

WARID: Chad (MDJT) 1999-2002
STARTDATE: 31 January 1999¹
ENDDATE: 31 December 2002
Related cases: Chad (MPS/MDD) 1990-1993
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Conflict overview

The civil war from 1999 to 2002 between the Chadian Government, embodied by the armed troops of the MPS (Mouvement pour le Salut), and the opposing MDJT (Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad) represented the first major conflict since the end of armed struggles between MPS and MDD (Mouvement pour un Développement Démocratique) in 1993. Between 1990 and 2005, more than ten armed rebel groups along with additional fragmented sub-factions contested the authority of the MPS.² The MDJT stands out as the first major rebel movement since the end of the democratic transition phase in the mid-1990s.

By openly accusing the Chadian president and MPS leader Idriss Déby of electoral fraud, corruption and authoritarian centralization of power in the hands of the Zaghawas, the MDJT – led by the former minister of defense Youssouf Togoïmi – started its rebellion in the fall of 1998 (Lanne 2003: 209f.). The civil war represented an ethnic conflict between the governing Zaghawas and the rebelling Tobou who inhabit the northern Ennedi territory. During the first stage of the conflict, the opposition forces were quickly able to gain control in the Tibesti

1 One source reports that Radio France Internationale first documented an activity by the MDJT against government forces on 16 October 1998. The beginning of war on 31 December 1999, as coded by the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset from 2010 (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/ (10 Feb 2015)), seems to be an estimation of the start date, set quite late, since other sources mention bloody fighting between government troops and the MDJT rebels as early as January 1999 (Mehler 2000: 216). The determination of the start date of the conflict as 30 October 1997, as coded by the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset from 2014 (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (10 Feb 2015)), appears highly unlikely since the movement only came into being in October 1998. Regarding the end date, there is also a lack of accord between the two UCDP datasets. The dataset from 2010 codes the end date as the 31 December 2002 and the 2014 version determines the end date to be 14 December 2003. In the case-specific literature, we found a peace agreement between a moderate faction of the MDJT under Adoum Togoï and the Chadian government on 14 December 2003 (Basedau 2004: 206). However, on 8 December 2002, the military command of the MDJT announced the dissolution of the political organs of the MDJT (Basedau 2003: 232). Due to the split in the MDJT after Togoïmi's death in September 2002 and a significant decrease of military action and members of the MDJT towards the end of 2002, we adhere to the end date suggested by the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset from 2010, namely 31 December 2002.

2 <http://www.ialtchad.com/opposition.html> (28 Mar 2014).

region near the Libyan border.³ Ongoing fighting between the government and the MDJT forces culminated in 2000 with around 1000 battle-related deaths, a number that had not been reached since the civil war in the 1990s. Afterwards, the MDJT was unable to perform operations outside the mountainous Tibesti region and found itself further isolated at the Libyan border (Bangoura 2005: 392f.; ICG 2011: 3). With air and ground support from French troops stationed near N'Djamena, the ANT (Armée Nationale du Tchad) was progressively able to surround or isolate the MDJT troops. Considering the development of the conflict, Libya's role cannot be underestimated: the Chadian Government was only able to increase pressure on the MDJT after the Libyan Government had ceased supporting the rebels (Africa Confidential 2001: 7, ARB 2006b: 16616; ARB 2007b: 1727).

As the conflict lost intensity, several attempted ceasefire negotiations were initiated but failed, including the 2002 Tripoli II agreement under a Franco-Libyan aegis (Africa Confidential 2003: 5f.). As a consequence, minor parts of the MDJT split up and restarted attacks at a low scale [WARENDUC=5].⁴ As the MDJT's fighting capabilities drastically diminished at the end of the conflict, with the MPS being the only party able to continue fighting in the entire disputed territory, most observers asserts a victory for the governing side, accompanied by sporadic low-scale encounters in the first post-war years [WARENDOS=4].⁵

In the course of 47 months, the civil war in Chad [WARDUR=47] claimed 1,910 lives, according to UCDP estimates [FATALUC=2000].⁶ The Armed Conflicts Location & Events Dataset (ACLED)⁷ provides a death toll that is only half as high [FATALOS=1000]. Considering that the Republic of Chad had a total population of 7.7 million⁸ [PREWARPO=7,700,000], the intensity of the war in relation to the share of fatalities to the pre-war population varies between 0.01% and 0.03% [INTENSUC=0.03; INTENSOS=0.01].

The military balance at the end of war

Major sources – including the International Crisis Group (ICG) – claim that the MDJT was a negligible threat to the Déby government at the end of the war due to leadership quarrels (ICG 2006: 5; ICG 2011: 3). As Déby's MPS managed to maintain power in N'Djamena and was likewise able to isolate the rebelling side in the north, the majority of the case-specific literature deems the end of war to be a victory for the governing side [VICTORY= -1].

3 <http://www.irinnews.org/report/5607/chad-government-admits-presence-of-new-rebel-group> (17 Mar 2014).

4 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/ (9 Feb 2014).

5 ICG 2006: 5.

6 <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=32&value=#> (9 Feb 2014).

7 <http://www.acleddata.com/data/africa/> (23 May 2014).

8 <http://data.worldbank.org/country/chad> (2 May 2014).

According to Cunningham et al. (2009), the rebelling side did not control any territory at the end of war; the case literature, however, dissents on this point. As the rebels under the radical faction leader Hassan Mardigué continued to question the state's power monopoly and territorial integrity in the north through the late 2000s, the government's clear lack of influence in the Ennedi territory is obvious (Country Watch 2007: 19).⁹ Even though the MDJT lost important territory during the conflict, there is strong evidence that the movement held control over its original territory up to the end of the war. Finally, for a significant portion of time, the rebels managed to benefit from their arrangements with local leaders in the Tibesti region and therefore held a civilian presence **[REBTERR=1]**.¹⁰ The secluded region represented a negligible but persistent problem for the MPS administration.¹¹ The MDJT, however, never established substantial holding capabilities on the ground outside of the isolated mountains (ICG 2011: 3). Consequently, the MPS controlled the overwhelming majority of the disputed territory at the end of the war **[MORETERR= -1]**.

In accordance with the vast majority of case-specific literature, Cunningham et al. (2009) assess the rebels' fighting capabilities as 'low' at the end of the conflict. Constant leadership problems weakened the MDJT and led to the progressive segregation of its sub-factions. This development finally culminated in splits within the movement between 2002 and 2005, following the signing of a number of peace agreements that gained only partial acceptance (Balencie/de la Grange 2005: 174; Bangoura 2005: 397; Country Watch 2007: 19).¹² Moreover, the MDJT's capabilities were seriously damaged after Déby succeeded in his strategy to remove Libya's financial support to the rebels and further isolate the MDJT (ICG 2010: 14).¹³ These developments were undoubtedly advantageous to Déby and favored the MPS troops **[REBFIGHT= -1]**.

As mentioned above, the MDJT was partially able to hold its position in the Tibesti region, yet was incapable of carrying out more than sporadic attacks outside of its own territory, let alone threaten the distant capital (ICG 2006: 5). In sum, at the end of war, the government

9 The battle between the government troops and the MDJT near Tanouc in December 2000 marked one important turning point: <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/chad-1960-present/> (11 May 2014).

10 The traditional leaders, or 'Derdé', meaning king, have represented a strong secular authority in the Tibesti region since the end of French dominance. Most of them originate from the Tobou, which explains the proximity of the MDJT and the Derdé (ICG 2010: 3; ICG 2011: 6).

11 The Tibesti Mountains remained an insurmountable discomfort for the Chadian Government until the peace deal with the National Resistance Army (ANR) in January 2003. The ANR was simultaneously rebelling in the eastern territories, which represented a geographically closer threat to the administration in N'Djamena (Africa Research Bulletin 2007: 16616).

12 <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=country&docid=440ed75620&skip=0&type=QUERYRESPONSE&coi=TCD&rid=456d621e2&quersys=MDJT&searchin=title&sort=date> (28 Mar 2014).

13 http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3629 (5 May 2014).

represented the only warring party able to carry out operations in the greater part of the disputed territory [CONFLICT= -1]. MDJT leader Youssouf Togoïmi was seriously injured by one of the government's remote controlled land mines and later died in a Libyan hospital (ARB 2007a: 16891; Bangoura 2005: 395). The MDJT, in turn, claimed to have killed the head of the president's security contingent, General Kerim Nassour – but this remains unconfirmed and did not, in any way, weaken MPS-leadership [LEADER= -1].¹⁴

We can therefore conclude that a strong military imbalance existed at the end of the war in favor of the government [WARBAL= -0.67].

The military balance in the post-war period

With the end of the conflict, several peace agreements were made – the first being the short-lived Tripoli II contract – that included clauses regarding a general amnesty for all MDJT rebels and their integration into the armed forces of the Chadian state (HIIK 2002: 19). However, the modalities of this integration remained vague and were put in the hands of undefined military and security sub-committees (UNSC 2002: 3). There are claims of a minor integration of 200 MDJT members into a moderate faction led by Adoum Togoï in the December of 2003; though these were few in number and do not pass our criteria for a substantial participation of the rebels in the state armed forces (Country Watch 2007: 19). The lack of information about such events supports the suggestion that the composition of the ANT's personnel in the first post-war year was the same as its arrangement in wartime [STATEFOR 2003= -1]. On account of the contested ceasefire agreement with the MPS, the post-war years were characterized by a growing fragmentation of the MDJT into internally quarreling sub-factions (Africa Confidential 2003: 5; ARB 2006b: 16616; ICG 2011: 6). Following another contested agreement in January 2005, the MDJT finally dissolved into different groups that were partly absorbed by a major rebel movement, the UFDD's National Alliance (Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement) in 2007 (Country Watch 2007: 19; ICG 2008: 16f.).¹⁵ Due to this and a dire lack of data, we assume that a substantial degree of integration of former MDJT rebels did not take place [STATEFOR 2004-2012= -1].

Considering the scarcity and inconsistency of available information, we may also assume that the state's armed forces were a force separate from the governing MPS. Similar to the composition of the FIR (Forces d'Intervention Rapide) and the ANT, it appears likely that the Chadian gendarmerie – comprised of around 4,500 men, according to the International Insti-

14 <http://www.irinnews.org/report/16420/chad-dissidents-claim-to-kill-head-of-president-s-security> (25 Mar 2014).

15 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/enhanced/doi/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2007.00711.x/> (21 May 2014).

tute for Security Studies (IISS) – was also under the exclusive mandate of the governing MPS (IISS 1999-2006).¹⁶ Even though Balencie and de la Grange (2005: 174) provide estimates for a significant drop in MDJT membership – from 1,500 to 200 men at the end of 2002 –, the rebels under Mardigué were still able to retain control of the Tibesti Mountains and push for additional peace arrangements with the MPS in 2005.¹⁷ At the beginning of 2004, rumors circulated of Darfurian Janjaweed militias collaborating with radical MDJT forces in the north. Other sources report that, until the end of 2005, the number of MDJT soldiers in arms grew slightly (Africa Confidential 2004: 4; Massey/May 2006: 445). In light of this evidence, we assume that both warring parties had separate forces under their command in the first post-war years [**SEPFORCE 2003-2005=0**].

The peace agreement from 2005 between the last major MDJT factions and the MPS provoked the final collapse of the rebel movement. This development led to a decisive split among the remaining leaders, leaving behind a small, radicalized rebel group led by Aboubakar Choua Dazi, one that lacked the capacities to continue its armed struggle (ARB 2006a: 16687; ARB 2007a: 16891).¹⁸ In 2008, the fragmented movement was absorbed by other rebel groups, losing its coherence and most of its military capabilities. As such, we determine that the MPS was the only former warring party that possessed separate troops [**SEPFORCE 2006-2012= -1**].¹⁹

A lack of uncontested information from the IISS related to the number of troops and armed equipment held by the former rebels precludes any quantitative comparison of the two factions [**TROOPS 2003-2005=n.d., TROOPS 2006-2012=n.r.; ARMS 2003-2005=n.d., ARMS 2006-2012=n.r.**].

Even though the MDJT always claimed to have overthrown the Déby government – and therefore theoretically contested the entire Chadian territory –, the movement never managed to gain a foothold outside the Tibesti region for the entirety of the post-war period. The region's advantage as a natural fortress in a protected mountainside during wartime was ultimately a mixed blessing: it offered scarce possibilities for exploiting material and human

16 The FIR, formerly known as the Republican Guard, was restructured during the democratic transition phase in the early 1990s. Its high-ranking officials were predominantly composed of Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawa who fought for Déby in the civil war against the MDD. The FIR was frequently accused of violating human rights (Bangoura 2005: 380).

17 <http://www.refworld.org/country,,IRBC,,TCD,,45f147a920,0.html> (25 Mar 2014).

18 Nevertheless, the IISS yearbooks document the MDJT as rebel force until 2007.

19 The regress of the MDJT in the post-war period exhibits striking similarities to the history of MDD rebels loyal to Habré in the 1990s. According to Bangoura (2005: 378) and Buijtenhuijs (1998: 97-98), Déby's grand strategy of 'ralliement' (cooptation) proved to be a successful measure in provoking the fragmentation of the rebel groups in a series of cases throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

resources due to having the lowest population density in Chad (Magrin 2008: 3ff.).²⁰ Considering this, it is irrelevant whether or not MDJT controlled the Tibesti: the region does not fulfill our condition of being an important territory [**TERRCON 2003-2012= -1**].

As the MPS already controlled all of the territory that matches our criteria, it could not gain any additional territory after 2003 [**TERRWIN 2003-2012= -1**]. Accordingly, we assume that the MDJT was the more vulnerable conflict party throughout the post-war period, having never been in control of any important territory [**VULNERAB 2003-2012= -1**].

Peacekeeping troops related to this specific dyad were not present in any of the post-war stages [**PEACKEEP 2003-2012=n.r.**].

After Déby's MPS overthrew the authoritarian ruler Hissène Habré in 1990 and initiated the democratic transition phase, it enjoyed the political, economic and military support of France. According to IISS, French Épervier units stationed near N'Djamena comprised of 900 to 1,050 soldiers from 1999 until 2012, supporting estimates by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2006: 17; IISS 1999-2012). France was undoubtedly the most vital co-designer and stakeholder in the Chadian DDR program (Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration), which determined the ANT's structure in the long-run (Caramés/Sanz 2009: 45f.). Paul Fontbonne, French foreign intelligence officer and concurrent military advisor to President Déby, embodies the deep relationship between France and the MPS administration (Country Watch 2007: 14). In the light of this evidence, we assume that in case of renewed hostilities in this dyad, a French intervention in favor of the governing side would have been very probable [**P5ALLY 2003-2012= -1**].

On the whole, the military imbalance in favor to the MPS tended to progressively rise throughout the post-war period. The apparent imbalance that characterized the end of the civil war grew in the subsequent years. In the immediate aftermaths of the conflict, the MDJT's military potential was significantly weakened but not eliminated [**POSTBAL 2003-2005= -0.83**]. In the long-term, however, the situation approached the maximum value for an imbalance, to advantage of the governing side [**POSTBAL 2006-2012= -1**].

Consequently, the total military imbalance in favor of the MPS – the combination of the military balance at the end of the war and in the post-war period – was remarkably strong in the first two post-war years [**BALANCE 2003-2005= -0.75**] and even rose in the aftermath. From 2006 until the end of our observation in 2012, the military imbalance to the benefit of the government tended towards the maximum value [**BALANCE 2006-2012= -0.83**].

20 <http://www.geohive.com/cntry/chad.aspx> (16 May 2014).

Economy

The long history of civil wars and ethnic rivalry since the late 1960s is reflected in Chad's low levels of macroeconomic performance. The country – ranked 183 of 187 in the UNDP Human Development Index for 2012²¹ – is grouped among the poorest states in the world. Despite the fact that its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has constantly increased since 2003, problems such as political instability, high inequality and dependency on oil revenues still pose as obstacles to Chad's development.

Table 1: GDP per capita in current USD

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
2003	9311234	294
2004	9665024	457
2005	10014413	664
2006	10356822	717
2007	10694366	808
2008	11030628	938
2009	11371325	814
2010	11720781	909
2011	12080037	1006
2012	12448175	1035

The scale of compromise after the civil war

In order to assess the scale of compromise between the MDJT rebels and the MPS in the post-war period, it is important to point out that the peace agreements were never fully implemented – including Tripoli II and its successors. These agreements generally contained unspecified commitments and delegated the modalities for political involvements by the MDJT to political and legal committees (UNSC 2002: 2). Various sources unanimously report that the short-lasting and vaguely defined contracts were examples of “cheap” diplomacy (Mehler 2008: 6): they intentionally led to disunity and splits inside the former rebel movements through the partial cooptation of a few privileged leaders (Berg 2008: 13; ICG 2011: 3-7; Mehler 2008: 22). Considering this, the small number of high-level government positions for leading MDJT personnel should not be understood as a proof of MDJT participation in the government (ICG 2008: 24, Polity IV 2010: 3).²² As the MDJT's original aims were to overthrow the Déby administration in N'Djamena, the territory of the entire state must be considered as disputed territory. In light of this, we assume that the former rebel side did not have any means to influence governmental decisions throughout the whole post-war period [GOVERN 2003-2012= -1].

21 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview> (19 May 2014).

22 http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3629 (5 May 2014).

Veto rights did not find their way into the series of peace regulations made with the MDJT, nor were they implemented into the Chadian constitutions of 1996 or 2005. Even though Youssouf Abbas, a prominent ex-member of the MDJT, became prime minister in 2008 (van Dijk 2009: 214), he was de facto powerless and devoid of veto rights vis-à-vis president Déby and the security apparatus he presided over until the end of the investigation period [**VETO 2003-2012= -1; VETOSAT 2003-2012=n.r.**].²³

Prominent indexes such as Freedom House and the Worldwide Governance Indicators have ascribed low values of political rights to the Chadian republic throughout our observation period (Freedom House 2013; World Bank 2012: 2ff.). A practical lack of accountability combined with low political stability and high-scale irregularities during almost every election in the post-war period highlight the absence of free and fair elections (BTI 2012: 9; Country Watch 2007: 17). The MDJT's failure to transform itself into a political party remained a secondary problem on account of the absence of free and fair elections that undeniably favored the governing MPS [**ELECT 2003-2012= -1**].

Although the MDJT took the northern Tibesti region to be its stronghold, the group's primary aim under Togoïmi was to overthrow the central government, seize N'Djamena and end the rule of President Déby (Lanne 2003: 209f.). There is no evidence in the case-specific literature that the parties fought over issues such as the federal borders inside the disputed territory, the allocation of competences among the political levels, or the question of which state the territory belonged to [**EXBORDER 2003-2012=n.r.; INBORDER 2003-2012=n.r.; COMPETEN 2003-2012=n.r.**].

Neither the MPS nor the MDJT – which solely addressed the issue of systemic corruption – challenged the liberal economic order during our observation period [**ECONOMY 2003-2012=n.r.**].

The civil war between the MPS and the MDJT must be considered within the framework of ethnic conflict, as the Toubou challenged the disproportionate domination of the Zaghawa both within the armed forces and the government (Massey/May 2006: 443). At the same time, there are no indications that the warring parties fought over special programs or measures regarding the promotion of specific groups [**SPECPRO 2003-2012=n.r.**]. Considering the case-specific literature, there were no further issues of a central interest during wartime [**ISSUE1 2003-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 2003-2012=n.r.**].

Shortly after the end of the war, the rebel movement turned oil extraction into a central issue. MDJT Deputy Chairman Mahamat Ali claimed that the non-transparent use of this new

23 BTI 2012: 9, 23; ICG 2008: 24.

source of income would raise corruption rather than lead towards developing the country (Mork 2003: 60).²⁴ This suspicion proved to be correct: increasing revenues were accompanied by growing military expenditures used to counter the remaining MDJT rebels (Country Watch 2007: 16f). In light of this, we assume that the governing party prevailed on this issue [NEWCON 2003-2012= -1]. No further issues emerged in the post-war period [NEWCON2 2003-2012=n.r.]. As there are no compromises that can be identified, the question of whether compromises tended to benefit one of the former conflict parties more than the other is irrelevant [BENEFIT 2003-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 2003-2012=n.r.].

In sum, the interests of the government were clearly dominant throughout the post-war period [COMPROM 2003-2012= -1].

Stability of peace

After 2003, high levels of hostility between the MDJT and MPS came to an end. The minor clashes that temporarily resumed after 2002 do fulfill our strict definition for a relapse into renewed civil war [SAMEWAR=0; DATESAME=n.r.]. Up to the end of 2012 which represents the end of our examination period 120 months of peace were counted [PEACMON1=120].

Chad suffered a return into civil war between the governing MPS and the coalition between the FUCD (Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique) and the RDL (Rally for Democracy and Liberty) at the end of 2005. Numerous coalitions, changing rebel movements and uncountable armed sub-factions emerged from this point onwards. Among these groups, the FUCD and the UFDD (Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement), led by Mahamat Nouri, represent the most important actors. Considering the 2,500 battle-related deaths from 2005 until 2010 in the respective dyads – according to the UCDP –, our criteria for a renewed civil war in the Republic of Chad was met [ANYWAR=1; DATEANY=18 Dec 2005; PEACMON2=36].²⁵

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Annex

Table 2: Troops (IISS 2003-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government</i>		<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
	<i>Army</i>	<i>Paramilitary</i> ²⁶		
2002	25,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2003	25,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2004	25,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2005	25,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2006	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2007	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2008	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2009	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2010	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2011	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
2012	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.

Table 3: Arms (IISS 2003-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government (Army)</i>	<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
2002	60 main battle tanks (MBT) 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2003	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2004	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2006	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2007	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2008	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2009	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2010	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2011	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.
2012	60 MBT 105mm total artillery	n.d.	n.d.

26 Both the Republican Guard and the Gendarmerie are considered paramilitary.