

WARID: **Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna)**

STARDATE: **15 January 1993**

ENDDATE: **1 March 1994**

Related cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) 1992-1995,
Yugoslavia (Croatia)/Croatia (Serbs) 1991-1993

Last update: 3 September 2015

Authors: Thorsten Gromes, Svenja Windisch

Reviewer: Tobias Flessenkemper

Conflict overview

Of all the armed conflicts in the course of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the longest and the bloodiest. One can differentiate between several dyads, i.e. constellations of conflict parties, in this war. The most important dyad related to the struggle between the internationally recognized government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second-most important dyad consisted of the government and Croat rebels.¹

In 1991, 44% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's inhabitants declared themselves as Muslims, 31% as Serbs, and 17% as Croats. While most Muslims later preferred the term 'Bosniacs' and most Croats favored the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, most Serbs wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent, a Serb rebellion aimed at splintering off as much territory as possible from the new state. The Croats' position also changed. They supported the government at the beginning and at the end of the war. In 1993 and the first months of 1994, however, Croat units, supported by troops from Croatia, fought against the government. They established the Croat Republic Herceg-Bosna, seeking unification with Croatia. The fighting concentrated in the Herzegovina and in Central Bosnia (Burg/Shoup 1999; Silber/Little 1997; Woodward 1995).

On 1 March 1994, the Washington Agreement (1994) ended the war between the government and the Croat rebels [**WARENDUC=1; WARENDOS=1; WARDUR=14**]. This peace accord established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth 'Federation') and became a building block for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP 1995) – which ended the war between the government and the Serb re-

1 In contrast to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), we do not identify a separate armed conflict between the government and Croat irregulars. The irregulars can be seen as a part of the Croat rebels.

bels in November 1995. Since then, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been composed of two so-called ‘Entities’: the Federation and Republika Srpska. The Federation consists of ten Cantons.

The UCDP estimates that about 4,000 people [**FATALUC=4000**] were killed in the armed struggle and by one-sided violence in this dyad.² According to this data, 0.15% of the 2.6 million Bosniac and Croat inhabitants in 1991³ [**PREWARPO=2600000**] died as a result of the war [**INTENSUC=0.15**]. For all dyads in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ‘Book of the Deaths’ compiled by the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo lists the names of 96,000 people killed⁴; studies for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia counted 105,000 fatalities.⁵ According to the UCDP, about 13% of the fatalities in all dyads related to the struggle between the government and the Croat rebels. Applying the same share to the overall number of 96,000 fatalities, about 13,000 people were killed in the war between the government and the Croat rebels [**FATALOS=13000**]. Accordingly, the war killed 0.5% of the pre-war population [**INTENSOS=0.5**].

The military balance at the end of the war

Croat troops made advances at the beginning of the war but Bosniac troops eventually struck back. Croatia’s intervention of thousands of troops likely prevented the defeat of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A standoff had existed prior to the Washington Agreement [**VICTORY=0**].⁶ The Croat forces were in possession of better equipment but were outnumbered by the government forces which had to fight against the Serb and the Croat rebels (Calic 1996: 99-102; Nation 2003: 155-160). At the end of the war, Croat forces still controlled territory in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia as well as in North Bosnia [**REBTERR=1**].⁷ But in February 1994, they only controlled 40% of the territory they had controlled in April 1993 [**MORETERR= -1**].⁸ Cunningham et al. (2009) assess the rebels’ relative strength as ‘moderate’ [**REBFIGHT=0**]. Both warring parties were able to continue fighting, as their ongoing war against Serb forces in 1994 and 1995 demonstrated [**CONFIGHT=0**]. Neither side eliminated or captured its enemy’s top political leadership [**LEADER=0**].

2 [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20®ionSelect=9-Eastern Europe#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20®ionSelect=9-Eastern%20Europe#) (22 Nov 2013).

3 See the summary of census results at: <http://popis2013.net/index.php?docid=938> (9 May 2014).

4 “Bosanska knjiga mrtvih” Mirsada Tokače, <http://www.otisak.ba/bih/15677-bosanska-knjiga-mervih-mirsada-tokae.html> (22 Nov 2013).

5 Hag: U BiH tokom rata stradalo više od 100 hiljada ljudi, Nezavisne novine, 29 March 2011, online edition.

6 Bougarel 1999: 210; Calic 1996: 107; Nation 2003: 168, 183; Ramet 2006: 437.

7 Burg/Shoup 1999: 294; CIA 2002: 207.

8 Ramet 2006: 438.

In sum, a military balance existed [**WARBAL=0**].

The post-war military balance

The Washington Agreement (1994: VI) set out to establish unified command over the government troops and Croat forces. Both sides contributed to the Federation's forces that remained in existence even after the Dayton Accords ended the war against the Serb rebels. During a defense reform process from 2003 to 2006 (Hadžović 2007a), the Federation and Republika Srpska transferred responsibility of defense policy to the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each of the three infantry brigades of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of a Bosniac battalion, a Serb battalion and a Croat battalion.⁹ Thus, since 2006, both the former government and the former Croat rebels provided troops to the armed forces at the state level [**STATEFOR 1994-2005=n.r., STATEFOR 2006-2012=0**].¹⁰

In accordance with the agreements signed in Washington and Dayton, Croat soldiers had to serve under a unified command, first in the Federation and then in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2006. It is doubtful, however, whether Croat forces would be loyal to the government in the case of an armed conflict.¹¹ Additionally, the Cantons maintained their police units (Azinović et al. 2011: 31, 34, 41). As such, both former warring parties possessed separate forces during the entire post-war period [**SEPFORCE 1994-2012=0**].

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in 1993, the government commanded 60,000 military troops¹², while the Croat rebels had about 50,000 fighters (see Table 2 in the annex). After the Washington Agreement was signed in March 1994, the ratio changed to the advantage of the government. Within the merged forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 45.9% of the soldiers were Bosniacs and 19.8% were Croats [**TROOPS 1994-2012= - 1**].¹³

With respect to the number of battle tanks and artillery, Croat forces clearly held a superiority compared to the government in 1993, though the latter held an advantage with respect to armored vehicles (see Table 3 in the annex). If considering artillery and main battle tanks, the balance significantly shifted to the benefit of the government from 1994 until 2000.¹⁴ The former rebels did, however, gain ground with regard to armored vehicles. In sum, for two of

9 See http://www.mod.gov.ba/o_nama/Odbrambena_struktura/?id=21715 (22 Nov 2013).

10 We round the Croats' share from 19.8% to 20%.

11 When the dominating Croat party proclaimed Croat self rule in 2001, nearly all Croat soldiers followed the call to leave their posts (Kasch 2002: 348).

12 The government forces were dominated by Bosniac troops but also comprised of Croat fighters.

13 BiH Ministry of Defense 2011: 15.

14 Exception: in 1995 there was significant change in favor of the former rebels with regard to main battle tanks.

the three categories, the government improved its situation [ARMS 1994-2000= -1].¹⁵ From 2001 onwards, IISS did not report data differentiating between successors of the government forces and the Croat rebels. If we assume that the ratio of the respective equipment for the period 2001-2012 reflects the ratio of the troops at that time, it seems unlikely that the Croat troops regained the superiority they had held during the war [ARMS 2001-2012= -1].

Until the end of the war against the Serb rebels, the Bosniac-dominated government forces and the Croat units each controlled a part of the Federation. Like the other institutions of the Federation, the Cantons only came into existence after the war against the Serb rebels (cf. Bildt 1998: 127-128, Calic 1996: 251). The Cantons Posavina, West-Herzegovina and Canton 10 are predominantly Croat; the Cantons Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva are mixed; the Cantons Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje and Sarajevo are predominantly Bosniac. As such, all warring parties controlled territory with state institutions and were able to recruit people and to extract resources [TERRCON 1994-2012=0].

Following Dayton, the Federation controlled more territory than it had at the time of its founding in March 1994.¹⁶ The government forces as well as Croat troops won territory formerly held by Serb fighters. The Federation received control over most of Sarajevo and a corridor connecting the city of Goražde to other parts of the Federation. As Sarajevo and Goražde had mainly been inhabited by Bosniacs before the war¹⁷, the government gained more important territory [TERRWIN 1994-1995=0, TERRWIN 1996-2012= -1]. The predominantly Bosniac Canton of Una-Sana is surrounded by Republika Srpska and the predominantly Croat Canton 10, while the mainly Croat Canton of Posavina is isolated from other Croat territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are also enclaves within the Cantons, e.g. Žepče in Canton Zenica-Doboj. All in all, it appears that none of the former warring party's territory is more vulnerable than another's [VULNERAB 1994-2012=0].¹⁸

Armed peacekeeping forces were present in the entire post-war period. From 1994 to the end of 1995, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) kept the peace between Bosniac and Croat forces (United Nations Secretary-General 1994: para. 13). The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) kept the peace in the entirety of Bosnia and Herzegovina from December 1995 to December 1996. Up until December 2004, it was succeeded by the

15 See the respective yearbook 'The Military Balance' by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 1993-2012). The yearbooks 1996-1999 claim to report only data for the situation prior to the Dayton Agreement. Nevertheless, the reported numbers for these years changed significantly.

16 See the map at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bih94.JPG> (11 Dec 2013).

17 Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 1993: 7-13, 46-49.

18 See the maps by the Federation's Institute for Statistics at http://www.fzs.ba/mape_kantona_f_bih.htm (26 Nov 2013).

Stabilization Force (SFOR). After that point, the European Union Force Operation Althea continued peacekeeping [**PEACKEEP 1994-2012=0**].¹⁹

The USA, Russia, the United Kingdom and France assumed substantial roles in the efforts to establish, keep, and build peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of them committed themselves to guaranteeing peace, no matter if one side violated the peace agreement. None of them announced it would ally with one of the conflict party in the case of a renewed war [**P5ALLY 1994-2012=n.r.**].

To summarize, an imbalance in favor of the former government existed after the war [**POSTBAL 1994-1995= -0.29, POSTBAL 1996-2005=0.43, POSTBAL 2006-2012= -0.38**]. The scores for the military balance at the end of the war and for the post-war years show quite a balanced situation, with only slight advantages for the government [**BALANCE 1994-1995= -0.14, BALANCE 1996-2005= -0.21, BALANCE 2006-2012=-0.19**]

Economy

The war and its consequences upset Bosnia and Herzegovina's demographic structure. As the first post-war census did not take place until 2013²⁰, data for the population in the years 1994-2012 could only be estimated. The figures for the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are therefore also estimates. Note that in 1994 and 1995, the war between the government and the Serb rebels was ongoing.

Table 1: The gross domestic product per capita in current USD²¹

<i>Year</i>	<i>Estimated population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1994	3659409	343
1995	3520996	530
1996	3485575	799
1997	3535998	1038
1998	3640821	1131
1999	3752004	1249
2000	3834364	1436
2001	3879353	1482
2002	3897579	1707
2003	3895779	2148
2004	3886723	2579
2005	3879828	2822
2006	3875157	3200
2007	3868665	3950

19 See Fortna (2008: 21) for the period until 2004, for the later years, see http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134 (22 Nov 2013).

20 According to this census, the population is about 3.79 million: Maja Rener-Smajović: U BiH popisane 3.791.622 osobe, Nezavisne novine, 5 November 2013, online edition.

21 Data on GDP per capita and population available at: <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/bih?downloadformat=excel> (27 Nov 2013).

2008	3861201	4802
2009	3853446	4433
2010	3845929	4362
2011	3839322	4751
2012	3833916	4447

The scale of compromise after the war

According to the Federation’s original constitution – based on the peace accord –, a President and a Vice-President were to be elected. The regulations indirectly stipulate that one of them should be Bosniac and the other one Croat (Constitution 2003: B.1).²² Moreover, at least one-third of the Ministerial positions should be occupied by Croats (Constitution 2003: B.2). The Federation’s President and Vice-President were elected in 1994.²³ Consequently, power-sharing was implemented even before the end of the war against the Serb rebels. Power-sharing in the Federation continued after the Dayton Agreement. Of similar importance was power-sharing within the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the new constitution, which was part of the peace agreement, the tripartite presidency consists of a Serb, elected in Republika Srpska, as well as a Bosniac and a Croat, elected in the Federation (GFAP 1995: annex 4.V). In sum, Bosniacs and Croats were consistently included in the government, both in the Federation and in the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina [**GOVERN 1994-2012=0**].

The Federation’s constitution established veto procedures within the parliament and the cabinet (Constitution 2003: A.4.18, B.2.6.1). In Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite Presidency, each member possesses a veto right (GFAP 1995: annex 4.V.2). All decisions require a majority of votes in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which “includes at least one-third of the votes of Delegates or Members from the territory of each Entity” (GFAP 1995: annex 4.IV.3d). Another veto right is institutionalized in the House of Peoples – one of two chambers of the Parliamentary Assembly – comprised of five Bosniacs, five Serbs and five Croats. A decision that affects a vital interest of one people requires approval from a respective majority in each of the three caucuses (GFAP 1995: annex 4.IV.3e). Despite many debates about reforming this political system, the veto rights are still in force [**VETO 1994-2012=0**].

In the post-war period, Bosniac parties have supported Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state shared by Serb, Croats and themselves. At the same time, they favored the establishment of

22 The constitution has been changed several times. An English version from 2003 is available at: <http://www.bihdaytonproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/fbih-constitution.pdf> (4 Dec 2013). Changed parts are in italics, footnotes document the original wording.

23 See information provided by the CIA World Factbook 1994 at: <http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact94/wf950033.txt> (4 Dec 2013).

functional regions over the preservation of ethnically defined Entities. Moreover, many Bosniac politicians called for constraining or abolishing veto rights. As the largest group, Bosniacs perceive power-sharing and veto rights to be a strait jacket. Since Croats comprise a smaller share of the total population, they perceive power-sharing and veto rights to be a protection against Bosniac domination.²⁴ After an imposed reform to the Federation's constitution in 2002, Croat politicians have complained that their veto position has significantly been weakened in this Entity [**VETOSAT 1994-2001=1, VETOSAT 2002-2012=0**].²⁵

Until the first post-war elections were held in September 1996, the Constitutional Assembly served as the Federation's parliament. It consisted of representatives who had been elected to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 (Omerović 2011: 461). Since the war against the Serb rebels ended, political parties with Bosniac or Croat affiliations, parties from across the Federation, and parties with multi-ethnic orientations have all run in post-war elections for the institutions of the Federation and the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina [**ELECT 1994-2012=0**].²⁶ All post-war elections have basically been free and fair.²⁷

The war was dominated by the question of whether Bosnia-Herzegovina would continue to exist with its internationally recognized borders. Most Bosniacs supported the government's struggle for the state's territorial integrity, whereas the Croat rebels tried to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina. They first established the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna and then the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, which they intended to integrate into Croatia. According to the Washington Agreement (1994: I), the Federation is "[b]ased on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Moreover, the agreement allowed for a confederation between Croatia and the Federation – which never materialized in the end. Thus, the conflict over secession was settled in accordance with the government's position [**EXBORDER 1994-2012= -1**]. Cantons comprise the federal units within the Federation, some mixed and most with an outright majority of either Bosniacs or Croats. The borders of the Cantons, which were recognized after the Dayton Agreement, do not reflect the dictate of one warring party. However, since this aspect is also considered in relation to power-sharing

24 Bildt 1998: 138-139, Gromes 2012: 67-90.

25 Interviews with high-ranking representatives from the leading Croat party conducted by Thorsten Gromes, Sarajevo, October 2008.

26 See all results in the local language at <http://www.izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=48&Lang=3&Mod=0> (22 Nov 2013). The English version does not present all election results.

27 Freedom House rated the political rights from 1996 to 1999 a '4', 2000 to 2008 a '2', and 2009 to 2012 a '1'. The best possible rating is a '1', the worst a '7'. See <http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Territory%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28final%29.xls> (20 Sep 2014).

and the allocation of responsibilities between the federal level and the Entities, it does require renewed coding **[INBORDER 1994-2012=n.r.]**.²⁸

While Bosniac representatives strived to establish a strong central government, Croat politicians demanded powerful political units in which they could make decisions independently of the other peoples (cf. Burg/Shoup 1999: 361). The Washington Agreement (1994: III) established a decentralized federation in which the Cantons were granted many responsibilities. On the other hand, the Dayton Agreement did not constitute a strong central government, either. The Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo were responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the federal institutions, immigration, refugee and asylum policies, international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, common and international communication facilities, the regulation of inter-Entity transportation, and air traffic control. All other responsibilities were reserved to the Entities (GFAP 1995: annex 4.III). Between the years 2000 und 2006, the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained new responsibilities in the areas of the judiciary (Independent Judicial Commission 2004), border protection, police (Ahić 2007a und 2007b), intelligence (Hadžović 2007b), and finance (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 150-158). As already mentioned, the Entities lost their responsibility over defense policy. Nevertheless, Bosniac parties assessed the Entities to be too powerful, even after these reforms **[COMPETEN 1994-2012=1]**.

Dissent over economic policy, special programs for particular groups or other issues did not constitute driving forces in the war **[ECONOMY 1994-2012=n.r.; SPECPRO 1994-2012=n.r.; ISSUE 1994-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 1994-2012=n.r.]**.

The Dayton Agreement authorized an internationally appointed High Representative to coordinate efforts to implement the provisions related to civilian matters (GFAP 1995: annex 10). In December 1997, the High Representative was given the competency to remove elected politicians and other officials and to impose legislation (Peace Implementation Council 1997: para. XI). Until December 2012, the High Representative dismissed almost 200 politicians and other officials; in total, he made more than 900 decisions using his expanded powers.²⁹ As many Croats believe that the High Representative used his powers to weaken their parties, restrict power-sharing, and centralize the country, they tend to be more critical towards him than the Bosniacs **[NEWCON 1994-1997=n.r.; NEWCON 1998-2012= -1; NEWCON2 1994-2012=n.r.]**.

28 See maps at http://www.fzs.ba/mape_kantona_f_bih.htm (26 Nov 2013).

29 S. <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp> (22 Nov 2013).

A compromise regarding the cantonal borders did not clearly favor one of the former warring parties [BENEFIT 1994-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2=n.r.].

In sum, relations between Bosniacs and Croats were characterized by large-scale compromises [COMPROM 1994-1995=0.17, COMPROM 1996-1997=0.14, COMPROM 1998-2012=0].

Stability of peace

The separate peace between the government and the Croat rebels did not collapse in the course of the ongoing war against the Serb rebels. After the Dayton Agreement was concluded in 1995, no further war took place [SAMEWAR 1994-2012=0; DATESAME=n.r.; ANYWAR 1994-2012=0; DATEANY=n.r.].³⁰ Peace between the government and the Croat rebels lasted from the signing of the Washington Agreement up until the end of the period under investigation at the end of December 2012 [PEACMON1=226; PEACMON2=226].

References

- Ahić, Jasmin 2007a: Bosnia's Security Sector Reform – State Border Service of BH as an efficient Border Management Agency, in: Ebnöther, Anja H./Fluri, Philipp H./Jureković, Predrag (eds.): Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, Vienna and Geneva, 309-322.
- Ahić, Jasmin 2007b: The Reconstruction of the BH Police Force, in: Ebnöther, Anja H./Fluri, Philipp H./Jureković, Predrag (eds.): Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, Vienna and Geneva, 371-389.
- Azinović, Vlado/Bassuener, Kurt/Weber, Bodo 2011: Assessing the potential for renewed ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A security risk analysis, o.O, http://democratizationpolicy.org/uimages/pdf/DPC-AI_BiH%20Security_Study.pdf (21 Nov 2013).
- BiH Ministry of Defense 2011: Brochure of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/maj_2011/bosura%20eng%20mail.pdf (9 May 2014).
- Bildt, Carl 1998: Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, London.
- Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit 2009: Staatlichkeit in Zeiten des Statebuilding. Intervention und Herrschaft in Bosnien und Herzegowina, Frankfurt am Main.
- Bougarel, Xavier 1999: Zur Ökonomie des Bosnien-Konflikts: zwischen Raub und Produktion, in: Jean, Francois/Rufin, Jean-Christophe (eds.): Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege, Hamburg, 191-218.
- Burg, Steven L./Shoup, Paul S. 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, London.
- Calic, Marie-Janine 1996: Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Hercegowina. Erweiterte Neuauflage, Frankfurt am Main.
- CIA 2002: Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995, Volume 1, Washington, DC.
- Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003, "Official Gazette" of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/94, 13/97, 16/02, 22/02, 52/02, 60/02, 18/03,63/03, <http://www.bihdaytonproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/fbih-constitution.pdf> (4 Dec 2013).
- Cunningham, David E./Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede/Salehyan, Idean 2009: It Takes Two. A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53: 4, 570-597, data available at: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/nsa_v3.3_7March2012.asc (22 Nov 2013).

30 See http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20®ionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe# (22 Nov 2013).

- Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine 1993: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva. Rezultati za republiku po opštinama i naseljenim mjestima 1991., Sarajevo, <http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/nacionalni%20sastav%20stanovnistva%20po%20naseljenim%20mjestima%20bilten%20234.pdf> (9 May 2014).
- Fortna, Virginia Page 2008: Data Notes, <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pk&pkept%20data%20notes.pdf> (22 Nov 2013).
- General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, 14 December 1995, www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 (22 Nov 2013).
- Gromes, Thorsten 2012: Ohne Staat und Nation ist keine Demokratie zu machen. Bosnien und Herzegowina, Kosovo und Makedonien nach den Bürgerkriegen, Baden-Baden.
- Hadžović, Denis 2007a: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: Ebnöther, Anja H./Fluri, Philipp H./Jureković, Predrag (eds.): Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, Vienna and Geneva, 79-100.
- Hadžović, Denis 2007b: Intelligence Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: Ebnöther, Anja H./Fluri, Philipp H./Jureković, Predrag (eds.): Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, Vienna and Geneva, 218-241.
- Independent Judicial Commission 2004: Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission, January 2001–March 2004, www.hjpc.ba/reports/pdf/final_report_eng.PDF (22 Nov 2013).
- IISS 1993/94-2013: The Military Balance, London.
- Kasch, Holger 2002: Die HDZBiH und die Forderung nach kroatischer Souveränität in Bosnien-Herzegowina, in: Südosteuropa, 51: 7-9, 331-354.
- Nation, R. Craig 2003: War in the Balkans, 1991-2002, Carlisle, PA.
- Omerović, Enis 2011: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, in: Banović, Damir/Gavrić, Šaša (eds.): Država, politika i društvo u Bosni i Hercegovini. Analiza postdejtonskog političkog sistema, Sarajevo, 459-491.
- Peace Implementation Council 1997: PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 (22 Nov 2013).
- Ramet, Sabrina P. 2006: The Three Yugoslavia. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005, Washington, DC and Bloomington, IN.
- Silber, Laura/Little, Allan 1997: Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation, revised and updated edition, New York, NY, et al.
- United Nations Secretary-General 1994: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994), S/1994/1067, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1994/1067 (4 Dec 2013).
- Washington Agreement 1994, 1 March 1994, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washagree_03011994.pdf (26 Nov 2013).
- Woodward, Susan L. 1995: Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, DC.

Annex

Table 2: Troops in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (IISS 1993/94-2013)

Year	Former government	Former rebels	Ratio	
	ARBiH	HVO		
1993	60000	50000	1.2	1
1994	110000	50000	2.2	1
1995	92000	50000	1.84	1
1996	40000	16000	2.5	1
1997	40000	16000	2.5	1
1998	40000	16000	2.5	1
1999	40000	16000	2.5	1
2000	30000	10000	3	1
2001	16800	7200	2.33	1
2002 ³¹	9200	4000	2.3	1
2003	9200	4000	2.3	1
2004	11992	4408	2.72	1
2005	11992	4408	2.72	1
	<i>AFBiH</i> ³²			
2006	11865		2.32 ³³	1
2007	9047		2.32	1
2008	8543		2.32	1
2009	11099		2.32	1
2010	10577		2.32	1
2011	10577		2.32	1
2012	10550		2.32	1

Table 3: Arms in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (IISS 1993/94-2013)

Year	Former government	Former rebels	Ratio	
	ARBiH	HVO		
1993	20 MBT ³⁴	50 MBT	1	2.5
	30 APC ³⁵	0		
	some total artillery	500 total artillery		
1994	40 MBT	75 MBT	1	1.88
	30 APC	0		
	340+ total artillery	200 total artillery	1.7	1
1995	31 MBT	100 MBT	1	3.23
	35 APC	80 AIFV ³⁶	1	2.29
	302+ total artillery	530 total artillery	1	1.75
1996	75 MBT	100 MBT	1	1.33
	35 APC	80 AFV	1	2.29
	600 total artillery	930 total artillery	1	1.55
1997	80 MBT	50 MBT	1.6	1
	70 APC	30 AFV	2.33	1

31 In contrast to other years, IISS excludes conscripts in its data for 2002 and 2003.

32 Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

33 The ratio for the years 2006-2012 assumes that 45.9% of the soldiers are Bosniacs, 33.6% Serbs and 19.8% Croats (cf. BiH Ministry of Defense 2011: 15).

34 Main battle tank.

35 Armored personnel carrier.

36 Armored infantry fighting vehicle.

	2500 total artillery	1250 total artillery	2	1
1998	60+ MBT	50 MBT	1.2	1
	70 APC	30+ AFV	2.33	1
	3850 total artillery	1250 total artillery	3.08	1
1999	150 MBT	75 MBT	2	1
	150 APC	80 AFV	1.88	1
	2000 total artillery	400 total artillery	5	1
2000	170 MBT	80 MBT	2.13	1
	150 APC	90 AIFV	1.67	1
	1,500 total artillery	500 total artillery	3	1
2001	205 MBT			
	185 APC, AIFV			
	919 total artillery			
2002	203 MBT			
	105 APC, AIFV			
	880 total artillery			
2003	192 MBT			
	105 APC, AIFV			
	900 total artillery			
2004	188 MBT			
	105 APC, AIFV			
	914 total artillery			
2005	188 MBT			
	164 APC; AIFV			
	946+ total artillery			
<i>AFBIH</i>				
2006	194 MBT			
	194 APC, AIFV			
	357+ total artillery			
2007	194 MBT			
	194 APC, AIFV			
	357+ total artillery			
2008	325 MBT			
	325 APC, AIFV			
	754+ total artillery			
2009	325 MBT			
	276 APC, AIFV			
	1,757 total artillery			
2010	334 MBT			
	264 AIFV, APC			
	1,521 total artillery			
2011	334 MBT			
	264 AIFV, APC			
	1,521 total artillery			
2012	316 MBT			
	264 AIFV, APC			
	1,521 total artillery			