_violence
5   For the UCDP a non-state armed conflict is given, if 25 or more people die in fights between two organised groups of which none is the government of the concerned state: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Negotiation

on the other.[6] The other version looks at the conflict level.[7] Different armed formations that fight for the same issues and objectives are assigned to the same party to the conflict. Thus, the same conflict can include more than one dyad. We will take the version at the conflict level as a starting point.

A compromise is given when both parties to the conflict renounce asserting their goals completely.[8] Compromises come in two basic forms: In the first variant, the conflict parties compromise on a single issue; in the second form, the compromise embraces several issues – while one side realizes its demand on one issue, its opponent prevails on another.[9]

In a strict sense, a compromise is characterized through an active affirmation by both conflict parties. However, our project considers these compromises as well as other situations in which neither side can fully implement its demands, regardless of whether these constellations result from direct agreement.

Several aspects of a post-war order are related to the disputed territory. For civil wars like in Angola, El Salvador or Nepal, where rebels tried to seize the power of the central government, the whole state territory counts as disputed territory. In conflicts about secession or autonomy, the disputed territory is restricted to the areas mainly affected by the violence. This means we consider Kosovo, not Yugoslavia, and Northern Ireland, not the United Kingdom, as disputed territory.

Identification of the warring parties: In simple cases, only two organizations engage in war, the rebels and an organization ruling during the complete wartime and even participating in post-war political life. MPLA and UNITA in Angola are a good example. Many cases, however, are more complicated. It is possible that a government changes or that the rebels do not target a certain government, but the political order and/or the state in general. In these cases, it makes sense to consider warring parties not only in terms of a single organization. Opponent of the UÇK in Kosovo was not only the ruling party of Milošević, but the whole state of Serbia and every party which wanted to preserve its borders. In other countries, liberals and conservatives alternatively held governmental power, but were always fought by the leftist guerrilla. Insofar, we have to consider liberals and conservatives in this case as a joint warring

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6   http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55054_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_2010_Dyad.xls
7   http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55052_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_2010_Conflict.xls
8   Fumurescu, Alin 2013: Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History, New York, 4-6, 25-30; Margalit, Avishai 2010: On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton and Oxford, 5, 20; Martin, Oliver 1948: Beyond Compromise, in: Ethics, 58: 2, 118-122; Simmel, Georg 1905: Das Ende des Streits, in: Die neue Rundschau; 16: 6, 746-753, http://socio.ch/sim/verschiedenes/1905/streit.htm.
9   Cf. Lepora, Chiara 2012: On Compromise and Being Compromised, in: Journal of Political Philosophy, 20: 1, 1-22, 9-10.

party. Such a broad categorization is also necessary for conflicts where the parties define themselves through ethnic, national or confessional attributes. Therefore, we consider the Independent Serb Democratic Party in Croatia as a part of the Serb faction, although the party does not have much in common with the Serb rebels. Nevertheless, the fact that the party was permitted to participate in elections and even in the government for some years after war is important for assessing the post-war order. In cases of anti-regime wars without a strong affiliation to ethnic identities or territories, it needs to be scrutinized whether the ruling warring party is adequately captured with one single organization.

The conflict is treated as ethnic when the ethnic affiliation of a person is the strongest indication of which warring party this person will most likely support. Nevertheless, in many ethnic conflicts, there is no complete polarization between the different ethnic groups. This means that some members might support the warring faction not belonging to their own ethnicity. An ethnic group is defined by common attributes such as native language, religion and/or appearance, but most importantly by the belief in a common origin. It is mainly constituted by self-perception, not by perception of others. An ethnic group is too big for interaction between all members; membership is typically not chosen, but attributed by birth.[10]

The following table shows which of the cases in our project are considered as an ethnic war by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF 2011) or count as an "ethnic armed conflict" until 2005 following the criteria of Wimmer et al.[11] (2009). Annex 1 explains our case selection.

Table 1: Ethnic wars and ethnic armed conflicts in our project

Case	War period	PITF Ethnic Wars	Wimmer et al. 2009
Angola (UNITA)	1975-1995	yes	yes
Angola (UNITA)	1998-2002	yes	yes
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1988-1994	yes	yes
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croats)	1993-1994	yes	yes
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serbs)	1992-1995	yes	yes
Burundi (CNDD, CNDD-FDD)	1994-2004	yes	yes
Burundi (Palipehutu-FNL)	1997-2008	yes	yes
Cambodia (Khmer Rouge)	1979-1998		
Chad (MPS/MDD)	1990-1993	yes	yes
Chad (MDJT)	1999-2002		yes
Congo-Brazzaville (Cobras/Cocoyes, Ninjas, Ntsiloulous)	1997-1999		yes
Democratic Republic of Congo (MLC)	1998-2002	yes	

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10   Cf. Horowitz, Donald L. 2000: Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 2nd edition, Berkeley et al. 53-56.
11   Wimmer, Andreas/Cederman, Lars-Erik/Min, Brian 2009: Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set, in: American Sociological Review, 74: April, 316-337.

Case	War period	PITF Ethnic Wars	Wimmer et al. 2009
Democratic Republic of Congo (RCD)	1998-2004	yes	
Democratic Republic of Congo (CNDP)	2006-2009	yes	
El Salvador (FMLN)	1980-1991		
Ethiopia (ELF, ELF-PLF, EPLF)	1964-1991	yes	yes
Ethiopia (EPRP, TPLF, EPDM, EPRDF)	1976-1991		yes
Ethiopia (OLF)	1983-1992		yes
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1992-1993	yes	yes
Guatemala (FAR I, FAR II, OPRA, EGP, URNG)	1965-1995	yes	yes
India (Punjab)	1983-1993	yes	yes
Indonesia (Aceh)	1999-2005	yes	yes
Iraq (KDP)	1986-1997	yes	yes
Iraq (PUK)	1985-1997	yes	yes
Iraq (SCIRI)	1991-1996	yes	yes
Liberia (NPFL)	1989-1996		yes
Liberia (LURD, MODEL)	2000-2003		yes
Mozambique (Renamo)	1977-1992		yes
Myanmar (KIO)	1961-1992	yes	yes
Nepal (CPN(M))	1996-2007		
Nicaragua (Contras, FDN)	1982-1990		yes
Peru (Sendero Luminoso)	1982-1999		
Philippines (MNLF)	1972-1990	yes	yes
Russia (Chechnya)	1994-1996	yes	yes
Rwanda (FPR/PALIR, FDLR)	1990-2002	yes	yes
Sierra Leone (RUF, AFRC)	1991-2000		
Sri Lanka (LTTE)	1983-2001	yes	yes
Sri Lanka (JVP)	1987-1990		
Sri Lanka (LTTE)	2005-2009	yes	not coded
Sudan (SPLA, NDA)	1983-2004	yes	yes
Tajikistan (UTO)	1992-1996		
Uganda (LRA)	1986-1991	yes	unclear
Uganda (ADF)	1996-2002	yes	unclear
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	1970-1994	yes	yes
Yemen (South Yemen)	1994		yes
Yugoslavia (Croatia)/Croatia (Serbs)	1991-1993	yes	yes
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1998-1999	yes	yes
Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (AFDL)	1996-1997	yes	yes

Basic information

Terminated civil war (WARID)

- Country (rebels/region)

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Termination Dataset.

Country abbreviation according to "Correlates of War" (COUNTRY)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: Correlates of War Country Codes[12]

Country code in "Correlates of War" (CCODECOW)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: Correlates of War Country Codes[13]

Conflict identification in UCDP datasets (UCDPID)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: "ConflictID" in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

Identification of the rebels in UCDP datasets (IDREBELS)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: "SideBID" in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

New dyad identification in UCDP datasets (NEWDYADID)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: "dyad_id" in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset versions since 2017.

Note: In 2017, UCDP changed its identification system for conflicts, dyads, and actors: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#idtranslation.

New identification of the rebels in UCDP datasets (NEWREBELSID)

This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description.

Source: "side-b-id" in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset versions since 2017.

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12   http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes
13   http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes/cow-country-codes

Note: In 2017, UCDP changed its identification system for conflicts, dyads, and actors: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#idtranslation.

Date of the start of war (STARDATE)
- Day, month, year

Source: UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (until 2010), UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (from 2011), own adjustments in case of incorrect UCDP data.

Conflict between ethnically defined parties (ETHNICCON)
This information is given in the tabled data but not in the case description. The coding considers the assessments in Table 1 and the conflict overview in the case description.

Date of the war termination (ENDDATE)
- Day, month year

Adopt the UCDP data, if the warring parties do not only stop violence against each other but also any one-sided violence against civilians and any participation in related non-state armed conflicts. If one-sided violence or non-state armed conflict continues with participation of one of the warring parties, we will deviate from the UCDP data. The year in which the armed conflict as well as one-sided violence and non-state conflicts are terminated is considered the last year of war. The concerned calendar year we calculate with six months, until 30 June. In case of deviating from the UCDP data, substantiate the coding decision.

Related cases
- Country name (war) first year of war – last year of war

Refer to other wars in the same country or related wars in neighboring countries that are also investigated by our project. A war in a neighboring country is a related case, when it directly influences the course of conflict in the case under study or when the examined case directly influences the conflict in the neighboring country.

Authors
- First name and name

Reviewer

- First name and name

Conflict overview

Describe the warring parties and their positions towards the object of conflict. Subsequently, outline how the war ended (WAREND), its duration (WARDUR), and the death toll (FATALUC, FATALOS). Do not discuss war causes.

The end of war according to the UCDP (WARENDUC)

• Peace agreement:	1
• ceasefire with regulation of further military issues:	2
• ceasefire:	3
• victory:	4
• low intensity under the threshold of the conflict definition:	5
• conflict definition is not met anymore:	6
• no data	n.d.

Source: UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.

Please adopt the data of the column "outcome". If the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset does not include the case, check the information in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

The UCDP defines an armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year."[14] The intensity is below the threshold when there are less than 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.[15] For all different types of war termination see the UCDP webpage.[16]

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14 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/
15 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#incompatibility_2
16 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Termination_of_the_use_of_armed_force

The end of war according to the case-specific literature (WARENDOS)

- Peace agreement: 1
- ceasefire with regulation of further military issues: 2
- ceasefire: 3
- victory: 4
- low intensity under the threshold of the conflict definition: 5
- conflict definition is not met anymore: 6
- no data   n.d.

Source: case-specific literature.

If you think that the UCDP assessment for the end of war is correct, repeat its code. In case you judge the UCDP assessment as wrong, present your own opinion.

If no side won the war militarily **[VICTORY=0]** and both conflict parties were able to keep on fighting **[CONFIGHT=0]**, it is not plausible to assert a victory **[i.e. not WARENDOS=4]**. In case that one side won the war and it was the only conflict party which could continue to fight **[VICTORY=1; CONFIGHT=1]**, it is obvious to code a victory **[WARENDOS=4]**.

The duration of war (WARDUR)

- Duration in months

From the 16th day, round up to a whole month, below the 16th, round down. As we consider a war only as terminated when one-sided violence or relevant non-state conflicts also end, in some cases we have to deviate from the UCDP data. In case the case literature does not have more detailed data about the temporal extension of one-sided violence or non-state conflicts, we calculate the last calendar year with six months in these cases.

Death toll based on UCDP data (FATALUC)

- Total number of war victims (rounded to thousands)

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.[17]

Here we do not only count the battle-related deaths, but also the victims of non-state conflicts and one-sided violence given there is a relation to the armed conflict under investigation. Use

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17   At least in some cases, the data on fatalities in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia deviates from the data presented in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4.2014, the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.2.5-2014, the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v1.4-2014, and the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset v.5-2014. We stick to the data in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, as the last versions of the mentioned datasets have only been published when many cases in our project had already been coded.

the "best estimates". If these are not provided by UCDP, use the "low estimates".

We demonstrate the calculation method with the case Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1998/99: The victims in the categories "war & minor conflict" and, if applicable, "non-state conflict" and "one-sided violence" are relevant for our investigation. If you click on "war & minor conflict" on "Yugoslavia: Kosovo", you obtain the figures for 1998 and 1999 (1,235 and 1,386 deaths). In "non-state conflict", there is no conflict concerning Kosovo. Therefore, we proceed to "one-sided violence" with only one entry relating to the Kosovo war, as the explanations show. They indicate for the concerned war years a death toll of 211 and 781. Adding up the figures (1,235+1,386+211+781), we obtain the sum of 3,613 victims.

In cases with several armed conflicts at the same time it might be difficult to assign the death tolls to one of the ended civil wars in our project. The victims of non-state violence have to be included, if the rebels or a part of them participated in it. If there are several ongoing armed conflicts in the period concerned, it is not possible to assign the victims of one-sided violence of the government unambiguously to a certain conflict. In such cases, the victims of one-sided violence or non-state conflicts in one year have to be divided by the number of armed conflicts at the time (e.g. 800:2=400). You may deviate from this regulation, if the explanations of UCDP give insights into the exact distribution of the victims of one-sided violence by the government. Any uncertainties and doubts have to be documented in the case description.

Death toll based on other sources (FATALOS)
- Number of war victims (rounded to thousands)
- no data   n.d.

Source: case literature.

Again, we report the total number of the conflict's victims, not only the battle-related deaths. Compile the information on the total death toll. Explain shortly which source is most reliable. The criteria for a reliable source include the basis of the information (i.e. the documentation of all victims' names) or its timeliness.

Pre-war population (PREWARPO)
- Population of the whole country or of the disputed territory before the war (rounded to hundred thousands)
- no data   n.d.

16

Source: census data in the case-specific literature or data at: http://data.worldbank.org/.

If possible, present the data for the last calendar year before the war. Otherwise use the best available pre-war or war data.

When rebels want to topple the government (e.g. in El Salvador), the population of the whole country is relevant. In conflicts over secession or autonomy report only the number of inhabitants in the disputed territory, not of the whole country (i.e. for Northern Ireland, not for United Kingdom).

War intensity according to the UCDP (INTENSUC)

- Total death toll according to the UCDP in percent of the pre-war population
- no data   n.d.

Source: data for FATALUC and PREWARPO.

War intensity according to other sources (INTENSOS)

- Total death toll according to other sources in percent of the pre-war population
- no data   n.d.

Source: data for FATALOS and PREWARPO.

Ascertaining the military balance and the scale of political compromise

We use a three-stage scale with the possible values -1, 0, and 1 to quantify the extent of military balance and compromise. Whenever variables are answered in favor of the side forming the government at the beginning of war, it is represented by the value -1. Whenever variables are coded in favor of the rebels, we assign the value 1. We code 0 in the case that no advantage for either side can be detected. The three-stage scale of -1, 0, and 1 is neither a normative judgment, nor is it an expression of sympathy. We do not ascertain how much a political arrangement favors one side, which could be expressed by using the values 1, 2, 3 and -1, -2, -3 respectively. Our goal is to detect whether there is a military balance respectively a compromise or not. Nevertheless, we designed a special variable in the section measuring the compromise in order to display which side has benefited the most. Beyond that, any scale exceeding the three-stage form would mean an intractable enhancement of the already enormous efforts required by data collection. Consequently, we have to accept the loss

of information. We use our scale for all items measuring military balance and compromise, unless a lack of data prohibits a qualified judgment or the respective item is irrelevant. This approach helps us to avoid difficulties of aggregation and weighting, which would certainly arise, if, for instance, we allowed some items to take values between 4 and -4 and others to take values between 1 and -1. The latter would require complicated adjustments to avoid that items with a larger spectrum of possible values gain an unjustifiably higher weight.

The Military Balance (BALANCE)

BALANCE is derived from the arithmetic mean of the military balance at the end of war (WARBAL) and the military balance in the post-war period (POSTBAL). POSTBAL can vary with the respective post-war year. Both, POSTBAL and WARBAL, are values composed of the arithmetic mean of several items. Round the values of BALANCE, WARBAL, and POSTBAL to the second decimal place.

The military balance at the end of war (WARBAL)

WARBAL is composed of the arithmetic mean of the following variables: VICTORY, REBTERR, MORETERR, REBFIGHT, CONFIGHT, and LEADER. Irrelevant variables and variables with no data are not included.

1. Which side is considered as the military winner by the case-specific literature? (VICTORY)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Do not use datasets (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2009 and 2013, column „victory.side"). Instead, consult case-specific literature.

Be careful with premature conclusions. Cease-fire agreements or peace treaties signed by the warring parties do not necessarily indicate a military stalemate. Case experts may well consider one side as the military winner in spite of that. Example: the cease-fire agreement of 1994 in Azerbaijan after a military victory of the Armenian side.

2. Does the rebel side control any territory during wartime? If so, is it still in control of the bigger part of that territory by the end of war? (REBTERR)

- The rebel side never controlled any territory during wartime: -1
- by the end of war the rebel side lost control of the bigger part of the territory it previously controlled: -1
- the rebel side still controls the bigger part of its territory by the end of war: 1
- no data: n.d.

Source: Cunningham et al. 2009 and 2013 (column "terrcont" in their dataset), case-specific literature.

Control of territory is more than military activity and more than military predominance in an area. Control is indicated by a civilian presence which lasts for more than two months.[18] Civilian presence can be given in terms of official state institutions, illegal state-like structures or at least by some arrangements which claim to fulfill some executive or administrative or legislative or judicial tasks. Through such a civilian presence a conflict party recruits fighters and supporters and extracts resources. Note that controlled territory in a neighboring state is also relevant.

If Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013) say "yes", i.e. that the rebels did control territory, it is obligatory to consult case-specific literature. Evaluate the territorial status by the end of war and determine whether the rebel side still executed control of the bigger part of the territory formerly occupied by them. If you find strong evidence for a misjudgment by Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013), make your coding decision as indicated by the case-specific literature and name the sources you are referring to. Furthermore, specify in what aspects your coding decision differs from the codes in the dataset of Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013).

You can overrule the code "no", i.e. that the rebels did not control any territory, if the case-specific-literature clearly points to another direction. Again, first report the assessment by Cunningham et al. (2009and 2013) and then present your coding decision.

If values are missing in the dataset of Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013), it is again obligatory to consult case-specific literature.

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18   This does not hold for wars that last only few months.

3. Which side controls more of the disputed territory at the end of the war? (MORETERR)

- The side governing at the beginning of war clearly controls more territory: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war clearly controls more territory: 1
- both sides control territory roughly of the same size: 0
- no data: n.d.
- the item is not relevant: n.r.

Source: case-specific literature.

The variable is only relevant when both sides control parts of the disputed territory during the war.

4. How strong is the relative fighting capacity of the rebel side? (REBFIGHT)

- low, indicating an advantage for the government: -1
- moderate: 0
- high, indicating an advantage for the rebel side: 1
- no data: n.d.

Source: Dataset of Cunningham et al. 2009 and 2013, column „fightcap". Mark this column by color in order to avoid shifting between columns and referring to wrong values.

The case-specific literature can suggest to overrule the coding decision by Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013), e.g. if they assess the rebels' relative fighting capacity as "low", although the rebels win the war by military means. Alike, you can deviate from Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013) in cases where the rebels clearly lose the war despite an alleged "high" relative fighting capacity. Anyway, first report the assessment by Cunningham et al. (2009 and 2013) and then document your coding decision.

5. Regarding the last weeks of fighting: Which warring party has troops that would allow them to keep on fighting in more than a few areas of the disputed territory and in more than a sporadic manner? (CONFIGHT)

- The side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides: 0
- neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature.

A side cannot resume fighting when its troops at the end of the war have mostly or totally been expelled from the territory in dispute or even have suffered extinction. If guerrilla warfare is the applied military tactic of one of the warring parties, check if they suffered a weakening concerning the spatial comprehensiveness, intensity or frequency of their actions. The point of reference is the former kind of warfare in the same case.

6. Which side kills or captures its opponent's political leader(s) shortly before or at the end of war? (LEADER)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides: 0
- neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature.

Here, it is relevant whether one side has lost their leader(s) by military or armed action of the opponent's side (e.g. UNITA 2002, LTTE 2009). Legal change of government, toppling of the respective leader(s) by third parties, or death not caused by hostile action are irrelevant scenarios.

The military balance in the post-war period (POSTBAL)

POSTBAL is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the following items: STATEFOR, SEPFORCE, ARMS, TROOPS, TERRCON, TERRWIN, VULNERAB, PEACKEEP, and P5ALLY. Irrelevant variables and variables with no data are not included.

1. Which former warring party participates substantially in the state's military forces/police forces? (STATEFOR)

- Only the side governing at the beginning of war participates substantially: -1
- only the side rebelling at the beginning of war participates substantially: 1
- both sides participates substantially: 0
- neither side participates substantially: d.e.
- not relevant, as there is no official state force (in the disputed territory):   n.r.
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature, IISS Yearbooks „The Military Balance".[19]

A substantial participation is defined by the following criteria: the respective side provides at least 3,000 soldiers/policemen or (in reference to the disputed territory) at least 20% of the staff in the state's military forces and/or police forces.

2. Which former warring party has separate armed forces at its disposal? (SEPFORCE)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides: 0
- neither side, but both sides participate substantially in the state military forces (see STATEFOR):   n.r.
- neither side has separate forces and neither side participates substantially in the state military forces: d.e.
- no data: n.d.

Source: case-specific literature; IISS Yearbooks „The Military Balance".

For coding this item also check whether the state's armed forces can be considered as separate forces. The military is a separate force, if the other side participates with less than 1,500 soldiers. The police is a separate force, if the other side contribute less than 1,500 officers. Be aware that the other side can have separate forces outside the state's military and police.

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19   International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1990-2013: The Military Balance, London.

3. If both sides have separate armed forces at their disposal: is there a change of the number of troops in favor of one side? (TROOPS)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- in support of the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- in support of the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- in support of neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: IISS Yearbooks „The Military Balance".

This item is about significant changes, it is for instance not about shifts in the troop ratio from 100,000:50,000 to 99,000:50,000. Significant changes shall be detected as follows:

1. Determine the troop ratio at the end of war through division of the bigger number by the smaller. Consider the outcome of this division as numerator for the denominator 1. Example: 100,000/50,000=2. The ratio is 2:1. If necessary, round to the second decimal place. This guideline for rounding is valid for the following steps as well.

2. Divide the numerator in step 1 by 4 (here 2/4=0.5).

3. Determine the corridor of insignificant changes by subtracting the outcome in step 2 from the numerator in step 1 (here 2-0.5=1.5) and add the outcome in step 2 to the numerator in step 1 subsequently (here 2+0.5=2.5). In this example, the corridor ranges from 1.5 to 2.5.

4. Calculate the troop ratio for the respective post-war years as in step 1. Example: 77,000/42,000=1.83

5. Determine whether the troop ratio for the respective post-war year exceeds the corridor of insignificance. If so, code "1" or "-1" depending on which side benefited from the change. If not, code "0". In the example, the outcome 1.83 required the code "0" because it does not exceed the calculated corridor.

Generate a table such as the one below for the Annex of the case description:

Year	Government	Rebels	Ratio	
1994	100000	5000	20	1
...				

Given the scenario that both sides participate in the state's forces and additionally both conflict parties have separate forces, proceed as following: Subtract the number of soldiers in the state forces with a rebel background from these state forces and add that number to the

separate rebel forces. After that, calculate the ratio as presented above.

Please note IISS' reporting scheme.

Table 2: Reporting scheme of the IISS Yearbooks "The Military Balance"

Yearbook	Data
1989/90–1995/96	data as at 1 June of the first year (e.g. yearbook 89/90 → data as at 1 June 1989)
1996/97–2005/06	Data as at 1 August of the first year (e.g. yearbook 96/97 → data as at 1 August 1996)
2006	Data as at March 2006
2007–2013	Data as at November of the previous year (e.g. yearbook 2007 → data as at November 2006)

4. If both sides have separate armed forces at their disposal: is there a change of equipment in favor of one side? (ARMS)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- in support of the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- in support of the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- in support of neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: IISS Yearbooks „The Military Balance" (be aware of the reporting scheme (s. TROOPS)).

In order to facilitate a methodologically robust comparison, it is important to use the same source over the entire post-war period. Please provide information which branch of military service you refer to. To evaluate the ratio of changes, proceed as described for TROOPS.

Generate a table such as the one below for the Annex of the case description:

Given the scenario that both sides participate in the state's forces and additionally both conflict parties have separate forces, code "no data."

Year	Government	Rebels	Ratio	
1994	100 MBT (main battle tanks) 800 total artillery …	5 MBT 100 total artillery	20 8	1 1
…				

5. Which side is in control of important territory? (TERRCON)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides: 0
- neither side: d.e.
- no data: n.d.

Source: case-specific literature, including treaties, contracts and other documents. Also check in how far treaties etc. have been implemented.

Control is indicated by a civilian presence which lasts for more than two months. Civilian presence can be given in terms of official state institutions, illegal state-like structures or at least by some arrangements which claim to fulfill some executive, administrative, legislative or judicial tasks. Through such a civilian presence a conflict party can recruit fighters and supporters and extract resources.

A certain territory can be important for several reasons, two of which are the number of inhabitants and extractable resources (e.g. diamonds, ore, drugs). Regarding the population aspect, a territory is unimportant, if it contains only small villages. Case-specific literature usually highlights whether a certain territory is important or not. Consequently, we forego setting thresholds defined by absolute numbers or percentage values. It is not necessary to consider local elections.

We consider territory in the state where the civil war was fought and territory in other states controlled by one of the former warring parties.

6. Which side controls more important territory than it did at the end of war or shortly thereafter? (TERRWIN)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides: 0
- neither side: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature, including treaties, contracts and other documents. Also check in how far treaties etc. have been implemented.

Consider the explanations on control for TERRCON.

If one side does not control territory at all while its opponent is in control of the entire

disputed territory, code in favor of the side controlling the entire territory. Do not code „0" or „n.r." because not holding any territory throughout the entire post-war period would incorrectly be coded as compensating factor in the calculation of post-war military balance.

7. Which former warring party is strategically less vulnerable in its territory? (VULNERAB)

- The side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- neither side: 0
- the item is not relevant: n.r.
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature.

In the case that one side does not hold any territory at all, the opposite side shall be considered less vulnerable provided that it controls territory for its part. Please do not code „0" or „n.r." for such scenarios. Otherwise, not holding any territory would incorrectly be coded as compensating factor in the calculation of the post-war military balance.

If both sides control territory, strategic vulnerability is indicated by:

- narrow corridors linking large territories,
- exclaves with large population or economic significance,
- a political and/or economic stronghold nearby the expected frontline,
- the opponent holding a significantly higher number of strategically important areas like mountain ridges and other areas with topographical advantages.

If a (former) guerrilla controls territory which is difficult to access but small compared with the territory controlled by the other side, do not assess this situation as advantage for the (former) guerrilla.

8. Are armed peacekeeping troops present after the war? (PEACKEEP)

- Armed peacekeeping troops are present: 0
- armed peacekeeping troops are not present: n.r.

Source: until 2004: Fortna 2008, from 2005 onwards: Yearbook Alert!, IISS Yearbooks "The Military Balance", UN, and case-specific literature.

Relevant are only peacekeeping troops related to the conflict under study. In the data of Fortna 2008, look up the values of the column "pkop1". Be careful not to confuse with "pkop" beneath. The values 3, 4, and 5 indicate a presence of armed peacekeeping troops, the

values 0, 1, and 2 indicate their absence. We code "0" for the presence of an armed peacekeeping force even if it was deployed for less than six months.

9. Is there a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (P5) which in case of a new armed conflict is expected to intervene in order to at least prevent the defeat of one party? If so, for which side would it intervene? (P5ALLY)

- There is a P5 state which would intervene on the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- there is a P5 state which would intervene on the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- each party has a P5 state which would intervene on its side: 0
- no party has a P5 state which would intervene on its side: n.r.

Source: Case-specific literature.

A P5 state is expected to intervene when it has deployed troops in the post-civil war society or has committed itself to protect one of the former warring parties. Note that a contribution to a multilateral peacekeeping mission does not count as a troop deployment in the sense of this item. If the state where the war took place is a P5, it does not count as P5 ally.

Economy

GDP per capita (GDPCAP)

- GDP per capita in current US-$ (rounded to whole numbers)

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/,   if   not   available: unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/ dnltransfer.asp?fID=9.

For the GDP per capita, give the value of the respective year. Taking into account that the figures on population size will be quite vague in post-war societies, we will also document the estimations of the population size according to World Bank (row "Population (Total)"). Compile a table with the columns "Year", "Population" and "GDP per capita". Title of the table: "The gross domestic product per capita in current US-$."[20]

We assume that the economic data will drop with the start of a new war. As this could lead to wrong conclusions, for such cases we consider reporting the last peace year's figures in our tabled dataset. If despite a new war the GDP per capita increases, report the data for that year.

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20   URL of World Bank (date of access).

The scale of compromise after the civil war

<u>The scale of compromise (COMPROM)</u>

COMPROM is the arithmetic mean of the following variables' values: GOVERN, VETO, VETOSAT, ELECT, EXBORDER, INBORDER, COMPETEN, ECONOMY, SPECPRO, ISSUE, ISSUE2, NEWCON, NEWCON2, and BENEFIT, BENEFIT2. Irrelevant variables and variables with no data are not included. Please keep in mind that the value of COMPROM can vary throughout the post-war years. Round the value to two decimal places.

The point of departure to calculate compromises are the articulated maximum demands of one conflict party about one central conflict item. Nearly all questions focus on the time before and during the civil war, only in NEWCON and NEWCON2 we refer to maximum demands emerging in the post-war years. These demands have to be articulated by persons officially speaking for and representing the whole organization. We do not consider statements of single fractions or splinter groups as maximum demands. We only investigate the demands referring to central conflict items, not all demands articulated by one party, such as an import ban on videos, articulated by the Maoist guerrilla in Nepal in a list of 40 demands. A conflict item is central when both parties refer to it several times. Such demands are accompanied by statements showing the importance of the item, often articulating the priorities or preconditions. We assume that items concerning physical security, power, wealth or the identity of a conflict party will be quite central. In these areas, the political leaders and fighters of a conflict party will probably consider their own aspirations as more important than the interests of the whole organization represented by them. Controversies about eventual negotiations are not central. Therefore, any disputes about location, host or participants in negotiations do not entail as central items. Relevant as central items are especially those which are also articulated when there are no reasonable prospects for negotiations. In general, conflict analyses in the case literature should indicate the central conflict items.

To identify a compromise, both conflict parties have to renounce on fully enforcing their own aims. If each conflict party can realize its aims more or less to one half, we have a clear compromise.[21] If one party prevails to 99%, it still makes concessions, but the term of a compromise would be inappropriate. The common use of the term 'compromise' demands substantial concession of all parties involved without defining any threshold.[22] For items

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21   Cf. Smith, T.V. 1942: Compromise: Its Context and Limits, in: Ethics, 53: 1, 1-13, 3.
22   Cf. Margalit, Avishai 2010: On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton and Oxford, 48.

easily to be quantified, we consider concessions of at least 25% of the maximum demands of each party as a compromise. Nevertheless, many conflict items cannot be easily quantified. In these cases, we consider a result between the maximum demands of each party as a compromise. We assume that a result very close to the demand of one party could not be identified as an arrangement between the maximum demands. If it is still doubtful after thorough investigation whether there is a compromise about one item, we do not consider it a compromise. If this problem reappears a second time, we should then consider it a compromise.

We consider the realization of the compromise as crucial, not their formulation on paper. The implementation of the compromise is the single criterion for the coding decision.

If there is no compromise on a conflict issue, the item is nevertheless relevant. In such cases, consider which conflict party benefits more from the given situation than the other and code accordingly.

1. Which of the former warring parties participates in the government of the disputed territory? (GOVERN)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both: 0
- neither side: d.e.
- no data: n.d.

Source: Constitution, treaties, descriptions of the political system, country reports of Freedom House or Bertelsmann Transformation Index, case-specific literature.

Please mind following aspects:

A)   Document in the case description whether you consider the entire state or only a part of it as the disputed territory (see definitions of terms).

B)   If during the civil war only a part of the existing state was disputed territory, check whether the disputed territory has institutions of self-government on a level between the central government and the communal level (regions or federal units). If this is not the case, consider the whole state as disputed territory.

C)   After secessions, the new state (Eritrea, Kosovo, South Sudan) is the disputed territory.

2. Are there political decisions within the disputed territory to which all former warring parties in government, parliament or the constituent assembly have to agree to? If not, which party decides? (VETO)

- No, exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war decides: -1
- no, exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war decides: 1
- yes, there are veto rights for both sides: 0
- both sides share power but a veto right for each side does not exist: n.r.
- neither side: n.r.
- no data: n.d.

Source: Constitution, treaties, descriptions of the political system, country reports of Freedom House or Bertelsmann Transformation Index, case-specific literature.

What matters here is whether the representatives of the former warring parties are forced to consensus in several issues. Joint decisions do not always indicate a mandatory consensus-based decision making. It has to be determined in a treaty, the constitution or a similar document that in all or several defined issues one party cannot decide without (minimal) consent of the other. Such a mandatory consensus can appear in multiple ways. For instance, the required level of consent varies, sometimes a respective majority in both parties is needed, other times a complete majority has to be composed of at least one third of votes in each party, in other variations the majority must be bigger than all votes one side could deliver. Furthermore, the range of the mandatory consensus differs. In some cases, it applies only in certain issues; in others it is not limited. It is also possible to achieve these veto rights by being in parliamentary opposition.

The explanations B and C on GOVERN also have to be considered in this question.

3. Given there is a mandatory consensus-based decision making in government, parliament or the constituent assembly, is one party more satisfied with the application fields of these decisions than the other and therefore feels that it is less necessary to amend this system? If so, which side? (VETOSAT)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- yes, the side governing at the beginning of war is more satisfied: -1
- yes, the side rebelling at the beginning of war is more satisfied: 1
- no, both sides are equally satisfied: 0
- no, both sides are equally discontented   0

- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature going beyond the country reports of Freedom House and Bertelsmann.

The party demanding less amendment to the current regulations than its counterpart or being in favor of keeping the status quo is more satisfied. The positions of the representatives should be easily accessed through prominent debates about constituent assemblies, before elections or in disputes about the political system. Descriptions of the political system, election reports, and general analyses of the post-war development should refer to such debates. In many cases, the outnumbering party is more discontent with the regulations than its counterpart and therefore often times wants to weaken the current mandatory consensus while the smaller conflict party often aims to keep or widen it. But this rule-of-thumb in no way makes further research about the debates dispensable.

The explanations B and C on GOVERN also have to be considered in this question.

4. Which organizations of the former warring parties are allowed to participate in basically free and fair elections? (ELECT)

- Exclusively the side governing at the beginning of war is allowed to participate: -1
- there are no free elections which is to the advantage of the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
- exclusively the side rebelling at the beginning of war is allowed to participate: 1
- there are no free elections which is to the advantage of the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1
- both sides are allowed to participate: 0
- there are no free elections which is to the advantage of both sides: 0
- neither side is allowed to participate: d.e.
- no data: n.d.

Source: Freedom House[23], case-specific literature.

Relevant is the assessment of political rights (PR) by Freedom House. If the political rights' rating for the respective year and country is equal or lower than "5", elections can be

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23   See the following tables:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28FINAL%29.xls
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Territory%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28final%29.xls

considered as basically free and fair. If the rating is "6" or "7", we do not assess elections as basically free and fair, even if both former warring parties participated formally. It is nevertheless obligatory to consult case-specific literature. If you find strong evidence for a misjudgment by Freedom House, make your coding decision as indicated by the case-specific literature and name the sources you are referring to. Furthermore, specify in what aspects your coding decision differs from the Freedom House evaluation. If values are missing in the dataset, it is again obligatory to consult case-specific literature.

Due to the fact that elections do normally not take place every year, extrapolate the remaining years between the elections. This means that years without elections keep the value of the last year with elections. Example: In 2002, both parties participate in elections, which is coded 0. In the years 2003 to 2005, where no elections took place, the value of 0 remains. In 2006, new elections take place and we get a new value. Municipal elections are not relevant for this question.

In case there is an official recognition of election results from pre-war times after the war, this election can be evaluated. Example: In Angola, the elections of 1992, where both warring parties had participated, were officially recognized and implemented after the war ended in 2002.

The explanations B and C on GOVERN also have to be considered in this question.

5. If the warring parties fought over the question to which state certain territories should belong, is there a compromise that has been mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (EXBORDER)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

If the item is relevant, shortly draft the maximum demands of the warring parties. On this basis, evaluate the compromise. Evidence is very important here.

6. If the warring parties fought over the borders between federal or other sub-state units, is there a compromise that has been mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (INBORDER)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

See the explanations concerning EXBORDER.

7. If the warring parties fought over the allocation of competences among the political levels (central state, regions or federal units, municipalities), is there a compromise that has been mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (COMPETEN)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

See the explanations concerning EXBORDER.

8. If the warring parties fought about the economic order, is there a compromise whose provisions are mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (ECONOMY)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

See the explanations concerning EXBORDER.

9. If the warring parties fought over special programs for the promotion of specific groups (based on ethnicity, profession, class, caste, inhabiting certain regions) or over measures against their discrimination, is there a compromise which has been mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (SPECPRO)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

See the explanations concerning EXBORDER.

10. If the warring parties fought over another central issue during the war, what was it? Does a compromise exist which has been mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (ISSUE, ISSUE2)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

Answer the question twice in case there are two central issues missing. The matrix allows for two additional central conflict issues (ISSUE, ISSUE2).

See explanations concerning COMPROM and EXBORDER.

11. If a central issue emerged only in the post-war time and the parties involved therefore only referred to it after the war, does a compromise exist which is mostly implemented? If there is no such compromise, which party prevails in this issue? (NEWCON, NEWCON2)

- The item is not relevant: n.r.
- the side governing at the beginning of war prevailed: -1
- the side rebelling at the beginning of war prevailed: 1
- there was a mostly implemented compromise: 0
- no data: n.d.

Source: Case-specific literature about the war and the post-war time.

If more than two issues have emerged in the post-war time, choose the two most central. Keep the criteria for centrality described in COMPROM in mind. Take into account that recent conflicts might appear as more important because their outcome and consequences are yet unknown. In contrast, older (resolved) conflicts with known consequences might appear less important.

12. Looking at the disputes with mostly implemented compromises, for which party are the compromises generally more favorable? (BENEFIT, BENEFIT2)

- The item is not relevant as there were no implemented compromises in questions 5-11:
                                                                    n.r.
- the item is not relevant as the compromises in questions 5-11were not mostly in favor of one side: n.r.
- in more than half of the items the compromises are slightly, but not preponderantly in favor of the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
  (weight question once by coding only BENEFIT)
- in more than half of the items the compromises are preponderantly in favor of the side governing at the beginning of war: -1
  (weight question twice by coding BENEFIT and BENEFIT2)
- in more than half of the items the compromises are slightly, but not preponderantly in favor of the side rebelling at the beginning of war   1
  (weight question once by coding only BENEFIT)
- in more than half of the items the compromises are preponderantly in favor of the side rebelling at the beginning of war: 1

(weight question twice by coding BENEFIT and BENEFIT2)

Questions 1-4 are not relevant here. Question 12 refers only to the answers to questions 5-11 with value "0". Values of "-1" and "1" in the questions 5-11 indicate the irrelevance of question 12. Explain your decision shortly.

Stability of peace

Renewed war according to the strict definition (SAMEWAR)

- Yes: 1
- no: 0

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

A civil war is an intra-state armed conflict with at least 1,000 fatalities caused by battles or one-sided violence. The threshold of 1,000 deaths applies to the total time of the armed conflict, thus, it is not necessary that at least 1,000 people are killed in each calendar year. A war is considered as ongoing as long as there are at least 25 battle-related deaths, 25 or more people killed in one-sided violence or at least 25 fatalities in relevant non-state conflicts in one calendar year. A non-state conflict is relevant, if at least one party to the intra-state armed conflict is involved.

The strict definition of a renewed civil war covers only those cases that take place in the same or in a similar constellation. This criterion is fulfilled whenever several, but not necessarily all, former warring parties resume fighting over the same or part of the same type of incompatibility. Splintered factions of former warring parties shall also be considered as same parties, whenever they resume fighting. The strict definition also covers scenarios in which the warring parties switched roles in the course of events (former rebels becoming the government and vice versa). Interstate or intrastate wars subsequent to state partition after secessionist conflicts shall be considered as renewed war in the strict definition.

Starting date of the renewed war (DATESAME)

- Day, month, year
- n.r.

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

See comments on SAMEWAR.

Number of months since the end of the preceding war (PEACMON1)

- Number of months

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

See comments on SAMEWAR.

Renewed war according to the broad definition (ANYWAR)

- Yes:　　1
- no:　　　0

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

A civil war is an intra-state armed conflict with at least 1,000 fatalities caused by battles or one-sided violence. The threshold of 1,000 deaths applies to the total time of the armed conflict, thus, it is not necessary that at least 1,000 people are killed in each calendar year. A war is considered as ongoing as long as there are at least 25 battle-related deaths, 25 or more people killed in one-sided violence or at least 25 fatalities in relevant non-state conflicts in one calendar year. A non-state conflict is relevant, if at least one party to the intra-state armed conflict is involved.

Normally, the broad definition of a renewed civil war considers every other civil war in the same country as renewed war, irrespective of conflict constellation. That means that ANYWAR has to be coded as "1" for yes, if SAMEWAR is coded as "1" for "yes" and occurs before another war. Please note that wars between states which emerged from partition after secessionist conflicts are relevant in the strict definition (e.g. Ethiopia-Eritrea).

There are some countries with more than one terminated war in the period under investigation (e.g. Sri Lanka or the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Under such circumstances it has to be avoided that the same renewed war is counted twice, e.g. that the second war between the Sri Lanka's government and the Tamil Tigers is considered both as a recurrence of the first war of this constellation and as a renewed war (in the sense of ANYWAR=1) with respect to the terminated war between the government and the People's Liberation Front (JVP). Therefore, in the case description on the JVP conflict, ANYWAR has to be "0".

Starting date of renewed war according to the broad definition (DATEANY)

- Day, month, year
- n.r.

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

See comments on ANYWAR.

Number of months since the end of the preceding war (PEACMON2)

- Number of months

Source: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.

See comments on ANYWAR.

Annex 1: Case selection

Our project examines almost all societies in which since 1990 a civil war has come to an end. Because the Cold War has been an important influence on the course of conflicts, the project is limited to the more recent era. The last two decades are marked by intrastate wars that have a shorter duration[24] and that end more often with a peace agreement than in the decades before.[25] The second time-related limit for our case selection is marked by the end of 2009 because the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset only considers armed conflicts until this year.[26]

The conflict level version of the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009 counts almost 200 terminated intrastate conflicts since 1990 of which about 60 have a death toll of at least 1,000 and therefore meets our definition of a civil war. However, in some cases, the classification as an intrastate armed conflict seems questionable, for example in the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda (2001-2001).[27] The conflict summary of the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia refers to this conflict as a case of one-sided violence against civilians, which is certainly a more accurate description.[28] We follow this description and strike this case from our list. The same happens with the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (1990-1999). In this case, there was no intrastate conflict. Israel fought a non-state Lebanese actor on Lebanese territory.[29] The UCDP classifies the violence in Somalia 1986-1996, 2001-2002 and since 2006 as intrastate armed conflicts, all of which meet the definition of a civil war except the conflict in 2001-2002. Lacking a government, the UCDP speaks for the time spans of 1997-2000 and 2003-2005 of non-state armed conflicts.[30] As the violence in fact never ended, but only changed the category, we do not consider Somalia as a terminated civil war. Following the UCDP data, "the troubles" in Northern Ireland would not constitute a civil war. Nevertheless, as the detailed Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland by Malcolm Sutton shows, there were between 1970 and 1994 at least 25 battle-related deaths

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24   Hironaka, Ann 2008: Neverending Wars. The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War, Cambridge/London, 49.
25   Call, Charles T. 2012: Why Peace Fails. The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, Washington, 184-185; Kreutz, Joakim 2010: How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset, in: Journal of Peace Research, 47: 2, 243-250, 246.
26   UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009, latest actualization on 29 of November 2010, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/
27   The conflict obtains the value „3" in the category „type", which stands for the intrastate character: http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55056_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_2010-1.pdf
28   http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=164&regionSelect=3-Northern_Americas#
29   http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=79&regionSelect=10-Middle_East#
30   http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=141&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#

each year and during the complete period more than 3,000 fatalities.[31] Therefore, we include Northern Ireland in the list of terminated civil wars.

Based on the UCDP data and the adjustments lined out, we obtain a list of 48 civil wars which were terminated between 1990 and 2009 (see Table 1). As some entries deviate from the UCDP data, the following sections line out the guidelines for these adjustments. However, due to reasons of space, we will not go into detail for each case. The respective case descriptions explain the reasons for dissenting from the UCDP.

The UCDP ignores one-sided violence and non-state violence, when it calculates the duration of armed conflicts, even if there is a clear relation to the armed conflict and its actors. For Liberia, for example, it identifies a first civil war from 1989 to 1990, but from 1991 until 1996, there were approximately 10,000 killed in acts of one-sided violence, incurred by either the government or its adversaries.[32] It would be counter-intuitive to speak of a post-war time despite such a high degree of violence. Therefore, the project includes the extent of non-state violence and one-sided violence before and after the armed conflict. If there are during one year at least 25 victims of non-state or one-sided violence, the definition of a civil war is still met. The violence must be executed by an actor participating in the armed conflict: rebels or government. According to this adjustment, the first civil war in Liberia endured until 1996. Concerning the civil wars in Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq, Rwanda and Uganda, this adjustment has drastic consequences. The wars in Afghanistan and Darfur were not terminated before 2009 and therefore are excluded from the list of terminated civil wars. In Iraq, Rwanda, and Uganda, several civil wars merge to one conflict.

In some cases, the inclusion of non-state and one-sided violence does not change the number, but the duration of armed conflict. This is the case with Nepal and the two civil wars in Burundi.

We do not consider the seizure of the government by the rebels as a termination of the civil war, if the fighting continues with interchanged roles. This affects the wars in Rwanda, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville.

Finally, the project subsumes some separate conflicts according to the UCDP into one civil war. This is valid for Yugoslavia/Croatia and Russia (Chechnya).

According to the UCDP data, eight other cases fulfilled the criteria of a terminated civil war: Colombia (ELN) 1984-2006, Lebanon (Lebanese Army) 1989-1990, Myanmar (KNU) 1966-

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31   http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html

32   http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=94&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#

1992, Myanmar (MTA-SSA-S) 1993-2002, Philippines (CPP), Philippines (MILF) 1996-2005, Philippines (Abu Sayyaf) 2000-2007, and Uganda (UPA) 1987-1992. The last case is the only one we did not include due to a lack of available literature. All other cases were covered by at least one draft of a case description. The complex civil war in Lebanon did not fit the bi-polar structure which is needed to trace the military balance and the scale of compromise. With respect to the other six cases, the coding teams and external experts were of the opinion that the civil wars did not really end until 2009.

Annex 2: Eritrea, Kosovo, and South Sudan

Eritrea

Considering the years of 1991 and 1992, the items shall be coded for the entire state of Ethiopia unless the territory in dispute (Eritrea itself) is explicitly affected. From 1993 on, almost all items shall be coded in reference to Eritrea.

STATEFOR in the section of military balance in the post-war period (POSTBAL) shall be coded exclusively in reference to Eritrea from 1993 onwards. Concerning SEPFORCE, ARMS and TROOPS in the section POSTBAL, however, it is obligatory to consider the armed forces of Ethiopia as well as the armed forces of Eritrea. SEPFORCE shall be coded „0" from 1993 on, given that both sides dispose armed forces. Because both sides have been independent states since the partition, TERRCON takes the value „0" for „both sides". TERRWIN requires clarification whether the partition meant an extension of territorial control for one side. VULNERAB determines the vulnerability of the territory of the independent states.

From 1993 on, items 1-4 in the Section COMPROM shall be coded exclusively in reference to Eritrea. Institutional arrangements in Ethiopia are irrelevant. The coding of variables 5-11 in this section has to take the state partition into consideration.

The items addressing the stability of peace shall only be inquired with regard to a possible intrastate war in Eritrea or an interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both states waged war against each other in the years 1998-2000. Eritrea shall be considered only until the starting date of this war and be withdrawn from the sample subsequently. It is not necessary to gather further data for Eritrea from 1998 on.

Kosovo

The items have to be coded for the entire state for the years from 1999 until 2007, unless the territory in dispute (Kosovo) is explicitly affected. Until February 2003, the entire state is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until June 2006, it is Serbia and Montenegro and until February 2008, Serbia respectively. From 2008 on, since it is the year of the declaration of independence, items shall be coded almost exclusively in reference to Kosovo.

The item STATEFOR in the section POSTBAL shall be coded in reference to Kosovo exclusively from 2008 onwards. It is not necessary to include Serbia into the inquiry for this period. The items SEPFORCE, ARMS and TROOPS in the section POSTBAL have to be coded by taking into consideration the armed forces of both, Kosovo and Serbia. For the

entire period since 2008, SEPFORCE shall be coded „0", if both sides dispose armed forces. Due to the state partition, TERRCON has to be coded „0". The coding of TERRWIN requires clarification whether the partition meant an extension of territorial control for one side. VULNERAB determines the vulnerability of the territory of the independent states.

From 2008 on, items 1-4 in the Section COMPROM shall be coded exclusively in reference to Kosovo. Institutional arrangements in Serbia are irrelevant. The coding of the variables 5-11 in this section has to take the state partition into consideration.

The items addressing the stability of peace shall only be inquired with regard to a possible intrastate war within Kosovo or an interstate war between Kosovo and Serbia. Until 2012, neither scenario has occurred.

South Sudan

The items have to be coded for the period between 2005, the first year after war termination in 2004, and July 2011, when South Sudan became independent and suffered a relapse into war.

PEACKEEP relates to the conflict between North and South. The GDP per capita has to be reported for the entire state. All items in WARBAL relate to the entire state. For the items in POSTBAL consider the situation in the entire state Sudan, as it would be even more misleading only to look at South Sudan.

GOVERN, VETO, VETOSAT, and ELECT refer to the disputed territory, that means to South Sudan. The case description can mention that the SPLM participated also in the central government. All other items in COMPROM relate to the entire state of Sudan.

For SAMEWAR report and code the first relapse into civil war. Mention the start of armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan but do not code it.

Annex 3: Case-specific literature

Entries in datasets or comments in statistical analyses do not provide the necessary information we expect to find in case-specific literature. Case-specific literature is concerned with the particular civil war and the respective post-war period in detail. Case-specific literature entails:

- primary sources like agendas and manifestos of the warring parties, ceasefire agreements and peace accords or reports about peace operations,
- monographs,
- reports of scientific institutes or political consultants,
- articles in scientific journals.

First impressions of a case can be gathered by consulting the general conflict information provided by the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia or the respective entries on Wikipedia. Both sources are meant to provide initial access. The Autonomous University of Barcelona provides databases and yearbooks comprehending brief updates in reference to conflicts and peace processes. Reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG) give details on many wars and peace processes.

Annex 4: Online sources

Bertelsmann Transformationsindex: http://www.bti-project.de/

Constitutions: https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en

Cunningham, David E./Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede/Salehyan, Idean 2009: It Takes Two. A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53: 4, 570-597, data available at: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html

Cunningham, David E./Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede/Salehyan, Idean 2013: Non-state actors in civil war: A new dataset, in: Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30: 5, 516-531, data available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html

ECP Database on Conflict and Peacebuilding: http://escolapau.uab.es/english/conflictandpeacebuilding/index.php

Freedom House (Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit; Countries at the Crossroads): http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports

Fortna, Virginia Page 2008: Codebook: http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pk&pkept%20data%20notes.pdf; dataset (Stata) http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pk&pkept.dta

International Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/

Peace Agreements: http://www.usip.org/category/publications/peace-agreements or https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/accords/ or https://www.ireon-portal.de/IREON/Portal/ireon_de.aspx?lang=de-DE

PITF Ethnic Wars 2011, http://bit.ly/11Raejh

UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2014, 1989-2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/

UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/database/.

UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset

UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5-2014, 1989-2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_non-state_conflict_dataset_/.

UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v. 1.4-2014, 1989-2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-sided_violence_dataset/.

UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/database/

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014, 1946–2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset./

UN Peacekeeping Operations: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/

UN Statistics Division: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm

Wimmer, Andreas/Cederman, Lars-Erik/Min, Brian 2009: Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set, in: American Sociological Review, 74: April, 316-337, Ethnic Armed Conflict Dataset, data available at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36583&versionNumber=1&tab=files

World Bank: http://datacatalog.worldbank.org/:

Yearbook Alert! (since 2002): http://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=532%3Aanuarios-alerta&catid=46&Itemid=66&lang=en

Yearbook on DDR: http://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=523%3Aanuarios-ddr&catid=46&Itemid=66&lang=en

Yearbook on Peace Processes (since 2006): http://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=533%3Aanuarios-procesos&catid=46&Itemid=66&lang=en