

WARID: Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) 1988-1994
STARDATE: 1 January 1988¹
ENDDATE: 12 May 1994
Related cases: none
Last update: 15 October 2015
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Conflict overview

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ignited in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union; it promoted the strengthening of nationalism in the South Caucasus as well as the tightening of tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (Halbach 2009: 15). The conflict was preceded by a long history of violence between the two nations: in the 20th century alone, clashes occurred from 1904 to 1906 and were followed by a full-scale war from 1918 to 1921. One of the major issues was sovereignty over the mountainous region of Karabakh (Auch 2009: 35; Halbach 2009: 17). In 1921, Soviet rule was established in the South Caucasus and the mostly Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh region was assigned to remain a part of Azerbaijan (Mammadov 2012: 58). However, tensions that had been ‘frozen’ by the Soviet regime for over 70 years reignited in the beginning of 1988. These were prompted by Armenian mass demonstrations demanding the independence of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO) from the Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) Azerbaijan and its unification with Armenia. While Armenians represented less than 6% of Azerbaijan’s population at the time,² they accounted for 77% of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh (Baguirov 2008). Public protests were soon followed by outbursts of violence against the respective ethnic minorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1989, violent clashes between civilians and between weakly organized and uncontrolled Azerbaijani and Armenian militias began. Moreover, the remnants of the Soviet army repeatedly intervened in the conflict, alternately acting in favor of each conflicting side. First, conventional battles involving Azerbaijani

1 Deviating from the UCDP dataset, which considers 30 January 1989 as the start date of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the beginning of the conflict is coded as 1 January 1988, as reported by the CONIAS Research Institute datasets: <http://www.conias.org/datens%C3%A4tze/verf%C3%BCbare.html> (9 Jun 2014). The case literature shows that the conflict ignited with one-sided violence against civilians in early 1988, alongside mass demonstrations and upheavals in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Whereas Armenian sources claim that the violent conflict began with the pogrom of Sumgait on 26-28 February 1988, Azerbaijani scholars claim that violence against Azerbaijani civilians occurred prior to Sumgait (Auch 2009: 38; Manutscharjan 2009: 38).

2 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

nis and their central government, on the one side, and the Armenian state and the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, on the other, were fought in 1991 and endured until May 1994 (Halbach 2009: 26f.). In 1992, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan;³ subsequently, in 1992 and 1993, Azerbaijan and the Armenian side struggled for territorial control in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh forces took over Lachin and Shusha – creating a corridor to Armenia that opened supply routes – and a number of Azeri strongholds outside of Karabakh. Throughout 1993, the Armenian side made steady territorial gains, taking control of settlements in the south and east as well as in the Zangilan-Fizuli strip between the NKAO and Iran; it also maintained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the corridor to the west (Cornell 1999). Meanwhile, several attempts made by the International Community and neighboring states to mediate the conflict failed (Human Rights Watch 1994: 1ff.). Finally, after an unsuccessful Azerbaijani military offensive, a ceasefire agreement between all warring parties was reached on 12 May 1994 [**WARENDUC=3; WARENDOS=3; WARDUR=76**].⁴

According to the estimates of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia,⁵ 4,835 people lost their lives in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [**FATALUC=5000**]. However, available information on the death toll is very controversial: different sources provide numbers that vary between 18,000 and 30,000 deaths (e.g. ICG 2005: 2; Mooradian/Druckman 1999: 712; Rowland 2008: 100). We have therefore applied the average of 25,000 casualties [**FATALOS=25000**].⁶

Based on the last Soviet census from 12 January 1989, the pre-war population of the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh was estimated at 190,000 (Rowland 2008: 104).⁷ Although the conflict had already ignited at the time of the census, large displacements (of mostly Azerbaijani civilians) from Nagorno-Karabakh occurred between 1991 and 1993. Therefore, the data from 1989 may be considered a reliable source of information on the pre-war population in Nagorno-Karabakh [**PREWARPO=200000**]. In sum, the intensity of the conflict varies significantly depending on the death toll estimates [**INTENSUC=2.5; INTENSOS=12.5**].

The military balance at the end of the war

During wartime, troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia progressively gained control of the disputed territory. By May 1994, they controlled over 90% of the former NKAO, as well

3 <http://www.nkr.am/en/declaration/10/> (10 Jun 2014).

4 Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement, <http://www.nkr.am/en/ceasefire-agreement/147/> (9 Jun 2014).

5 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=9®ionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe# (10 Jun 2014).

6 <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=52¶midioma=1> (10 Jun 2014).

7 This data refers to the territory of the NKAO.

as seven Azerbaijani districts outside the disputed territory (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Zangelan, Jebrail, Fizuli, and Agdam).⁸ Hence, military victory clearly belonged to the side of the former rebelling party of Nagorno-Karabakh [**VICTORY=1**]. Lachin provided a corridor to Armenia in the east while Kelbajar protected the corridor from the north, Fizuli protected Karabakh from the south, and the rest of the territory spanned the area between the NKAO and Iran.⁹ Azerbaijan thus had de facto lost 16% of its territory [**REBTERR=1; MORETERR=1**].¹⁰

According to Cunningham et al. (2009), the relative fighting capacity of the rebel side was ‘low’, suggesting an advantage for the government. Nevertheless, Azerbaijani troops were completely expelled from the disputed territory by the end of the war. Despite the quantitative military advantage of the Azerbaijani side (100,000 soldiers against 35,000 Armenian soldiers),¹¹ the Azerbaijani forces were considerably weakened by organizational difficulties due to intra-governmental quarrels. At the same time, Nagorno-Karabakh was supported by forces from Armenia and most likely by some divisions of the former Soviet army. Therefore, Armenian fighting capacity can be considered as at least moderate [**REBFIGHT=0**].¹²

Although the Armenian side won the war by military means, the Karabakh Armenians had little to no capacity to make additional gains vis-à-vis the Azerbaijani forces. Having already successfully conquered and held Nagorno-Karabakh and seven ‘buffer zone’ territories, the Karabakh Armenians had likely reached their capacity and desire for territorial expansion. Azerbaijani forces could only make sporadic attempts to reclaim territory. Azerbaijan maintained a large active fighting force and weapons arsenal that would theoretically allow them to keep fighting.¹³ Yet, Azerbaijani offensives carried out in December 1993 and again in April 1994¹⁴ did not succeed in pushing past the line of contact or in reclaiming territory (Zagorski 2009: 120). By the end of the war, Azerbaijani forces had entirely been expelled from the disputed territory. Although the Armenian side mostly focused on maintaining the ground that had already been gained, and was unlikely to push the line of contact further, Armenian territorial gains and the military advantage it reached by the end of the war should also be emphasized in the coding [**CONFIGHT=1**]. Nonetheless, the ceasefire agreement was ‘overdue’ and to the benefit of both conflict sides.

8 ICG 2005: 1; ICG 2007.

9 ICG 2011: annex A.

10 Cunningham et al. 2009.

11 Halbach 2009: 27.

12 Benedikter 2011: 97.

13 IISS 1994

14 Human Rights Watch 1994.

While Azerbaijani political leadership in Baku experienced some turbulence during the war, the situation stabilized after President Gaidar Aliev suppressed a coup attempt in late-1994 and “sidelined his one major political rival”, Prime Minister Surat Husseinov (Maresca 1996: 494). The Karabakh Armenians also maintained their leadership and their political influence in Armenia; the NK ‘clan’ influenced the ousting of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian in 1998, and the two subsequent Armenian presidents originated from the NK region [**LEADER=0**].¹⁵

In conclusion, the military balance at the end of war was mainly to the advantage of the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh [**WARBAL=0.67**].

The post-war military balance

By the time the ceasefire agreement was signed, the territory of the former SSR Azerbaijan was de facto divided in two separate entities. Throughout the whole post-war period, the state of Azerbaijan did not employ military or police forces from Nagorno-Karabakh [**STATEFOR 1994-2012=n.r.**]. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) remained in full control of the disputed territory and the seven occupied districts of Azerbaijan, where it maintained its own state-like structures and military.¹⁶ Thus, Azerbaijan and the NKR both possessed separate armed forces within their respective territory [**SEPFORCE 1994-2012=0**].

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the troop ratio changed in favor of the Azerbaijani side after the end of the war [**TROOPS 1994-1997= -1**]. From 1998 onwards, however, the number of active Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh forces gradually decreased [**TROOPS 1998-2000=0; TROOPS 2001-2002= -1; TROOPS 2003-2004=0**] – there is no data available on Karabakh forces from 2005 to the end of the investigation period [**TROOPS 2005-2012=n.d.**].¹⁷ From 2005 onwards, Azerbaijan made vast investments in its military to the extent that its military budget exceeded the entire national budget of Armenia (Halbach/Smolnik 2013: 5). On the other hand, it must be noted that on the rebel side, troop strength only considers the armed forces within Nagorno-Karabakh; in the case of a renewed military conflict, the Armenian army would most likely have fought alongside the NKR. If the strength of the Armenian forces is added to the NKR troops, the ratio between the conflict parties remains balanced throughout the post-war period.¹⁸

15 Ziyadov 2010.

16 Taking into account that the absence of Armenians in the military of Azerbaijan does not indicate a disadvantage for the Armenian side, one might consider changing the coding of the item to: **STATEFOR 1994-2012=0**.

17 IISS 1994/95-2013.

18 For a comparison, the IISS data on Armenian troops was included in Table 2 (see Annex).

As the IISS yearbooks do not provide any data on the equipment held by the rebelling side in 1994, data from 1993 is used to determine the ratio of changes between the government and rebel military equipment. In 1995, the arms ratio changed significantly in favor of the rebel side [**ARMS 1994=n.d.; ARMS 1995-2004=1**]. The IISS yearbooks do not provide information on the rebel's military equipment in the years from 2005 to 2012 [**ARMS 2005-2012=n.d.**]. Russia remained a crucial arms supplier for both conflict parties. Whereas Russia provided Armenia with 90% of its total military equipment, it also supplied Azerbaijan with 60% of its weapons arsenal from 2007 to 2011 (Halbach/Smolnik 2013: 29).

Throughout the post-war period, both conflict sides remained in control of important territory, so much so that they conducted recruiting and exploited resources by implementing state structures (Azerbaijan) and state-like structures (Nagorno-Karabakh) [**TERRCON 1994-2012=0**]. As the territorial division of Azerbaijan remained unchanged, neither side controlled more important territory than it did at the end of war [**TERRWIN 1994-2012=0**].

As a result of the war, troops from Nagorno-Karabakh occupied important strategic areas that formed a 'security belt' around the NKR, which – combined with the mountainous landscape – made it almost inaccessible for the Azerbaijani military (e.g. ICG 2005: 27; ICG 2009: 3). Although Azerbaijan was larger than the NKR, the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan was fully separated from the 'main part' of the state by Armenia and thus a highly vulnerable area. Even though neither conflict side could count upon an easy victory in case of a renewed war, the territory of Azerbaijan was geographically more vulnerable than the NKR [**VULNERAB 1994-2012=1**].¹⁹

While the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deployed observer missions to Azerbaijan and convened the Minsk Group to facilitate a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue,²⁰ a line of contact between Azerbaijan and the territories occupied by Armenian troops was not guarded by international peacekeeping troops. Shootings along the border occurred frequently, causing numerous fatalities among soldiers and civilians on both sides every year [**PEACKEEP 1994-2012=n.r.**].²¹

Strong support from the Armenian 'motherland' proved to be to the advantage of the NKR, itself a strategic ally to the Russian Federation. Russia was considered the most important regional power and external actor in the South Caucasus. Throughout the post-war period, Russia played a role in preventing the conflict from renewed escalation and in consolidating the status quo, which would both correspond Russia's strategic interest in maintaining its

19 ICG 2005: 27; Jahn 2009: 262.

20 Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

21 Fortna 2008: 19; Halbach 2009: 21.

dominant position in the region (Jahn 2009: 263; Zagorski 2009: 110). However, a number of factors indicate that, in the case of an armed conflict with Azerbaijan, Russia would come to Armenia's defense, though Moscow would hesitate to intervene in a war fought exclusively over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Collective Security Treaty obliges Moscow to defend Armenia against external aggression and provide security guarantees against general threats to Armenian security. On the other hand, it "does not fully clarify Moscow's military obligation if war resumes over Nagorno-Karabakh" and, according to Russian sources, does not extend to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (ICG 2011). At the same time, Russian relations with Azerbaijan significantly strengthened in the late-2000s in the areas of commerce, energy and the military. Moreover, Russian-Turkish relations, which have improved in recent years, would be strained by a Russian intervention on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh, as Turkey has signed agreements with the Azerbaijani Government that guarantee support in case of an attack (ICG 2011). Even though the 'Russian factor' played a crucial role in strategic considerations for all conflict parties, a direct involvement in case of a renewed war over Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be assumed with any certainty [**P5ALLY 1994-2012=n.r.**].

In sum, the military balance in the post-war period was highly balanced, and any respective advantages on either side were insignificant [**POSTBAL 1994=0; POSTBAL 1995-1997=0.17; POSTBAL 1998-2000=0.33; POSTBAL 2001-2002=0.17; POSTBAL 2003-2004=0.33; POSTBAL 2005-2012=0.25**].

The overall military balance slightly favors the conflict side of the Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh [**BALANCE 1994=0.33; BALANCE 1995-1997=0.42; BALANCE 1998-2000=0.5; BALANCE 2001-2002=0.42; BALANCE 2003-2004=0.5; BALANCE 2005-2012=0.46**].

Economy

Except for a slight dip in 1995 and 2009, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Azerbaijan grew almost constantly after the end of the war.

Table 1: GDP per capita in post-war Azerbaijan in current USD²²

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1994	7597000	436
1995	7685000	397
1996	7763000	409
1997	7838250	506
1998	7913000	562
1999	7982750	574
2000	8048600	655
2001	8111200	704
2002	8171950	763
2003	8234100	884
2004	8306500	1045
2005	8391850	1578
2006	8484550	2473
2007	8581300	3851
2008	8763400	5575
2009	8947243	4950
2010	9054332	5843
2011	9173082	7190
2012	9295784	7165

The scale of compromise after the war

Even though Nagorno-Karabakh's declaration of independence was not recognized by the International Community, state-like structures including a parliament, government and constitution were successfully established in the NKR. However, since the majority of the Azerbaijani population in Nagorno-Karabakh fled the region or was forcefully displaced over the course of the war, there were no Azerbaijani representatives left to participate in the Republic's government [**GOVERN 1994-2012=1**].²³ Accordingly, the Azerbaijani side could not be assigned a veto right, meaning that political decisions within the NKR were exclusively made by Armenians [**VETO 1994-2012=1; VETOSAT 1994-2012=n.r.**]. Although the constitution of the NKR does not prohibit an Azerbaijani opposition from participating in presidential or parliamentary elections, this was irrelevant as long as an agreement on the returning of the displaced Azerbaijani population to Nagorno-Karabakh remained absent. Until a political party or organization representing the Azerbaijani side exists in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani participation in the electoral processes of the Republic will be impossible [**ELECT 1994-2012=1**].²⁴

The main issue in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was the region's territorial status. Whereas Azerbaijan still considered the region an integral part of the Azerbaijani state and demanded it be returned to Azerbaijani jurisdiction (Babajew 2009: 88), the NKR called for

22 Data available at: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx> (10 Jun 2014).

23 ICG 2005: 1.

24 ICG 2005: 10. Until 2012 Freedom House classified the political status of the NKR as 'not free': <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/nagorno-karabakh#.U5TmfXZ-MpU> (10 Jun 2014).

international recognition of its independence.²⁵ In the absence of a compromise on this matter, the former rebelling party clearly prevailed by establishing the de facto independent state of Nagorno-Karabakh [**EXBORDER 1994-2012=1**]. Considering that the war was fought exclusively over the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh, other issues were hardly relevant for either side [**INBORDER 1994-2012=n.r.; COMPETEN 1994-2012=n.r.; ECONOMY 1994-2012=n.r.**].

Although the Armenian side claims that severe discrimination against ethnic Armenians within the SSR Azerbaijan was a major reason for initial calls for independence in 1988 (Manutscharjan 2009: 35), the simple promotion of the Armenian minority within the borders of Azerbaijan – instead of secession – was never actually considered [**SPECPRO 1994-2012=n.r.**]. There is also no evidence that any other issues were important in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [**ISSUE 1994-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 1994-2012=n.r.**].

However, the fighting brought about a new situation with new problems for both parties. Under the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides were able to agree on a list of ‘basic principles’ for the resolution of the conflict (ICG 2009: 5). Besides the clarification of the interim and (later on) final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the principles call for the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control and the return of all refugees to their homes. In exchange, a corridor is to connect Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh along with international guarantees that provide for security and self-governance in Nagorno-Karabakh.²⁶ Demands regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of occupied Azerbaijani territories, and the land connection to Armenia were not genuinely new issues but subsets of the territorial question. The question of the return of refugees and security guarantees for the NKR, on the other hand, can be regarded as new issues that came to be disputed in the post-war period. None of the basic principles had been implemented by the end of the period under investigation. Moreover, the prevailing status provided a rather secure standing for the Republic’s independence, though it strongly discouraged the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh (Babajew 2009: 88). Thus, both of the new issues were in favor of the Karabakh Armenian side [**NEWCON 1994-2012=1; NEWCON2 1994-2012=1**]. There were no compromises implemented in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict up to the end of the investigation period [**BENEFIT 1994-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 1994-2012=n.r.**].

25 Position of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: <http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/#a5>; http://www.president.nkr.am/media/documents/constitution/constitution_en.pdf (10 Jun 2014).

26 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-nagorno-karabakh-conflict> (10 Jun 2014).

In sum, the post-war order clearly favored the conflict party of Nagorno-Karabakh [COMPROM 1994-2012=1].

Stability of peace

Although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is far from being settled, there has not been a renewed war between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh since the ceasefire agreement of 1994 [SAMEWAR 1994-2012=0; DATESAME=n.r.; PEACMON1=224]. However, ceasefire violations have frequently occurred along the unguarded line of contact. Although some estimates claim that 3,000 persons died along the front line since 1994 (ICG 2009: 2), the fatalities officially reported have only twice reached 25 deaths in a year, according to the UCDP.²⁷ So far, skirmishes have not significantly damaged the ceasefire, as both sides continue to collaborate with the OSCE Minsk Group and to express their general will to settle the conflict by peaceful means (ICG 2009: 3-7).²⁸ There were no other conflicts that escalated to civil war either [ANYWAR 1994-2002=0; DATEANY=n.r.; PEACMON2=224].

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27 For the years 2005 and 2012, the UCDP reports 25 and 26 deaths on both sides: <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=9&value=#> (10 Jun 2014).

28 Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh: <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/11/208708.shtml> (10 Jun 2014); Kazan Summit: Time For Breakthrough In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process?, Radio Free Europe, 24 June 2011, online edition.

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Annex

Table 2: Troops in post-war Azerbaijan (IISS 1994-2012)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government (active and paramilitary)</i>	<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Armenian forces</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	
1993	74,600	20,000		3.73	1
1994	96,000	20,000	32,700	4.8	1
1995	126,700	20-25,000	60,000	6.33	1
1996	110,700	20-25,000	57,400	5.53	1
1997	106,700	20-25,000	60,000	5.53	1
1998	87,150	20-25,000	53,400	4.36	1
1999	84,900	20-25,000	53,400	4.25	1
2000	87,100	15-20,000	41,300	4.36	1
2001	87,100	18,000	42,060	4.84	1
2002	87,100	18,000	44,610	4.84	1
2003	81,490	18,000	44,660	4.53	1
2004	81,490	18,000	n.d.	4.53	1
2005	81,490	n.d.	48,160		
2006	81,740	n.d.	48,160		
2007	81,740	n.d.	43,641		
2008	81,940	n.d.	42,080		
2009	81,940	n.d.	42,080		

2010	81,940	n.d.	46,684		
2011	81,940	n.d.	48,570		
2012			48,834		

Table 3: Arms in post-war Azerbaijan (IISS 1993-2012)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Armenian forces</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	
1993	286 MBT (main battle tanks) 330 total artillery	13 MBT 16 total artillery	160 MBT 257 total artillery	22 20.63	1 1
1994	279 MBT 350 total artillery	n.d.	120 MBT 225 total artillery	n.d.	1
1995	325 MBT 343 total artillery	50 MBT 100 total artillery	128 MBT 225 total artillery	6.5 3.43	1 1
1996	300 MBT 302 total artillery	50 MBT 100 total artillery	102 MBT 225 total artillery	6 3.02	1 1
1997	270 MBT 301 total artillery	120 MBT 200 total artillery	102 MBT 225 total artillery	2.25 1.5	1 1
1998	270 MBT 301 total artillery	162 MBT 298 total artillery	102 MBT 225 total artillery	1.67 1.01	1 1
1999	259 MBT 303 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	102 MBT 225 total artillery	0.82 0.94	1 1
2000	220 MBT 282 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	102 MBT 229 total artillery	0.7 0.87	1 1
2001	262 MBT 303 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	102 MBT 229 total artillery	0.83 0.94	1 1
2002	220 MBT 282 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	110 MBT 229 total artillery	0.7 0.87	1 1
2003	220 MBT 282 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	110 MBT 229 total artillery	0.7 0.87	1 1
2004	220 MBT 282 total artillery	316 MBT 322 total artillery	n.d.	0,7 0.87	1 1
2005	220 MBT 270 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 229 total artillery		
2006	220 MBT 270 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 229 total artillery		
2007	220 MBT 270 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 229 total artillery		
2008	220 MBT 270 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 229 total artillery		
2009	320 MBT 282 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 229 total artillery		
2010	320 MBT 282 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 239 total artillery		
2011	339 MBT 425 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 239 total artillery		
2012	339 MBT 458 total artillery	n.d.	110 MBT 239 total artillery		