# peace and development 2020

## An Analysis of Recent Experiences and Findings

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# Summary

Development cooperation is increasingly being conducted in conflict-affected states. As violent conflicts grow and spread, so does the expectation that development cooperation will constructively contribute to their resolution. At the same time, current conflict dynamics put decades of development progress at risk.

The development-peace nexus is not only of central importance for the Global South, but also for countries in the Global North. The latter contribute substantially to shaping the link between development and peace and are increasingly affected by the reciprocal cycle of violent conflict and development setbacks. However, insights on the exact interplay between development and peace dynamics remain limited. Similarly, recent practical experiences that target the development-peace nexus are yet to be systematically evaluated and assessed.

Against this backdrop, this report reviews and summarizes the state of the art on the development-peace nexus. In doing so, it analyzes contemporary trends, experiences, and challenges and derives practice-oriented recommendations for German and international development cooperation. This report was commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It is based on 30 interviews with experts from different world regions and complemented by a comprehensive review of current policy documents and academic research.

Three ongoing global trends shape the relation between peace (building) and development (cooperation): First, many of the interviewed experts emphasize a worldwide wave of domestic transformation featuring authoritarian backlash and novel protest dynamics. Second, environmental and climate change, and the related resource conflicts, are identified as a critical contemporary challenge. Third, shifts in the global power structure point towards an alleged decline of the “West” and an ascent of non-western actors. All three of these trends in turn affect the general conditions under which work on the development-peace nexus is conducted.

This report’s analysis generally confirms the positive empirical relationship between development and

peace while specifying that *inclusion* is the central bridge between the two elements. Nonetheless, the processes of development and peace are complex, may even be at odds under certain circumstances, and do not follow a linear logic. These complexities are inadequately reflected in the ongoing political debate, which reduces the development-peace nexus to a simple reactive stabilization of social and political order. This oversimplification has problematic implications for a nexus-oriented peace and development policy.

The recommendations set forth in this report relate to two overarching themes:

1. Understanding the development-peace nexus necessitates an understanding of peace development as a transformational project. Nexus-oriented development cooperation should therefore be aimed at supporting long-term transformations in a flexible manner. This demands both soundly assessing and willingly tackling the inherent risks of such an approach, which in turn requires sophisticated, context-specific analytical skills and capacities.
2. Established goals and strategies must be consistently put into practice. Generally speaking, the key challenge of international development aid in conflict zones is primarily one of implementation, rather than a problem of lacking of knowledge and expertise. First, this concerns the primacy of prevention, which continues to lack strategic direction, concrete and achievable aims, and adequate financial backing. A second challenge concerns an age-old, central tenet of development cooperation: coherence. Coherence must be pursued and established at all levels – in the donor country itself, internationally, and "on the ground" in conflict-affected contexts. Taking the truism of coherence seriously and putting it into practice requires novel organizational designs and institutional change.

The complexity of the link between development and peace processes does not lend itself to simple and short-term solutions. In conflict-affected contexts in particular, development cooperation needs sustainable and long-term approaches while also requiring more flexibility.

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# 1. Introduction

Peace is one of the five pillars of the United Nations' Agenda 2030. In its preamble, the Agenda states that without sustainable development there can be no peace, and without peace there can be no sustainable development (United Nations 2015: 6).[1] This is true despite the fact that only one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and one of the 169 targets explicitly concerns peace: SDG 16 calls for the promotion of "peaceful and inclusive societies" and target 16.1 seeks to significantly reduce "all forms of violence" (United Nations 2015: 30). As Thomas de Waal has stressed, peace is ultimately "a key determinant" for all the threats and challenges addressed by the SDGs, "from chronic diseases to child poverty to environmental degradation" (De Waal 2019: 1). Asako Okai from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Crisis Bureau (2019) stresses the other side of this: "Fragility and violence have become the biggest obstacles to the achievement of the SDGs". According to the World Bank, violent conflicts cause "80% of all humanitarian needs and reduce gross domestic product (GDP) growth by two percentage points per year, on average" (World Bank 2019a).[2] As the joint United Nation and World Bank Pathways for Peace report explains, the costs of violent conflict extend far beyond the direct victims (dead, wounded and displaced) to include the indirect consequences of conflict for medical care, food security, the provision of shelter and the supply of water (United Nations/World Bank 2018: 26). Furthermore, violent conflict is "a major cause of the reversals in economic growth that many low- and middle-income countries have experienced in recent decades" (United Nations/World Bank 2018: 33).

These insights into the links between the absence of peace and sometimes-dramatic setbacks to development[3] are by no means new (cf. Grävingholt 2019; see also the example Box 1 → page 10).[4] However, with the current rise in armed conflict, war and non-state violence, they have grown in significance again. As has been well documented, the downwards trend in indicators of organised violence that began in the early 1990s has reversed sharply since the start of the new millennium, and particularly in its second decade.[5] According to data gathered by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), "the years since 2014 have been characterized by the highest numbers of armed conflict since 1946" (Pettersson et al. 2019: 590). And even if the count of victims of organised violence has started to fall again since the peak of 2011–2014, the number of state and non-state conflicts remained at a historically high level in 2018

(Pettersson et al. 2019: 590–593).[6] At the same time, the number of undernourished people – which had been falling for decades – began to rise again in 2014 (Delgado et al. 2019: 2). If current trends continue, the OECD estimates that by 2030 more than half of all the world's poor people will be living in countries affected by a high level of violence (United Nations/World Bank 2018: xvii).

In view of these developments, development cooperation increasingly takes place in contexts that are affected by armed conflict and/or high levels of one-sided and/or non-state violence (cf. OECD-DAC 2019a: 3; United Nations/World Bank 2018: 249; Bohnet 2019: 251). Consequently, the role of development cooperation in the promotion of peace – whether in the form of crisis and conflict prevention, or with regard to peacebuilding – has taken on a new prominence in the political and academic debates. Both the Pathways for Peace report and the Agenda 2030 give a central role to development cooperation in addressing the structural causes of conflicts (see also BMZ 2014b: 3). Furthermore, alongside such long-term measures, development cooperation can also make short- and medium-term contributions to stabilisation in conflict situations, for instance within the scope of emergency relief and transition assistance efforts. The current debates around the "humanitarian-development-peace nexus" show that it is necessary to coordinate development cooperation, humanitarian relief efforts and peacebuilding in order to integrate these diverse programmes and activities more successfully (se OECD-DAC 2019a and the overview given in Howe 2019; for a critical view, see Peruvemba 2018).[7]

While this has raised expectations of what development cooperation can achieve, the proliferation of violent conflicts can threaten successes achieved over decades – in areas such as poverty reduction, education, and access to healthcare – in the blink of an eye (on the case of Yemen, see Box 1 → page 10). These negative implications of violent conflict are extremely serious, as reducing inequality and social insecurity are themselves basic preconditions for lowering the structural risk of armed conflict in developing countries.

The relationship between development and peace – and its reverse: The reciprocal cycle of violent conflict and development setbacks – is thus of increasing significance. At the same time, our knowledge of precisely how development and peace interact remains limited (Brock 2018: 59). In addition, we lack a systematic evaluation of recent experiences of practical engagement at the interface of peace and development. Narrowing these research gaps is the aim of this report. Based on 30 interviews with international experts, and supported by an analysis of relevant data and research findings, it presents current trends, experiences and challenges to derive practice-oriented recommendations for German and international development cooperation. Chapter 2 identifies three central global trends that are tangibly transforming the conditions that influence development, peace and their interaction: a global wave of domestic transformations, changes in the natural environment and shifts in the balance of global power. Chapter 3 examines experiences and insights from research and practice relating to the development-peace nexus. Chapter 4 identifies and analyses key recommendations for development policy. Prior to the presentation of the results of this three-part analysis, the following sections sketch out how German development cooperation is affected by contemporary conflict dynamics (chapter 1.1), lay out the theoretical basis of the peace-development nexus (chapter 1.2) and outline the report's structure and methodology (chapter 1.3).

> Fragility and violence have become the biggest obstacles to the achievement of the SDGs.
>
> Asako Okai, UNDP

### BOX 1: DEVELOPMENT SETBACKS AS A RESULT OF VIOLENT CONCLIFT – THE CASE OF YEMEN

The case of Yemen confirms the links between violent conflict and development setbacks. Two recent studies undertaken for the UNDP (Moyer et al. 2019a, b) reach the following conclusions:

The ongoing war is not only slowing the pace of development but drastically reversing progress that has already been achieved. In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), Moyer et al. conclude that the conflict has set Yemen back 21 years in terms of development. If the conflict continues until 2030, this would likely undo nearly 40 years of progress.

The Yemeni population suffers from both direct and indirect consequences of violence. While combatants and civilians are directly killed in the fighting and infrastructure is subjected to targeted destruction, it is the long-term consequences that are particularly harmful to human and societal development. Yemen's economy has continually shrunk since the outbreak of the conflict, by 28% in 2015, 9.9% in 2016 and 5.9% in 2017. A third of enterprises have ceased to operate, and oil production has stopped completely. Only 39% of land is now being worked, and agricultural output is at merely 42% of the pre-war level. The conflict has thrown 11.7 million people into extreme poverty. Were the conflict to continue until 2030, Yemen would be the poorest country on earth, with 78% of the population surviving on an income below 1.90 US dollars a day. Between now and then, five times as many people are expected to die from the indirect effects of the war as directly in the fighting. This effects two population groups in particular: While almost all the victims of indirect mortality are children under the age of five, it is above all women who suffer from displacement, extreme poverty as a result of widowhood, and gender-specific and sexual violence.

Food security, healthcare and infrastructure have been identified as the key areas needing rapid and large-scale investment if the effects of the conflict on human development are at least to be ameliorated.

## 1.1 German Development Cooperation in the Global Conflict Landscape

According to OECD figures, German bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the sector "Conflict, Peace & Security"[8] rose from 20 million euros in 2001 (fourth highest among members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, DAC) to 645 million euros in 2017 (second highest). Germany has been one of the top-three donor countries in this sector consistently since 2008, and in 2017 spent only eleven million euros less than top-ranked USA. The most significant sub-category for German development assistance in this sector is "Civilian Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Resolution",[9] which has accounted for more than half of Germany's distributions in the sector each year since 2007. In 2017, 504 million euros, amounting to 78% of Germany's distributions in the sector, flowed into this area. Germany is thus one of the key players active in promoting peace through development cooperation. Nonetheless, as a proportion of Germany's total ODA spending, the amount dedicated to bilateral cooperation in the area of conflict, peace and security remains marginal: Between 2001 and 2017, this proportion varied between 0.2% (2001) and 2.8% (2010). In 2017, this sector accounted for 2.6% of total German ODA (see also Deneckere/Hauck 2018: 11–12). This is despite the fact that German development cooperation, as will be outlined below, is deeply impacted by the rise in violent conflict noted above.

According to our analysis, which is based on UNDP data,10 37 states were affected by violent conflict worldwide in 2018. With the exception of Russia, these are all developing countries by the DAC's definition; 32 of them are partners for German development cooperation activities. Given that Germany is currently involved in development cooperation with 85 countries, it follows that a minority of 38% are affected by acute violent conflict. These conflict-affected partner countries, however, account for all violent conflicts fought in 2018. Also, 76,172 of the 77,310 victims of organised violence recorded by UCDP were killed in partner countries of German development cooperation; 90% of them in just ten states.

The German Federal Ministry for Development and Cooperation (BMZ) currently distinguishes between three types of partner country (BMZ 2019a). The core is a group of 50 developing countries where development cooperation is carried out in the form of bilateral country programmes. Among these close partners, some 40% (21) were affected by violent conflict in 2018. With further 35 countries Germany focuses its bilateral development cooperation "in the context of regional/thematic programmes", six of which receive what is categorised as "cooperation for a limited period within the framework of a programme of structural development measures with long-term effects". Of these 35 countries, eleven are affected by conflict, including five of the six states in the last group.[11] Figure 1 (→ page 12) uses georeferenced conflict event data to illustrate how, in 2018, violence was concentrated in developing countries in general, and in partner countries of German development cooperation, in particular.

Comparing the current situation with the state of affairs at the turn of the millennium (see Figure 2 → page 14), reveals that the number of states affected by violent conflict has hardly changed: In 2001, 39 countries were affected by at least one conflict, and in 2018 the number was 37. In the intervening time, the number of countries affected by conflicts fell back sharply in the first decade of the 21st century (dropping to 28 in 2012), before temporarily rising steeply again until 2016 (to 43). Despite a gradual decline in recent years, both the absolute number of violent conflicts and the number of people killed remain significantly higher than in the early 2000s. The conflict landscape within conflict-affected states has thus become both more complex and deadlier (for further details, cf. Pettersson et al. 2019; Walter 2017).

Figure 2 (→ page 1) shows that analogous trends can be observed for partner countries of German development cooperation. The number of states in the core group of countries with bilateral country programmes that are affected by conflicts has also barely changed: In 2001, 22 such states were affected by violent conflict, one more than in 2018. Since the total number of states at this closest level of cooperation has, however, fallen from 70 to 50 over the same period, it follows that a far higher proportion of them were affected by conflict in 2018 (a rise from 31% to 42%).12 In line with global trends, the number of individual conflicts and of those killed in bilateral cooperation countries was also significantly higher in absolute terms in 2018 compared to 2001.[13] However, the list of states with bilateral country programmes does a poor job – currently poorer than ever – of reflecting the actual priorities of German development cooperation, as Table 1 on (→ page 15) suggests. It shows that of the 20 main recipients of German ODA in 2017, only eleven have a bilateral country programme. The third and fourth largest recipients are China and Turkey, two countries with no formal status as cooperation partners at all. The largest recipients of aid without bilateral country programmes include countries such as Syria, Iraq and Jordan. This is a result, in particular, of regional special initiatives in the context of the war in Syria as well as the massive expansion of Germany's development cooperation activities in the area of refugees and migrants (cf. Deneckere/Hauck 2018: 15–16). Overall, in 2017, these 20 states accounted for 69% of Germany's bilateral ODA that can be ascribed to specific countries.

In 2017, of the 20 most important recipients of German development cooperation, 14 were affected by violent conflicts. However, Table 1 (→ page 15) shows that the intensity of the conflicts in these states varied considerably. In 2017, six countries were affected by a violent conflict that led to at least 1,000 deaths. By contrast, states affected by low-intensity conflicts include Brazil and India, where the proportion of victims of violent conflict among the overall population is marginal (0.1 conflict deaths per 100,000 residents, in each case).

Figure 3 (→ page 16) shows changing patterns in the distribution of German development assistance according to conflict-affectedness over time. In absolute terms, bilateral German ODA for countries affected by conflicts has risen almost continuously and very rapidly: from 1.5 billion euros in 2001 to 6.5 billion in 2017. In relative terms, too, the proportion of bilateral ODA that goes to countries suffering from conflicts was 60% in 2017, well above the 2001 level of 35%. However, it is hard to detect a clear trend here – and the highest proportion was back in 2005, when the level reached 63%.

Thus, while a majority of partners for German development cooperation are not affected by violent conflicts, significantly more than half of bilateral ODA flows to those that are. Germany is currently actively involved in development activities in nearly every conflict-affected country. The question of where peace and development intersect and what this means in terms of practical activities therefore has immediate relevance.

## FIGURE 1: PARTNER COUNTRIES OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND VIOLENT CONFLICT EVENTS, 2018




*Sources: Georeferenced conflict event data: UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019); and, for Syria, ACLED (2019). The event data is scaled according to the number of fatalities. Using natural breaks (Jenks) means (rare) events with high numbers of fatalities appear smaller. Conflict deaths: UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019). Violent conflicts and conflict-affectedness: Our calculations based on UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019) with min. 25 conflict deaths per year, country and conflict. Country categories: OECD-DAC (2019b) for developing countries and BMZ (2019a) for type of cooperation.*






Distribution of countries by country category




Conflict-affected countries by country category




Violent conflicts by country category (excl. Syria)




Conflict deaths by country category

## FIGURE 2: CONFLICT-AFFECTEDNESS OF GERMAN COOPERATION PARTNERS, 2001–2018

**Conflict-affected countries by country category**




**Conflict deaths by country category**




*Countries with bilateral cooperation partnerships**
*Partner countries with focused cooperation**
*Partner countries for a limited period*
*Developing countries with no formal cooperation status*
*Other countries*

*Sources: Conflict deaths: UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019). Violent conflicts and conflict-affectedness: Our calculations based on UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019) with min. 25 conflict deaths per year, country and conflict. Country categories: OECD-DAC (2019b) for developing countries and Deutscher Bundestag (2001: 1–2), BMZ (2005: 121, 2012: 3, 2013: 27, 2017: 201, 2019d) and Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/terre des hommes Deutschland (2003: 25, 2004: 30, 2006: 42, 2007: 46, 2008: 56, 2009: 57, 2010: 57, 2011: 57, 2013: 37, 2014: 36) for type of cooperation.*

** Based on partner categories used since 2008. Priority partner countries and partner countries (2001–2005) and partner countries (2006–2007) were classified as cooperation partners with bilateral country programmes. TRANSFORM countries participating in the Central Asia and Caucasus Initiatives were also placed in this category, as were states that remained members of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Enough Europe for ten years. All other DAC developing countries among the TRANSFORM states were placed in the category "Partner countries with focused cooperation".*

## TABLE 1: MAIN RECIPIENTS OF GERMAN ODA, 2017

| Rank | Country | Bilateral ODA (€ millions) | Cooperation status* | Conflict deaths | Conflict deaths per 100,000 residents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | India | 1,048 | bilateral | 843 | 0,1 |
| 2 | Syria | 780 | focused | 33,117 | 194,0 |
| 3 | China | 630 | - | 6 | 0,0 |
| 4 | Turkey | 584 | - | 449 | 0,6 |
| 5 | Iraq | 474 | limited period | 11,400 | 30,4 |
| 6 | Afghanistan | 424 | bilateral | 19,776 | 54,5 |
| 7 | Morocco | 407 | bilateral | 0 | 0,0 |
| 8 | Indonesia | 295 | bilateral | 2 | 0,0 |
| 9 | Jordan | 295 | focused | 0 | 0,0 |
| 10 | Mexico | 282 | bilateral | 1,451 | 1,2 |
| 11 | Nigeria | 258 | focused | 3,557 | 1,9 |
| 12 | Yemen | 221 | bilateral | 2,722 | 9,8 |
| 13 | Somalia | 198 | limited period | 2,066 | 14,1 |
| 14 | Pakistan | 190 | bilateral | 924 | 0,4 |
| 15 | Serbia | 190 | bilateral | 0 | 0,0 |
| 16 | Ukraine | 180 | bilateral | 409 | 0,9 |
| 17 | Egypt | 179 | bilateral | 902 | 0,9 |
| 18 | Lebanon | 171 | limited period | 293 | 4,3 |
| 19 | Tunisia | 166 | focused | 5 | 0,0 |
| 20 | Brazil | 162 | focused | 309 | 0,1 |

*Sources: Countries in which at least one war took place with 1,000 or more deaths in 2017 are coloured red. Countries in which at least one low-intensity conflict with between 25 and 999 deaths took place are coloured light red. Violent conflicts and intensity: Our calculations based on UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019). Conflict deaths: UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019). Population figures: World Bank (2019b). Bilateral ODA (gross spending in millions of euros 2017): OECD (2019c). Exchange rate: BMZ (2018). Cooperation status: BMZ (2017; 2019a).*

** The BMZ officially distinguishes between cooperation countries with bilateral country programmes ("bilateral"), with focused cooperation in the context of regional or thematic programmes ("focused") and with cooperation for a limited period within the framework of a programme of structural development measures ("limited period").*

## FIGURE 3: GERMAN ODA BY CONFLICT CONTEXT, 2001–2017

**German ODA by Conflict Context (millions of euros, 2017)**




**Attributable bilateral ODA by conflict context (%)**




*Bilateral ODA in states affected by wars*
*Bilateral ODA in states affected by conflicts*
*Bilateral ODA in states free of conflicts*
*ODA for refugees and asylum seekers in Germany*
*Other ODA (unspecified, regional, or multilateral)*

*Sources: Affectedness by conflict or war: Our calculations based on UCDP GED (Högbladh 2019) and UCDP (2019) with between 25 and 999 deaths per year, country and conflict in the case of the former and at least 1,000 in the case of the latter. German ODA (gross spending in millions of euros 2017): OECD (2019b, c). Exchange rate: BMZ (2018).*

## 1.2 Conceptual Basis: The Development-Peace Nexus

Whether focused on the link between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, on the development-peace nexus, or on the threefold "humanitarian-development-peace nexus" – current policy-oriented nexus debates all concentrate on the interplay between the various policy fields, i.e. the interactions between development policy, humanitarian assistance and/or peacebuilding (cf. Howe 2019; OECD-DAC 2019a). By contrast, this report considers the causal relationships between processes of societal transformation that are usually labelled "development" and "peace". To analyse the relationships between development and peace, it is first necessary to clearly define and distinguish the two terms. This is done most straightforwardly by considering peace as a process of decreasing physical violence and development as a process of socioeconomic progress (Grävingholt 2019: 357). However, research shows that politico-institutional developments are also of central significance for peace and conflict. This relates to democratisation processes in the broadest sense and, in concrete terms, to the broadening of political participation, the strengthening of states' compliance with the rule of law and human rights, and expanding state capacity.[14] In order to do justice to both (the analytical precision of a narrow focus on socioeconomic development and the empirical significance of political institutions), this report addresses both dimensions, while distinguishing between them conceptually.

In the current debate, as previously discussed, there is a broad consensus at the most general policy level: Without peace there can be no development, and in the absence of development, there can be no sustained peace. Existing research also confirms a positive relationship between development and peace: In the first place, more peace means – ceteris paribus – better opportunities for development, while violence and conflict have a significantly negative influence on development (cf. Collier 1999; Collier et al. 2003). Second, development – all things being equal – stabilises peace, while development setbacks contribute to the escalation of violence and conflict (cf. Collier/Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2003; Fiedler et al. 2016: 2–3; Grävingholt 2019: 357–358; Hegred/Sambanis 2006; Miguel et al. 2004; Ray/Esteban 2017). The development-peace nexus is thus central from the perspectives of both development policy and peacebuilding. However, the relationship is by no means deterministic, but depends to a high degree on the context. This is illustrated in Figure 4 (➜ page 18), which shows the relationship between indicators of peace and development around the globe.[15] While the graph confirms a positive statistical correlation, there is nonetheless an enormous amount of scatter. While states such as South Sudan (SSD), India (IND) and Norway (NOR) fall into a pattern that suggests a linear relationship, there are also many outliers. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2018, states such as Sierra Leone (SLE) and Malawi (MWI) are as peaceful as Greece (GRC), but have scores on the Human Development Index (HDI) that are lower than those of Afghanistan. By contrast, Mexico (MEX) and Lebanon have relatively high HDI scores, but in terms of GPI are as unpeaceful as Burundi (BDI) and Mali (MLI). The chart thus reveals the complexity of the nexus between development and peace at the level of individual countries: In actual practice, the two do not necessarily go hand in hand.

The situation is further complicated if one considers development and peace as processes and asks how they interact. A differentiated view reveals potentially contradictory relationships, which a nexus-sensitive peace development policy must take seriously:

- Socioeconomic development (social inclusion through the reduction of poverty, socioeconomic inequalities, etc) reduces the causes of violent conflict and raises (via economic growth) the legitimacy of existing political regimes and the ability of the state to respond to societal grievances. However, development processes – to the extent that they generate redistributive socioeconomic effects and socio-environmental costs and/or are based on potentially disputed conceptions of development – also carry with them risks of violent conflict.[16]

- The development of political institutions (political inclusion, improvements in states' compliance with the rule of law and human rights) reduces, for its part, the causes of violent conflict, while democratisation in the broadest sense enables the peaceful management/transformation of violent conflicts. However, democratisation processes – to the extent that they imply the redistribution of political power and institutional change and hence political fragility and uncertainty and are based on potentially disputed conceptions of democracy – also carry with them risks of violent conflict.[17]

## FIGURE 4: THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT, 2018




*Sources: Global Peace Index (2019: 84–98; Reference year 2018), average of the domains "Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict" and "Societal Safety and Security"; UNDP (2019; reference year 2018). All values rescaled to 0–100.*

- Violence reduction and peacebuilding (making and consolidating peace) enable socioeconomic development as well as the development of political institutions. However, the associated positive effects are by no means certain; there is no guarantee of a "peace dividend" (cf. Collier 1999; Ferreira 2006).

Figure 5 (➜ page 19) focuses on the two phenomena (development and peace) and their interrelationship. The various policy approaches that underpin international activities undertaken in the name of peace and/or development are indicated in the arrows at the foot of the figurepage:[18]

- The left and right extremes of the diagram are occupied by peace-sensitive development policy and development-sensitive peace policy. These approaches remain rooted in their respective policy fields, but take potential broader effects into ccount, at least in terms of a do-no-harm approach.

## FIGURE 5: THE DEVELOPMENT-PEACE NEXUS




*Source: PRIF*

- This can be distinguished from peace-oriented development policy and development-oriented peace policy, which systematically address the nexus, while remaining rooted in their respective policy fields for operational purposes.

- The centre of the diagram is occupied by "peace development policy". This approach seeks to promote simultaneous progress in both development and peace and therefore directly addresses the areas where they interact. In practical terms, peace development policies systematically combine both fields in a way that does not assume that development will simply lead to peace and vice versa, but aims at promoting both.[19]

In the policy debate on the relationship between peace/conflict and development, the question of the significance of violent conflicts is frequently placed in direct connection with the fragility of countries or

states (cf. BMZ 2014a; OECD-DAC 2019a; United Nations/World Bank 2018; World Bank 2019c; for a critical view, see Bethke 2012; Ferreira 2017). Here, fragility is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon. In addition to questions of (in-)security, peace and/or violence in a narrow sense, it also encompasses various other political, economic and societal issues, which – in line with the conception of the OECD (2018) – are considered to indicate exposure to risk (vulnerability), on the one hand, and coping capacities of states and societies, on the other. For a systematic discussion of the relationship between development and peace, questions of fragility in this broad sense are obviously significant, yet violence/conflict-affectedness and fragility also need to be kept separate for purposes of both policy and analysis (Pospisil/Kühn 2016; Ferreira 2017). For countries that are considered highly fragile do not always demonstrate an equally high level of violence and may not be affected by an open violent conflict at all.20 Such constellations, where high fragility and the relative absence of organised physical violence are combined, are not necessarily less significant, but they do require different approaches in the field of development policy (OECD 2018: 24–25). In this report, we are concentrating on problems of fragility that are directly associated with dynamics of violence and conflict.

## 1.3 Methodology

The report aims at presenting and analysing the current state of knowledge on the development-peace nexus with a focus on contemporary developments, experiences and challenges. On this basis, it derives recommendations for German and international development cooperation in contexts affected by violent conflict.

Methodologically, the analysis is based primarily on 30 guided interviews with renowned international experts in peace and development studies that work in research institutions or think tanks on the relations between development and peace. The expert interviewees were selected based on criteria including their international reputation or the reputation of the institutions they represent and the aim to cover all relevant topics and regions of the globe (see annex: List of Interviewees). The interviews were analysed inductively to identify central common topics, observations and assessments.[21] Analysis of the interviews in terms of the three main clusters (developments, experiences, challenges) was accompanied by an evaluation of relevant policy documents and academic research.

As regards the key terms used in this report, we will stick largely to standard usage in the relevant current debates. This is not the place to tackle the many conceptual disputes around terms like peace and development, let alone to undertake a critical reflection on the key normative assumptions that underlie them (for an example, see Müller et al. 2014).[22] We understand development in the broad sense of all those processes that lead to material improvements in human living conditions. This predominantly is understood in terms of socioeconomic improvements as measured by indicators such as economic growth per capita, poverty rates, life expectancy and infant mortality. As stressed above, however, the development of political institutions is also central – particularly for the subject covered by this report. The development of political institutions is often conflated with democratisation (in the broad sense), but it can also be defined – without reference to any specific political regime type – in terms of progress in (political and civic) human rights or, in the sense of SDG 16, with reference to the inclusivity and accountability of political institutions. For the purposes of this report, we define peace in the narrow or negative sense as the absence of physical violence or as a process of reduction in levels of violence. In the following, violence and conflict refer for the most part to violent conflict, or that which the UCDP understands by "organised violence". This category encompasses classical inter-state and intra-state violent conflicts as well as the phenomenon of "one-sided violence" in which one organised actor (state or non-state) deliberately exercises deadly violence against unarmed civilians. Of course, violence also occurs outside such conflict situations and can assume non-conventional and interpersonal forms (on the latter, see section 3.2.3).

1 *This report is the result of a research project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and carried out in coordination with the Sector Programme "Peace and Security, Disaster Risk Management" of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Ben Christian and Simone Schnabel of PRIF's project team performed and analysed the interviews. The figures are based on quantitative data compiled and processed by Jens Stappenbeck and Anton Peez. This English version of the report was translated by Graeme Currie. The original version „Frieden und Entwicklung 2020: Eine Analyse aktueller Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse" can be accessed at www.hsfk.de/FriedenEntwicklung.*

2 *For more detail, cf. Collier (1999) and Collier/Hoeffler (2004: 134) as well as recent studies by Costalli et al. (2017) and Dunne et al. (2019).*

3 *For details on Yemen, see Box 1. For the case of Syria, see Hippler (2018: 63– 65) and United Nations/World Bank (2018: 26, Box 1.4).*

4 *As Jörn Grävingholt (2019: 355) notes, in Germany "former Chancellor Willy Brandt is frequently held up as the pioneer of the notion that peace and development should be closely related." In 2002, then development minister, Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul, announced her ministry's programme with the slogan "peace needs development" (Bohnet 2019: 184). In the same year, Peter Uvin identified six different areas of global development cooperation work where the link between peace and development could be considered central (Uvin 2002). And finally, the German government's 2017 report on development policy was entitled "Development Policy as Future-Oriented Peace Policy" (Grävingholt 2019: 356).*

5 *Cf. Pettersson et al. (2019); United Nations/World Bank (2018: 11–47); Walter (2017).*

6 *The only decline noted by the UCDP in 2018 was with respect to one-sided violence (Pettersson et al. 2019: 593–594).*

7 *UN Secretary-General António Guterres made the link in even broader terms (2017): "The interconnected nature of today's crises requires us to connect our own efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, not just in words, but in practice."*

8 *Data on Sector 152 "Conflict, Peace & Security" is taken from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (OECD 2019a). Figures given here and below are expressed in gross terms in 2017 Euro (exchange rate from BMZ 2018a).*

9 *Sector 15220 "Civilian Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Resolution" (OECD 2019a).*

10 *The data used here is derived from the UCDP's Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED), which consists of geospatial information on conflict events (Högbladh 2019). We consider a country conflict-affected when at least one violent conflict within the country's borders causes the deaths of at least 25 people in a given year; if there are 1,000 deaths, we refer to a serious violent conflict or war. In general, there is still a lack of reliable and accurate conflict data, despite constant improvements. Existing data is generally based on international reporting, which, for instance, tends to favour urban over rural areas. Quantitative conflict analyses therefore offer only a rough picture of reality and the representation of general trends.*

11 *This category currently includes: Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Chad and the Central African Republic. With the exception of Lebanon, all were affected by violent conflict in 2018.*

12 *In 2012, the number of conflict-affected partners for cooperation with bilateral country programmes briefly fell to an all-time low of 13 (of 50, i.e. 30%).*

13 *In 2001, there were 54 conflicts in these states and 15,649 conflict deaths; in 2018, 92 conflicts and 47,217 conflict deaths.*

14 *On this, cf. e.g. Acemoglu/Robinson (2006); Gates et al. (2006); Hegre (2014); Senghaas (1995).*

15 *Level of development is given here according to the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI); peacefulness on the basis of the Global Peace Index (GPI) produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (Sydney). The graph draws on two of the GPI's three domains "Ongoing domestic and international conflict" and "Societal safety and security". Since our concern here is with conflict and violence within countries, the dimension of "Militarisation", which is based on such things as military expenditure, is excluded.*

16 *Recent research has tended to focus on the risks of conflict implied by primary-sector based ("extractivist") development strategies (cf. Bebbington 2012; Engels/Dietz 2017; Omeje 2008). On this relationship generally, see – from varying perspectives – Acemoglu/Robinson (2006), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Schlichte (2005: 126–181) and, on the case of Colombia, Elhawary (2008).*

17 *For a brief overview, cf. Fiedler et al. (2016: 3); for a more detailed consideration, Acemoglu/Robinson (2006); Cederman et al. (2010); Hegre (2014); Snyder (2000).*

18 *These categories draw on a conceptual distinction proposed by Paul Howe. Howe, when considering the development-peace nexus, distinguishes between "nexus-sensitive" development or peace actions and "nexus actions" that specifically address the interconnectedness of development and peace (Howe 2019: 3–6).*

19 *This type of policy certainly offers the best way to address the development-peace nexus as such, but, in general, there is no hierarchy among the various approaches. Nor should the different approaches be considered in competition with one another; they represent different but generally compatible methodologies.*

20 *According to the OECD's most recent States of Fragility report, 19 of the 27 states categorised as chronically fragile have not experienced major conflict in the recent past (OECD 2018: 24–26).*

21 *Although the analysis did not seek to identify controversies and contradictions, it remains noteworthy that we identified hardly any appreciable differences in the central statements of the interviewees. Certainly, however, this observation is at least partly a result of the relatively abstract level of the present report.*

22 *The experts cited do not all share the same definitions. To the extent that that is relevant to understand their statements, we have attempted to draw attention to this and make appropriate distinctionst.*

# 2. The Current Context and Challenges for Peace Development

As regards the current context of the development-peace nexus, our interviews with experts reveal three main global trends. These are also reflected in academic and political debates:[1]

1. **Transformation within societies:** Currently, a wave of transformation processes can be observed in many countries across all regions of the world. These affect both donor and recipient countries and therefore have consequences for the potential effectiveness of development cooperation as well as for international cooperation in general (for more on the last, see Trend 3). Key aspects of these transformations include the rise of nationalist, illiberal and often authoritarian movements and leaders, increasing restrictions on civil society actors ("shrinking civic spaces"), and the consequences of these trends for international activities in the areas of peacebuilding and development cooperation. On the one hand, these changes are reflected in a decline in the quality of democratic regimes as well as in a general trens of autocratization. On the other, however, we can also observe a global proliferation of protest movements and the emergence of new forms of civic activism.

2. **Changes in the natural environment:** Climate change, with its observable and potential consequences for the escalation of conflicts over diminishing (natural) resources, is currently receiving increasing attention. Though we still lack reliable knowledge regarding the concrete effects of climate change on current and future conflicts, there is no longer any doubt about its significance for the development-peace nexus.

3. **Shifts in the global balance of power:** Major structural shifts in global politics have been taking place in recent years, often discussed in broad terms as the relative decline of "the West" (reinforced by its diversification) and the parallel rise of new global and regional powers such as China, India and Brazil. The latter are also emerging as donors in the field of development cooperation and undertaking their own peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations.

Taken together, these three trends reveal that the background conditions influencing development, peace and their interplay are changing dramatically – and that these changes are

creating complex new challenges for policies that aim at tackling the development-peace nexus.

## 2.1 Transformations within Societies: Authoritarian Backlash and New Forms of Protest

The first global trend concerns the internal shifts that can be observed within societies worldwide. This comprises, on the one hand, the strengthening of nationalist, illiberal and often authoritarian actors (cf., for instance, Norris/Inglehart 2018) and, on the other hand, and partially related, a global recession of democratic development that has already led some to identify an outright "wave of autocratization" (Lührmann/Lindberg 2019). While these developments do not necessarily lead to an escalation of violent conflict, they do go hand in hand with a trend of increasing restrictions on civil society actors, which has direct repercussions for peace within societies (Interview with Tobias Debiel, Institute for Development and Peace, INEF; cf. also Poppe/Wolff 2017). Such developments are not restricted to individual countries. Rather, we can observe a global "national populist wave" (Caroline Hughes, Kroc Institute): the USA; Europe, Brazil, Colombia, India and the Philippines are frequently mentioned in this context, as is the major impact this wave has on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development cooperation.[2] For Dan Smith from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this revival of the "love of the strong man" represents a real danger for international cooperation in the field of peace and development, because the new leaders are often "much less committed to the long-term and sustained support for the transition from conflict-affected underdevelopment to something that is more stable". One consequence of this development is, for instance, shrinking budgets for development cooperation and the funding of civil society organizations (Interview with Patricia Justino, Institute of Development Studies, IDS). Also, in a number of countries, including Brazil, this has led to an increase in violence and societal conflict (interview with Adriana Abdenur, Igarapé Institute).

Even in countries where nationalist and/or right-wing populist parties have so far been restricted to opposition, the political discourse has shifted in recent years. In this regard, Andrew Sherriff (European Centre for Development Policy Management, ECDPM) speaks of a significant rise in "geopolitical interest for conflicts coming closer to the borders in Europe in the last couple of years". This has had a powerful effect on both general guidelines of development policy and the concrete work of development agencies.[3] In particular, the dominance of the issue of flight and migration has to be understood in this light (Interview with Natascha Zupan, Working Group on Peace and Development, FriEnt).[4]

At the same time, observers have noted a growth of all kinds of protest movements around the world (cf. e.g. Youngs 2017). Thomas Carothers from the Carnegie Endowment speaks in this regard of a global "public anger" with deep roots: "Rising levels of corruption, rising levels of inequality and slow growth – that's a formula for trouble". Mass protests can provide an opportunity to invigorate development, but, at the same time, according to Carothers, they can also have destructive effects. For Vasu Gounden (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD), the central question is whether protests and conflicts lead to the escalation of violence:

> Conflict is a necessary means for social change. Without conflict you will not get social change. Non-violent conflict is in many ways a helpful thing if there are tensions in a society, and might in fact have a positive impact on development.
>
> Vasu Gounden, ACCORD

> „Conflict is a necessary means for social change. Without conflict you will not get social change. Non-violent conflict is in many ways a helpful thing if there are tensions in a society, and might in fact have a positive impact on development."

However, when conflict becomes violent, it has "a negative impact on development and we have seen this".

In this connection, Tobias Debiel (INEF) notes that some of the forms taken by these (newer) protest movements have not yet been adequately observed and researched: Although protest movements, such as those seen in Hong Kong or Ecuador in 2019, are becoming increasingly important, the academic and political worlds are "so far underprepared" for them. Debiel also stresses the ambivalent consequences of protests for the development-peace nexus: "Ukraine is a striking example of how a protest movement can topple a government while simultaneously destabilising the country".

## 2.2 Natural Environment: Climate Change and Resource Conflict

A second trend is the growth of conflicts over resources as a result of environmental changes driven by climate change.[5] There can no longer be any doubt that climate change is affecting development and peace processes: "The climate-conflict-development nexus is becoming ever more important", according to Tilman Brück from the International Security and Development Center (ISDC). Dirk Messner (United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security, UNU-EHS) makes a similar argument:

> „If we look forward to the world in 2050 or 2070, we will face a whole new set of challenges. With a rise of three degrees or more, every corner of the planet will become more dangerous, and the potential for societies to become destabilised will rise sharply. That's why this topic is so central precisely in terms of preventive development cooperation and ensuring peace."

Nonetheless, current debates on the relationship between climate and conflict often lack nuance, as Dan Smith (SIPRI) complains:

> „If you're trying to tell the story of instability and violent conflict and you leave nature out of the picture, you're only telling half or a part of the story. But if you try to tell the story with only the reference to nature then you mess up as well. Climate change is a challenge and a threat for security and stability in its interaction with other features of the socio-economic landscape – in that sense, climate change weakens social stability around the world." (see also Koubi/Spilker 2017)

This is essentially confirmed by a recent study into "Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict". Drawing on in-depth interviews carried out with experts, the authors conclude there is a consensus that climate change influences the risk of armed, intrastate conflict. At the same time, however, "the role of climate is judged to be small compared to other conflict drivers". Furthermore, there are uncertainties regarding the mechanisms through which climate change affects conflicts (Mach et al. 2019: 196). Nonetheless, in the future, "with intensifying climate change, climate is expected to increasingly affect conflict risk" (Mach et al. 2019: 193). Climate change should thus be considered a risk multiplier:

> „By 2030, climate impacts could push an additional 100 million people into poverty and, by 2050, as many as 143 million people could become climate migrants in just three regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America)." (World Bank 2019c: 3)

Climate change should thus be considered a threat to development and peace because it intensifies (existing) resource conflicts[6] and thus acts as a destabilising factor. This conflict-intensifying role of climate change "has received relatively scant attention" so far (Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, IPCS; cf. also Delgado et al. 2019: 20–21; Ide 2015). Conflicts over land are one example of this, as Tobias Debiel (INEF) explains: "These are mostly not conflicts that escalate at the national level, but rather affect local communities, for instance at the Horn of Africa."[7] Struggles over resources lead to long-lasting conflicts with serious consequences mostly at the local level. In concrete terms, Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy from the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies stresses that climate change has negative effects on security and stability at the local, regional and national level, for instance by restricting access to resources such as water. As a consequence, the need for disaster and climate risk management as an aspect of development cooperation is already rising sharply (cf. e.g. BMZ 2019).

For Michelle Ndiaye (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, IPSS), most "community conflicts" can be understood as the result of changing environmental conditions and the resulting resource shortages. In particular, rural depopulation and urbanisation in many African states are often a consequence of environmental change – and these developments have serious consequences. Such trends and their results are not negative per se, but they certainly do contain conflict risks, according to Ndiaye. This is because, in rapidly enlarging cities, the struggle for resources is often more intense, making them "hot spots" for conflict:

> "The theatre of conflict in Africa is moving and has already moved to urban areas. People moving into the urban areas are moving into nothing: no employment, no housing, no health care, no education and that is what is driving conflict. It's conflict over scarce resources which then translate into political challenges over the status quo and that is really disruptive." (Vasu Gounden)[8]

Academic research on the relationship between climate change as a risk multiplier and intra-state conflict has grown significantly in recent years. The links between climate change, on the one hand, and peace and security, on the other, have also been enjoying increased prominence in the global political debate, in frameworks such as the climate change conferences (COP), the G7 or the UN Security Council. However, existing findings on the specific role of climate change in conflict dynamics are at least in part contradictory (Koubi/Spilker 2017: 6). More research is therefore required to precisely identify the theoretical and empirical connections between climate change and violent conflict.

## 2.3 Global Power Shifts: Decline and Diversification of the "West" and the Rise of New Players

The third trend relates to ongoing shifts in political power at the global level. Major structural adjustments in global politics have been taking place in recent years, mostly discussed in terms of a relative (though not uniform) decline of "the West" and a concurrent rise of new global and regional powers. The latter are now also taking a prominent part – as donors – in the field of development cooperation and undertaking peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in conflict-affected states.[9]

The most obvious implication of current changes in global politics is a general weakening of multilateral cooperation as a result of the behaviour of the three largest powers. As Håvard Hegre from Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) emphasises: "The current leaders of the three great powers, the US, Russia and China, are not committed to the international status quo; they are all challenging the international order." In particular, the withdrawal of the USA from a series of multilateral forums and existing cooperative relationships, together with the various "trade wars", create great challenges for its partners. Multilateralism and international cooperation are coming under increasing pressure, according to Michelle Ndiaye from the IPSS: "Countries are currently more inward-looking today and are dropping the ball of multilateralism. States' relationships and international relations seem to be more transactional in nature. What we observe on the global level is also taking roots in Africa"[10] For Ndiaye, this all has negative consequences for prospective international efforts to collectively shape future development and peace processes.

> "Climate change is a challenge and a threat for security and stability in its interaction with other features of the socio-economic landscape – in that sense, climate change weakens social stability around the world.
> Dan Smith, SIPRI

Alongside the general weakening of multilateral cooperation, the experts interviewed identified two further consequences of these international tensions. One the one hand, geopolitical disagreements lead to the formation of complex conflict lines in ongoing wars and violent conflicts, as currently in Syria or Yemen (Interview with Caroline Hughes, Kroc Institute). On the other hand, Russia and China are emerging as increasingly significant partners for development in Africa and Asia. China is attempting, for instance, to expand its influence in South-East Asia and beyond via its "Belt and Road" initiative, with major consequences for the affected states (interview with Emma Leslie, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, CPCS). Meanwhile, Russia (alongside China) is expanding its presence in Africa, particularly in military terms.

> „In the last ten years under Putin, there has been renewed interest in Africa [specifically in terms of] military arms sales, in nuclear power and mercenaries. So they sent soldiers to fight in various civil battles in Africa. They have, for example, been very involved in the Central African Republic, and it can also really distort the situation on the ground." (Steven Gruzd, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA); see also Stronski 2019)

All of these developments indicate that the context conditions shaping development, peace and their interplay are currently undergoing substantial change. The crisis of multilateralism and the growing influence of Russia and China create complex challenges for policies that pursue development and peace. The rise of new powers is not in itself bad. It is, however, already noticeably restricting the influence and room for manoeuvre of donor countries traditionally involved in development cooperation while also challenging the normative and political foundations of their engagement. Moreover, a study by the ECDPM concludes that there is a danger that current geopolitical shifts are undermining support for the promotion of peace in Europe as well, prompting a reversion to "power politics" as the dominant form of conflict resolution, while conflicts of lesser strategic importance are simply being ignored (Sherriff et al. 2018: 16).

1 *The three trends discussed here were mentioned throughout the interviews as key global developments that are of immediate relevance for the development-peace nexus. To be sure, they do not encompass all relevant global changes that can currently be observed. A further trend that is the subject of much discussion at present is change driven by (information) technology. Technological change is, for instance, emphasised in studies by the BMZ (see e.g. BMZ 2018b – which focuses on the implications for development) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (De Waal 2019 – which focuses on the implications for peace) but was not mentioned prominently by the experts we interviewed.*

2 *For instance, in the interviews with Dan Smith (SIPRI), Caroline Hughes (Kroc Institute), Thomas Carothers (Carnegie Endowment), Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) and Patricia Justino. See also BMZ (2018b: 26–29).*

3 *See also the interview with Patricia Justino (IDS).*

4 *See also chapter 3.2 as well as Bohnet (2019: 251).*

5 *Cf. BMZ (2018b); Federal Government (2017); Ide (2015); Mach et al. (2019); van Baalen/Möbjörk (2018). For an overview of the research on resource conflicts, see Mildner et al. (2011).*

6 *Existing research examines both resource scarcity and resource abundance as causes and/or drivers of conflict (Mildner et al. 2011, Koubi/Spilker 2017). The literature on resource abundance analyses non-renewable resources such as oil and minerals, which may have a positive effect on the socioeconomic development of a country, but may also, depending on circumstances, stand in the way of development (the "resource curse"), and investigates the relationship between abundance and the causes, duration, and intensity of conflicts (e.g., in the "greed versus grievance" debate). Development cooperation can play a supporting role here in shaping the institutional context conditions and procedures that shape resource extraction. However, in the interviews, conflicts over resources were only brought up in connection with climate change and resource scarcity.*

7 *Similar views were expressed by Natascha Zupan (FriEnt) and Jean-Paul Moatti (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, IRD).*

8 *For a similar view, see Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS): "cities will be becoming war zones". See also "urbanization" as a "megatrend" in Africa (SIPRI 2019: 9).*

9 *See Abdenur et al. (2014); Call/de Coning (2017). On the shifting balance of power and implications for Western development cooperation, democracy promotion and peacebuilding, see Carothers/Samet-Marram (2015) and Sherriff et al. (2018: 15–16). See also BMZ (2018b: 5–7); United Nations/World Bank (2018: xx).*

10 *For a similar view from the Latin American context, see Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute).*

# 3. The Development-Peace Nexus: Experiences and Findings

The experiences and findings reported in the interviews provide, in the first instance, detailed and differentiated insights into the relationship between development and peace (chapter 3.1). At the same time, they draw attention to an overly narrow understanding of the development-peace nexus that can currently be observed in political debates and political practice. This narrow understanding tends to conceive nexus-oriented policies primarily in terms of a reactive stabilisation of social and political order – something that has troubling consequences for a development cooperation (chapter 3.2).

## 3.1 The Connections between Development and Peace

Three central observations can be made about the interplay between development and peace:

- First, there is a broad consensus that peace needs development and development needs peace. This corresponds entirely with the basic concept of the development-peace nexus.
- Second, in line with the Pathways for Peace report (United Nations/World Bank 2018), the experts argue that inclusion is one of the key means of linking development and peace.
- Third, however, the interviews also confirm that the development and peace processes interact in complex ways, may be at odds under certain circumstances and do not follow a linear logic (see chapter 1.2).

### 3.1.1 Peace Needs Development and Development Needs Peace

The current debate on the development-peace nexus is based on the premise that peace needs development and development needs peace (see, for instance, the key policy documents listed in Box 2 on → page 29) This assumption was generally accepted by the experts we interviewed. They share a broad consensus that peace and development processes are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. For instance, Dan Smith from SIPRI emphasises the mutual interplay between peace and development processes in a way that closely parallels the preamble to the Agenda 2030, as cited in the introduction of this report:

> "Peace and development actually go together [even though development can also generate conflict]. You need peace in order to have good enactable development, and you need good enactable development in order to have sustainable reliable peaceful relations."

In this regard, Khaled Mansour from the Arab Reform Initiative speaks of two "parallel tracks" that can only function correctly when laid together. This chapter uses the results of the interviews to shed light on this overall relationship. In accordance with the conceptual framework introduced in chapter 1.2, we start by discussing the virtuous cycle by which peace and development processes reinforce each other. We then turn to the "conflict trap" (cf. Collier et al. 2003) in which setbacks in either area negatively influence the other in a vicious cycle.

Regarding the positive links between peace and development, the interviews stress how important it is that progress made in peace processes is stabilised by means of socioeconomic development. According to Jörn Grävingholt from the German Development Institute (DIE), it is particularly important that socioeconomic development has a broad reach so that everyone living in a country can benefit from economic growth. According to Grävingholt, research has confirmed the link between socioeconomic development and the stabilisation of peace. This is particularly true "when development is inclusive and does not cause major disruptions within society". Growth alone, however, is certainly "no guarantee of lasting peace".

In general, economic development and improvements in social security can legitimate and stabilise peace in fragile contexts. This idea is reflected in numerous policy documents, for instance in the nexus approach that the World Food Programme has formulated for its own projects:

> "[S]upporting the provision of basic social services, such as health, education and social safety nets, can instil greater confidence in governments. It may also help build government capacity, accountability and legitimacy." (Delgado et al. 2019: 4)

It is therefore vital for the nexus that peace and development are not understood and promoted as if they were elements in a linear sequence. Development projects already need to be supported during peace negotiations. Emma Leslie (CPCS) refers to a positive example of this kind from the Philippines:

> "Even before the peace agreement [of January 2014], the process invested in significant development work. Through pre-agreements in the peace process, the government supported MILF [the Moro Islamic Liberation Front] in their own development work in its own areas as confidence-building measure for both sides.

### BOX 2: CENTRAL POLICY DOCUMENTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT-PEACE NEXUS

BMZ (2014a): Development for Peace and Security. Development Policy in the Context of Conflict, Fragility and Violence, Bonn: BMZ (Strategy Paper 4/2013, new edition, April 2014).

Federal Government of Germany (2017): Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/290648/057f-794cd3593763ea556897972574fd/170614-leitlinien-krisen-praevention-konfliktbewaeltigung-friedensfoerderung-dl-data.pdf.

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> Development was rolling out the whole time they were negotiating and as a result, people were supportive of the peace process."

Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) describes a similarly successful nexus process in Latin America concerning the settlement of the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. In this case, it was a peace process that had a positive influence on the implementation of joint development projects – with positive consequences for both peace and the socioeconomic situation of the local population. Jörn Grävingholt (DIE) sees "undeniable evidence that peace is a constant necessary precondition for lasting and sustainable development, because civil war almost always goes hand in hand with economic collapse" (see also Box 1 on → page 10).

Franck Bousquet from the World Bank's Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group (FCV) illustrates the operation of this relationship in reverse – the negative effects of violent conflict on development:

> "Extreme poverty is rising primarily in countries that are impacted by fragility, conflict and violence. While overall, globally poverty is decreasing, we see a real increase in poverty in those countries. And the interesting thing is that it is not a low-income story, but it also affects middle-income countries."

The focus here is on socioeconomic development that benefits from the security and calculability of peacetime but suffers terribly in times of violent conflict, as Håvard Hegre (PRIO) explains: "Because of all the uncertainty about relations and property rights and so forth, conflict destroys the incentives to invest in domestic economies on top of all the humanitarian consequences." For Asako Okai from the UNDP Crisis Bureau, this form of fragility is "the biggest threat to development".

With regard to possible solutions to the "vicious cycle" in contexts where setbacks in development and in peace processes mutually reinforce each other to create a conflict trap (see Box 3 on → page 31), the experts we interviewed were rather more reticent. In terms of both research and practical experiences, there appear to be far more questions than answers. For instance, Tobias Debiel (INEF) notes a trend that has lasted some two decades now and affects a number of "neglected countries", "above all in sub-Saharan Africa (DR Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia, etc.) and South Asia (Afghanistan)." In these states, a powerful "double nexus" can be observed: "Without exception, these are poor and fragile states that find themselves in regions where violence is widespread and which, despite external peacebuilding efforts, cannot escape from the 'conflict trap' for long." These countries, according to Debiel, need "a different kind of thinking".

Michelle Ndiaye from IPSS has a similar tale to tell. She calls for new approaches to deal with these "intractable conflicts". Others share the general view that this form of conflict has a long-term negative effect on societies:

> "If the government cannot solve violence and conflict, it will become a prolonged phenomenon that will influence the ordinary life in a long period. Violence and conflict may then become a way of life and a kind of business, even industry, which will significantly undo progress in development, and shape behaviours of most of the society" (Chun Zhang, Yunnan University).

> Peace and development actually go together [even though development can also generate conflict]. You need peace in order to have good enactable development, and you need good enactable development in order to have sustainable reliable peaceful relations.
>
> Dan Smith, SIPRI

### BOX 3: THE "CONFLICT TRAP"

The conflict trap describes how violent conflicts reproduce themselves, i.e. how tthey create conditions that promote the risk of armed violence (Collier et al. 2003; Hegre et al. 2017). This is why it is difficult to end civil wars, and why even after a successful peace accord the risk is so high that conflict breaks out once more. In fact, most of the world's violent conflicts are being fought in a group of some 50 states, all of which find themselves in a downwards spiral of violence and development setbacks (Collier 2008).

Key to understanding the conflict trap phenomenon is the negative influence of violent conflicts on economic development. Violent conflicts hamper trade and investment while also causing direct economic damage by destroying infrastructure. In addition, death, injury, migration and flight from violence are direct losses of "human capital". Wars and the suppression of rebellions are frequently paid for by high levels of debt or the printing of money, which causes inflation. (cf. Berdal/Malone 2000).

A lack of development and of prospects entails a number of risks. Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS) lists several "conflict drivers" that can be identified from the perspective of development policy:

> "The analysis of what is driving conflict in Africa and from a development perspective remains: poverty, exclusion, lack of diversity management, service delivery to citizenry, civil liberties, restricted space for civil society organizations and media and electoral disputes, and the mega one that we all know is corruption."

Ndiaye considers these conflict drivers to be the feeding ground for three concrete security risks that she identifies with an eye to the situation in Africa: local conflicts, various forms of radicalization, and the failure of peace agreements to last or to gain acceptance after being concluded.

#### 3.1.2 Inclusion Is a Key Link between Development and Peace

In addition to confirming the close interconnectedness of peace and development processes, the experts we interviewed argued, in line with the 2008 Pathways for Peace report, that inclusion is the central factor that links development and lasting peace. The goal of inclusivity is certainly not new. For instance, with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States both donor and recipient countries recognised the centrality of supporting processes aimed at raising legitimacy and inclusivity in fragile states (Donais/McCandless 2017). However, in both political and academic discourse, inclusion is conceived of in a variety of very different ways (Donais/McCandless 2017: 304). Inclusion in peace processes, for instance, may refer to the active participation of elite members of various groups (horizontal inclusion), or to the participation of various (marginalised) groups (vertical inclusion) (van Veen/Dudouet 2017: 47).[1] In general, inclusion has both a socioeconomic dimension and a political-institutional dimension (political participation) (see also United Nations/World Bank 2018; Thier et al. 2018).

In line with the conceptual framework introduced in chapter 1.2, the experts we interviewed stressed two possible consequences: If development goes hand in hand with increasing social and/or political inclusion of broad parts of the population, then the causes of violence and conflicts are reduced. If social and/or political inclusion fails, however, this can create new risks of violence and/or conflict. Inclusion, as Jörn Grävingholt (DIE) explains, is thus not only normatively desirable. In terms of the linkage outlined above, it is also functionally necessary to enable a positive interplay of peace and development processes: For Grävingholt, inclusion is "not only a key issue from an

ethical and normative point of view", there are also "connections between inclusivity and questions of peace and the overcoming of fragility" (a similar view is also expressed by Ketut Erawan from the Institute for Peace and Democracy, IPD).

In the ideal case, inclusive strategies combine the socioeconomic and political dimensions. Colombia is a good example of a case where this linkage is not currently succeeding, according to Juan Diego Castro from the Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES): "Although the political inclusion of the former FARC guerrillas has been somewhat successful, the socio-economic reintegration of the former fighters has made little progress to date." As a result, grievances have not been addressed, which has hampered sustainable and inclusive development in the areas of the conflict. But political inclusion also involves challenges that are not simply resolved by the holding of elections, as Jörn Grävingholt (DIE) points out: Elections per se are not a problem. However, they often go alongside a one-sided focus on a specific institutional model. This "ignores the fact that this model can only develop its power when it is rooted in an overall context that also guarantees pluralism, inclusion and diversity of opinion." In addition to the relevance of participation and inclusion for the establishment of peaceful political orders, both of the dimensions of inclusion mentioned above are also vital when it comes to processes of negotiations (e.g. in the context of peace processes)

> Inclusion is not only a key issue from an ethical and normative point of view. There are also connections between inclusivity and questions of peace and the overcoming of fragility.
>
> Jörn Grävingholt, DIE

(Interview with Thania Paffenholz, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, GIIDS; for a similar perspective, see also Khaled Mansour, Arab Reform Initiative).

While there is broad agreement about the value of inclusion/inclusivity as a goal, the matter of implementation is far more fraught. Two prominent strands of discussion concern enhancing the inclusion of women and of young people (for more details and many further sources, see United Nations/World Bank 2018). There is a broad consensus that involving these groups has a positive effect on peace, even if the concrete mechanisms have only been partially researched. Studies also show that donors have difficulty in overcoming a tendency to focus on state institutions, elites and professional NGOs when implementing measures designed to increase inclusivity (cf. van Veen/Dudouet 2017:37; Aulin 2018; Paffenholz 2015). But this traditional kind of focus is incompatible with a comprehensive notion of inclusion that seeks broad participation of local actors at both national and subnational level.[2] Practical development and peace policy face difficult questions in this regard: who should be included? Why these actors and how should they be included? What kinds of tensions could arise between various forms of inclusion? (cf. Bell 2018) There is a tension between the call for external actors to somehow ensure the widest possible inclusivity in the interest of promoting development and peace and the recognition that, while development and peace processes can be supported from outside, they should always be locally owned and driven – especially in conflict states. This balancing act is unavoidable, but can be addressed constructively by taking a sequential approach, on the one hand, and by using dialogue and negotiation-based strategies, on the other (cf., with regard to the promotion of democracy, Poppe et al. 2019).

### 3.1.3 Development and Peace Processes are Non-Linear, Complex, and Contradictory

As the last two sections made clear, the interviews confirm the broad thesis that there is a close connection between peace and development. However, they also show the need for nuance: The interplay between development and peace processes is complex, partially contradictory and does not follow a linear logic. It is not only that "development setbacks" threaten peace and fuel conflicts, while "setbacks to peace" pose an immediate threat to progress made in development. Processes that lead to "more development" and "more peace" are also far more contradictory than a harmonious understanding of the development-peace nexus would suggest. The following section deals with the complexity of peace and development processes. In doing so it follows one of the central stipulations formulated at the most recent Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development with respect to the nexus: "Embrace its complexity, rather than seeking its simplification" (SIPRI 2019: 53).

The path to "more development" is always also fraught with conflict. The achievement of progress in development may have a positive effect on the safeguarding of peace in general (cf. stabilisation/legitimation in chapter 3.1.1), but development processes always have their own potential for conflict. That is a result, on the one hand, of the fact that development generally has redistributive implications, and, on the other, that there are conflicting views of what "development" means. Caroline Hughes (Kroc Institute) stresses that development projects initiated by external actors are particularly prone to generating conflict. Major development projects, in particular, do not simply benefit everyone, but also "exploit, displace, and marginalize people". Moreover, the political implications for society are often neglected. For instance, when it comes to divergent security perceptions and concerns:

> "There is a tendency that development organizations want to challenge or restructure the way that communities are politically organized. Attempting to do that through a development project is a fundamental misunderstanding how people in post-conflict situation understand their own security. Often development projects are premised on the idea that you can transform someone's security arrangements quite quickly with an inability to imagine what kind of risk that is for someone who has been living in that place." (For more, see the discussion in chapter 3.1.2 of the challenges that arise in the areas of inclusion and local ownership.)

> The path to development does not follow a very straightforward logic. It is rather a complex dynamic where one step that seems to create conditions for development comes with the risk of imploding one way or another.
>
> Mónica Serrano, COLMEX

Clearly, the consequences of development cooperation can be ambivalent at times, particularly in conflict situations, and the research confirms this (for details, see Boxes 4 and 5 on ➜ pages 34 and 35).

As an example of this ambivalence, we may take the conflict potential of democratic elections, which have often led to violence and/or new conflicts in the past, particularly in Africa. According to Steven Gruzd (SAIIA), there are "whole sets of conflicts that are centred on unresolved elections or elections that create a reason for violence and conflict or exacerbating reasons and often these issues are not solved until even the next elections" (cf. also Söderberg Kovacs/Bjarnesen 2018).

Overall, the path to "more development" is complex and difficult to plan, as Mónica Serrano from the Colegio de México (COLMEX) explains: The path to development does not follow "a very straightforward logic". It is rather "a complex dynamic where one step that seems to create conditions for development comes with the risk of imploding one way or another".

The situation is similar with regard to peace processes. While peace enables development processes (see chapter 3.1.1), the path "to more peace" is complex and does not lead immediately to development progress. With regard to the complexity of peace processes, Simon Gill from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) stresses the need to abandon the frequently dominant "formalistic" conception of peace:

> "A peace agreement does not necessarily change the realities of the people on the ground. There is a huge gap between the formal understanding of peace (negotiations, agreements) and the people's narrative of a peaceful life. These are different worlds." (see also Pouligny 2006; Uvin 2009; Firchow 2018)

According to Gill, it is an error to believe that a peace treaty will automatically lead to improvements in people's lives. In reality, it frequently takes "a long time for people's lives to improve". In this context, Rachel Scott from the OECD's Crisis & Fragility Unit believes it is therefore necessary to give more thought in general as to what "peace" actually means: "There is a vision of peace as utopia where the children are singing in the streets and the flowers are blooming. But actually, peace in practice is quite a messy thing."

One of the consequences of a deeper understanding of the complexity of peace and development

### BOX 4: RESEARCH ON THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ON VIOLENT CONFLICTS[3]

In existing research, "there is a broad consensus that at the macro-level, Official Development Assistance (ODA) has no direct influence on violent conflicts (cf. De Ree/Nillesen 2009). Accordingly, whether states receive high or low levels of development aid has no influence on the outbreak of civil wars. However, studies show that the local effects of development cooperation are context dependent: While development projects aimed at the stabilisation of post-conflict societies often produce positive effects, analysis suggests that activities that focus on security or humanitarian assistance in the context of ongoing violent conflicts can lead to the escalation or perpetuation of the latter (Zürcher 2017, 2019). In most cases, development cooperation only has a mitigating effect on conflicts when projects are carried out in a broadly secure environment and are protected by the presence of troops. In contested areas, by contrast, the result is usually either no effect or even conflict escalation. Furthermore, research has uncovered potentially unintended consequences and spillover effects. Unintended consequences were identified, for instance, for a project in Sierra Leone (Cilliers et al. 2016). Although truth and reconciliation measures made a positive contribution to social peace, the project also led to a deterioration of the psychological wellbeing of the participants. Spillover effects occur when development cooperation leads not to a reduction in violence but to its geographical shift: The violence in the region targeted by the project only decreases because violent actors move into neighbouring regions. To date, we lack a sufficient number of studies that would systematically evaluate development cooperation measures in this area in order to generate valid and robust findings on these complex causal logics.

processes is to be more realistic regarding potential results. This is true above all with regard to the timescale on which a potential "peace dividend" becomes perceptible. As Rachel Scott (OECD) states: "We need to be more realistic about what we can achieve and about what we want to achieve" (see also Böckler 2019). Ketut Erawan (IPD) notes generally that "supporting or promoting democracy and peacebuilding is not a straightforward process."

It is necessary to accept the complex and contradictory nature of peace and development processes and translate this into programme and project designs that are capable of learning and offer adequate leeway for reflection and adaptation. It is therefore important to take account of the insights into the inconsistent effects of development cooperation on violent conflicts as briefly summarised in Box 4 (→ page 34). Regardless of the level of funding, the societal and security environments have been shown to be critical factors for the success of development projects. In the selection, design and timing of programmes and specific projects, three types of conflicting objectives need to be taken into account: (1) short-term stabilisation vs. long-term peacebuilding, (2) intended effects vs. unintended consequences for the local population, and (3) the relationship between costs and effects of development cooperation measures. In the case of Germany, the guidelines on crisis prevention and peacebuilding adopted in 2017 have generally initiated corresponding policy changes. They take the complexity and non-linearity of conflicts into account, combining a focus on general operational principles with an acknowledgement of the importance of the specifics of conflicts, conflicting objectives and practical dilemmas, and propose an ongoing and inter-

> "There is a vision of peace as utopia where the children are singing in the streets and the flowers are blooming. But actually, peace in practice is quite a messy thing.
>
> Rachel Scott, OECD

ministerial process of reflexive adaptation of sectoral strategies and measures (Federal Government 2017). However, a nexus-sensitive optimisation of development cooperation that accounts for context-dependence and conflicting objectives also requires continuous and systematic evaluation (see chapter 4.1.3).

## 3.2 The Narrow Application of the Nexus in Policy and Practice

While the development-peace nexus, as shown in the previous chapter, is a prominent guiding concept in both theory and practice, in the current debate, the nexus is nonetheless often applied in a very narrow way: Instead of focusing on sustainable peace and a development agenda in line with the Agenda 2030, current debates and policies are characterized by a predominance of concerns for short-term stabilisation and security, supplemented by humanitarian alleviation of acute suffering, as, for instance, Thomas Carothers (Carnegie Endowment) and Khaled Mansour (Arab Reform Initiative) emphasise (see also De Waal 2019: 1). This conceptional narrowing has immediate consequences that can be illustrated with regard to three areas of tension: International development policy currently prioritises stabilisation over transformation (chapter 3.2.1), acts reactively rather than preventively (chapter 3.2.2) and focuses attention on collective, large-scale violence and war at the national level rather than other, local, non-conventional and interpersonal forms of physical violence (chapter 3.2.3).

### 3.2.1 Stabilising the Status Quo Is Eclipsing Transformative Peace Development

As a consequence of the trends in global conflict addressed in chapter 1, as well as in response to the growth in numbers of international migrants and refugees, which is increasingly impacting countries in the Global North, the political priorities of foreign and development policy have markedly shifted in recent years: In Europe particularly, the

**BOX 5: THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NEXUS – THE CASE OF MALI**

A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) examined the complex challenges for the provision of aid (food, medical and agricultural aid) in the context of the ongoing violent conflict in Mali. The conflict began in 2012 with the armed rebellion and capture of large parts of northern Mali by Tuareg forces in alliance with Islamist groups (Tranchant et al. 2019). The analysis focuses on the region of Mopti in central Mali, one of the most important centres of agriculture and livestock farming in the country. By comparing surveys of households taken in January 2012, shortly before the outbreak of the current war, and five years later (January 2017), the report's key findings demonstrate the complexity of a nexus-sensitive peace development policy:

1. Complex conflict dynamics: Statistically, no correlation could be found between the local presence of armed groups and the intensity of the violent conflict (measured by the number of conflict deaths).

2. Complex interplay between conflict and the provision of international aid: Villages that experienced higher local intensities of conflict were statistically likely to receive higher levels of international support. The presence of armed groups, on the other hand, reduced the volume of aid provided.

3. Complex relationships between development and conflict: Development as such does not guarantee peace. The study does show that households with secure livelihoods were more resilient to recruiting efforts on the part of Islamist groups, and hence that development has an indirect negative effect on the presence of violent actors. However, regions with higher levels of agricultural production, livestock numbers and wealth make attractive targets for armed groups. The result is a higher presence of armed actors in those regions.

The IFPRI report shows that peace and development processes in regions affected by violence are non-linear, complex and contradictory. It follows that continuous and conflict-sensitive analysis with the participation of local actors is necessary to take account of the complexities of causal mechanisms, particularly at the local level.

focus has noticeably switched to the (short-term) stabilisation of countries and regions affected by conflict alongside questions relating to flight and migration. This general shift in political priorities in recent years has had specific effects on practical development policy. According to our interview partners, the focus on stabilisation has meant the transformative ambitions of development cooperation have been placed on the back burner. This section therefore seeks to shed light on the tension between stabilisation and transformation; the central focus is on the counterproductive consequences of the narrowing of the nexus on stabilisation.

It is important to note at the start that none of those interviewed rejected stabilisation as a general goal. What did come in for criticism was the dominance of the stabilisation paradigm in contemporary development cooperation debates and practice:

> "In the past five years – if we look at the development funds coming from Germany and the EU to the MENA region – it was not really about 'development for peace' as much as about 'development for stabilisation', which are two very different things. Now people try to link whatever they do with counter terrorism, migration, and stabilizing communities, because they know that's what sells." (Khaled Mansour, Arab Reform Initiative)[4]

Furthermore, in many regions the tension between the imperatives of security and development that has been a matter for discussion since the 1990s can be observed to have increased substantially, as Thomas Carothers (Carnegie Endowment) notes. According to Carothers, the enormous importance often placed on the security imperative has, in many cases, led to a questionable choice of partners: "For example, Egypt and the Philippines are engaged in hard security issues but do a poor job in developmental issues."[5] As a consequence, in the view of Khaled Mansour, it is not uncommon for local development projects, including at the local level, to support and stabilise problematic regimes: "The problem with 'stabilization projects' is that you often modernize and upgrade security forces which are very repressive, do not work in a legal framework, and are corrupt" (see also Koch et al. 2018; Bartels 2019).

This is backed up by research findings: A significant number of studies have shown, particularly drawing on experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, that development cooperation in violent contexts may have clearly negative results: "Aid injected in highly insecure regions, where violence is a reality and insurgents retain some capacities, will increase, not dampen violence" (Zürcher 2019: 1).[6] Although the consequences are only unambiguously negative in situations of highly insecure situations (see Box 4 on ➔ page 36), this finding has far-reaching implications for the potential of development cooperation to succeed and should at least call into question the prominence given to the security imperative in many contexts. There is a need here for reflection and review.

> "In the past five years it was not really about 'development for peace' as much as about 'development for stabilisation', which are two very different things.
>
> Khaled Mansour, Arab Reform Initiative

Against this background, the dominant focus on stabilisation should be considered the problem, according to Andrew Sherriff (ECDPM), as it has led to many valuable and reliable ideas in peace and development policy being neglected:

> "This trend is unfortunate as there has been quite a lot of good and deep work done on inequalities in conflict, on policy work on SDG 16, a lot of thinking around statebuilding and peacebuilding, and these have been swept up into a political agenda of short-term stabilization, crises and migration management."

The current emphasis on trying to meet a demand for "rapid results" thus comes at the cost of structural and transformative peacebuilding efforts (see also Deneckere/Hauck 2018). While Carothers (Carnegie Endowment) acknowledges that the long-term results of short-term stabilisation measures have not yet

been researched, the examples mentioned give cause to doubt that the current focus on narrow stabilisation measures has been adequately aligned and integrated with the goals of peace-oriented development policy.[7] Research and practice need to answer the question of how a peace-oriented development policy can support comprehensive and inclusive transformation processes: "We have to think about how development can work not for stabilization but for transitions. There are several countries in transition at the moment and they should be the objective of development funding" (Khaled Mansour, Arab Reform Initiative).

Nonetheless, for Jörn Grävingholt (DIE), there are signs that thinking on the problems highlighted in this chapter is beginning to change in a number of ways. Yet, in the overall political climate, Grävingholt considers the extent to which a strategic change of direction may actually be in progress still to be an open question. While there is growing awareness "that the heavy focus on stabilisation is problematic", the political pressure to invest in short-term alliances is "simply too strong", "and with regard to major political crisis situations as in Syria, this shows no sign of stopping". The fixation on the status quo and on short-term mechanisms and coalitions has so far remained constant. Another finding that is closely connected with the dominance of the stabilisation paradigm is dealt with in the following section: the fact that international efforts along the peace-development nexus are primarily reactive rather than preventive at present – although the primacy of prevention has been acknowledged for many years, not only in development policy, but in foreign and security policy generally.

### 3.2.2 International Efforts along the Peace-Development Nexus Are Reactive rather than Preventive

A wide-ranging debate on the concept of conflict prevention was already held in the 1990s (cf. Carnegie Commission 1997, Call/Campbell 2017). In recent years, the idea has undergone a revival in connection with the changing – and in the meantime intensified – global conflict environment (see chapter 1.1). Prevention is the central mantra of the Pathways for Peace report. Within the UN, the agenda of prevention has assumed a position of centrality since 2015 and particularly since the appointment of António Guterres as Secretary-General: For Guterres, prevention is "not merely a priority, but the priority" (2017). In both the EU Global Strategy and Germany's guidelines for civilian crisis prevention, the idea of prevention is a key guiding concept (see also chapter 4.2.1). There are several references to the fact that conflict prevention not only reduces human suffering, but also saves money: "Averting a crisis at an early stage and preventing violent escalations avoids human suffering whilst being more effective and less costly than acute crisis response" (Federal Government 2017: 57; see also European Union 2016: 29; United Nations/World Bank 2018: 2–4). Franck Bousquet from the World Bank makes a similar argument: "We always say one US dollar in prevention allows us to save 16 US dollars down the road." Although prevention is stressed by all sides in the political debate, this general consensus is rarely reflected in practice: "At present, spending and efforts on prevention represent only a fraction of the amount spent on crisis response and reconstruction" (United Nations/World Bank 2018: xvii). Many of those we interviewed would concur.

Natascha Zupan (FriEnt), for instance, stresses that reacting to acute crises with short-term measures neglects the classical benefits of development cooperation: While the current focus is on "ad hoc reaction", "approaches based on the long term and on partnership" have "taken a backseat" in development cooperation in recent years. For Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS), the central problem is that the international community has a tendency only to look at acute conflicts.[8] Development cooperation, in particular, should take a different approach:

> "I think we have the tendency to put emphasis on violent conflicts, forgetting the pre- and the post-conflict, namely, prevention and post-conflict. As a result, I see developmental processes as a game changer if the interventions are is geared towards prevention. Prevention could be a game changer if more investment goes into avoiding conflicts and preventing relapses, rather than into peacekeeping."

Natascha Zupan's (FriEnt) recommendation to avoid being drawn too deeply into violent contexts and wars should also be understood in this light:

> "In the last 15 years, development policy actors have increasingly been working in contexts affected by acute violence. In such contexts, the cost of security is extremely high and there is little scope of entering into direct contact with people and societies to develop partnerships. This creates challenges for development policy actors and approaches towards development policy that need to be discussed more thoroughly."

In this context, prevention and sustainability have taken a back seat in operational terms. According to the Pathways for Peace report, "despite calls for greater investment in prevention […], most aid is still delivered after violence has occurred": "Development cooperation is still not commonly viewed as a relevant tool for early prevention, and policies that stimulate growth and poverty reduction often are assumed to be sufficient in and of themselves to reduce the risk of violence" (United Nations/World Bank 2018: 249; see also World Bank 2011)

Yet, according to Tilman Brück (ISDC), it is clear that prevention has major advantages over mere reaction: We know from medicine "that prevention is better and cheaper than treatment". If far more of the available resources were to flow "into preventive development assistance", emergency humanitarian aid would become superfluous in the long term. At the same time, Brück identifies a research gap in this regard: "We know how conflicts come about. But we do not know much about how to prevent them." Although many actors are now investing in monitoring and early recognition, this is done in a way that is far too fragmentary, lacks coordination and is often methodologically narrow. There is an untapped potential for mutual learning and synergy effects.

This also opens up new opportunities for various policy fields to shape prevention. This is particularly the case for refugee and migrant policy. As Caroline Hughes (Kroc Institute) comments, we need to come to a far better understanding of migration and the factors affecting "the way that home communities accept and reject migrants. The question is: How can you start even ahead of migrants showing up, to prepare people for a humane response?" In general, the interviewees stressed the vital necessity of making sure the nexus approach does not degenerate into a mere "repair operation" (Peruvemba 2018). Instead, the preventive elements should be placed in the foreground. This is a matter of implementation, as Asako Okai from the UNDP Crisis Bureau stresses:

> "Despite these findings and the recommendations which came out of OECD and the twin UN Resolutions on sustaining peace in 2016, it is really the political commitment that has not fully translated into action and actual investment." (See also Call/Campbell 2017 and chapter 4.2.1)

The statements of the experts we interviewed thus reflect the policy debates of the last few years (and decades) by highlighting again and again the importance of prevention. Nevertheless, these debates continue to stand in opposition to a practice in which prevention is anything but a priority. The problem is thus not one of strategic insight but rather detailed analysis; above all, there is a lack of implementation in terms of specific budget items, programmes and projects.

### 3.2.3 The Focus on Collective, Large-Scale Violence and War Neglects Local, Non-Conventional and Interpersonal Forms of Physical Violence

In addition to the primary focus on reactive stabilisation, the narrowing of the development-peace nexus can also be seen at work in another area of tension. The interviews reveal that the current debates and projects around the nexus tend to focus on collective large-scale violence and war, while local, non-conventional and interpersonal forms of violence mostly play only a minor role. Here two observations can be distinguished, as the following section briefly explains.

> Despite these findings and the recommendations which came out of OECD and the twin UN Resolutions on sustaining peace in 2016, it is really the political commitment that has not fully translated into action and actual investment.
>
> (Asako Okai, UNDP)

First, the current narrowing of the nexus debate neglects violent conflicts that have a limited geographical scope. The focus is rather on the "major" sources of conflict, as Tilman Brück (ISDC) ex-

plains: "We all stare as if hypnotised at the outbreak of large-scale violence, but we know little about continually recurring but less dramatic political violence." Yet from the perspective of the nexus, precisely local violent conflicts are central for development processes, as they frequently affect marginalised regions and hamper vital development progress.

Second, the focus on classical armed conflicts blocks our view of the sometimes enormous physical violence that can be observed under conditions that are nominally peaceful. Anke Hoeffler from the University of Konstanz calls for far greater attention to be paid to these forms of violence: Even where peace reigns, the key question still has to be asked: "How peaceful is it there really?" Against this background, according to Hoeffler, "we need to pay more attention to 'violence within peace'". Here, Hoeffler identifies a knowledge and research gap in the nexus debate:

> "Interpersonal violence has so far been largely neglected in the context of development, but it has consequences: In 2015, there were 45,000 deaths in Syria, and in Brazil in the same year, there were 55,000. This extent of interpersonal violence has so far barely been recognised – neither in development research nor in the policy debate."

Mónica Serrano (COLMEX) and Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) also refer to the levels of violence in Latin American countries, which the nexus debate tends to ignore. In Adriana Abdenur's words:

> "The peace development nexus debate to date has been heavily oriented towards contexts where there is recognized open armed conflict and, in the case of Latin America, it is restricted to very few places: primarily Colombia, Haiti and El Salvador. This is very problematic because there is conflict in most of Latin America, and it is very violent. We have the highest rates of homicide in the world. More people die due to homicide in Brazil than in most open conflicts in the world, if you use the PRIO definition. We have more dislocated persons than in most open conflicts, but this gets secondary status within the policy debate on the peace development nexus."

Mónica Serrano focuses on the enormous potential for violence unleashed by the illegal drugs trade. In her view, illicit drug markets have "created the conditions of violence in Latin America". As a result, Latin America is home to eight percent of the world's population, but 30% of global murders: "The reasons for that violence and the impact of it on the economies is not being reflected."

> Interpersonal violence has so far been largely neglected in the context of development, but it has consequences: In 2015, there were 45,000 deaths in Syria, and in Brazil in the same year, there were 55,000. This extent of interpersonal violence has so far barely been recognised – neither in development research nor in the policy debate.
>
> Anke Hoeffler, University of Konstanz

A recent analysis by the Carnegie Endowment concurs with these observations, describing "the increased capacity of nonstate actors in the modern world, such as warlords, drug barons, terrorists, and money-launderers, to cause conflict and instability" as a central trend that helps to define contemporary conflict (De Waal 2019: 3).[9] The World Bank also emphasises that interpersonal violence and gang violence disrupt development, accounting for more deaths than violent conflicts: "For each person who dies at war, between five and thirteen are victims of interpersonal violence" (World Bank 2019c: 3).

The comparison of homicides in Brazil with war deaths in Syria in Figure 6 (→ page 40) reveals that similar amounts of people are murdered in populous states as fall victim in large-scale wars. However, the levels of intensity of violence are different in Brazil and Syria: calculating deaths per 100,000 inhabitants – as is common for homicide – shows

## FIGURE 6: HOMICIDE AND CONFLICT DEATHS IN COMPARISON. BRAZIL AND SYRIA, 2000–2018

**Conflict deaths (Syria)/ Homicides (Brazil)**




**Conflict deaths (Syria)/ Homicides (Brazil) per 100,000 inhabitants**




*Sources: Homicides: Igarapé Institute (2019), Conflict deaths: UCDP (2019)*

that Syria's internationalised civil war is significantly more violent. For this reason, it is important not to downplay the phenomenon of violent conflict. Yet for the development-peace nexus, it is still an important indication that many countries – particularly but not only in Latin America – despite being in a state of peace, are affected by extremely high levels of violence (for a comprehensive treatment, see Zinecker 2014). And just as in the sections on stabilisation (chapter 3.2.1) and prevention (chapter 3.2.2), it is necessary to note that both research gaps and problems of implementation exist along the nexus. It has been recognised that political violence and conflict pose challenges for development cooperation, but, when it comes to interpersonal violence, efforts to develop programmes and concrete projects have largely been lacking. These shortfalls and challenges in implementation that arise from the complexity (chapter 3.1) and the narrowing (chapter 3.2) of the nexus create a need for action on various levels. Chapter 4 outlines a number of potential courses of action.

1 *In a report produced as input to the Pathways for Peace report, Thania Paffenholz et al. (2017) show that different forms of inclusion have different effects in different conflict phases – and are also sensitive to specific contexts and conditions.*

2 *Research on the "local turn" in peacebuilding in particular has shed a critical light on the practice of Western donors here. The critique revolves around the claim that peacebuilding is too often dominated by the application of liberal blueprints (liberal democracy, free markets, rule of law), while the specific contexts in states affected by conflicts and the specific interests and values of local groups are ignored. By contrast, sustainable peace needs to correspond to local understandings and contexts and, hence, cannot be built without real ownership and the inclusive participation of various social groups (for relevant case studies, see Donais 2012, McGinty/Richmond 2013, Paffenholz 2015).*

3 *In addition to a comprehensive review of existing empirical research, this summary draws on a Knowledge Gap Map created by the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval). We are grateful to DEval for kindly providing us with a copy of this documents.*

4 *With regard to the dominant view taken in the USA, Carothers (Carnegie Endowment) thus observes: "Peace is a nice by-product of a good security policy. In the US, the main focus is on stabilization in Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia."*

5 *In a similar way, with regard to Latin America, Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) notes: "What we can see in Latin America is a draw-back in the development of the nexus because we have a number of governments […] that have a heavy handed 'strong fist' (mano dura) approach to public security in particular. They heavily prioritize the militarization of public security and heavy-handed security policies over anything related to development. This also means that resources that should be going into development and prevention are channelled into this militarization approach. This approach has been replicated and […] the rationale behind it is progressively expanded in Latin America as well as to other sectors."*

6 *In addition, a recent study by the DIE on the effects of international peacebuilding efforts has found evidence that prioritising stability over the goal of democratisation often has negative implications for the effectiveness of international efforts in conflict situations as well (Fiedler et al. 2019).*

7 *With regard to the claim that development cooperation can assist in "combating the causes of flight", Jean-Paul Moatti (IRD) also notes: "The idea that development assistance can help to stop migration and conflict is a little bit naive. In terms of migration flows, it's contrary to evidence."*

8 *Anke Hoeffler (University of Konstanz) and Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) express similar views.*

9 *"Many societies ostensibly 'at peace' are far from peaceful. Some of them are experiencing endemic violence that exceed death rates in warfare. […] Almost nine out of ten violent deaths across the world today occur inside countries and cities that are not at war in the traditional sense. Criminal violence perpetrated by drug cartels, gangs, and mafia groups is skyrocketing, especially in Latin American and the Caribbean, causing global homicides to creep up again. Meanwhile, state security forces are continuing to deploy mass violence and excessive force against their own people." (Kleinfeld/Muggah 2019: 27).*

# 4. Recommendations

The recommendations we derive from our analysis of the development-peace nexus can be summarised in the form of two broad theses:

First, anyone who wishes to take the development-peace nexus seriously would be well advised to understand peace development as a project of fundamental societal transformation. This results in the following concrete practical recommendations:

- Nexus-oriented development cooperation should focus on providing flexible support for long-term processes of transformation.
- This kind of engagement requires both awareness of risk and a willingness to enter into risks.
- Interventions in complex and mutually conditioning development processes and conflict dynamics pose a particular challenge for the ability and capacity to perform context-specific analysis.

Second, international support for development and peace suffers not only from a lack of knowledge or inadequate strategies. Equally significant is the fact that key insights, some of which have been established and politically acknowledged for years or decades, are simply not being implemented effectively. This concerns two mantras of the development and peace discourse, in particular:

- the primacy of prevention, and
- the postulate of coherence.

## 4.1 Understanding Peace Development as a Transformative Project

### 4.1.1 Focusing Development Cooperation on Support for Long-Term Transformation Processes

EA central recommendation of the experts interviewed is that nexus-oriented development cooperation needs to be focused more strongly on long-term support for transformation processes (see also Bohnet 2019: 252). The short-term planning horizons that can frequently be observed are a problem, as Tilman Brück notes: “The more short-term our actions in fragile contexts, the greater the danger that the programme will weaken local institutions rather than strengthening them.” Khaled Mansour observes a clear shift towards ever shorter planning horizons, closely related to the domestic political interests of actors in the field of development policy: A key trend, for him, is that development cooperation “has slowly turned from big and overarching objectives of developing health, education, infrastructure, and good governance”. Today we see a short-term focus, driven by electoral cycles.

Andrew Sherriff (ECDPM) calls for development cooperation to abandon this short-term crisis management and instead turn to long-term and sustainable approaches. He refers explicitly to German peace and development policy: “Germany should take a step back in terms of promoting less the sort of crisis management, stabilization, countering violent extremism, migration management perspective and more saying how do we promote modestly

sustainable solutions and more long-term, more bottom-up solutions." Asked how the public demand for rapid results in crisis situations could be met, he formulated the following "communication strategy":

> "I would turn it on its head and would be saying: Do you want to be increasingly doing firefighting crisis management in the next 30 years? If the answer is yes, then fine, carry on with your short-term quick win approaches. If the answer is no, then you have to think of a different kind of approach"

Similarly, Emma Leslie (CPCS) called for ten-to-twenty-year planning horizons in fragile situations to replace the current tendency to plan for only two to three years at a time. This requires, according to Franck Bousquet (World Bank), not least changes in expectation management: "It is really important to manage expectations and realize that progress is rarely linear. Before it gets better, it can get worse."

more problematic when one considers how much is already known about the timescale of development processes after a conflict:

> "While a typical civil war lasts seven years, it takes 14 years to recover from one economically, the chances of a setback are high and it can take 25 years to rebuild lost state systems and institutions to the level of 'good enough' governance." (SIPRI 2017: 9)

In other words, if we are to take the development-peace nexus seriously and to understand peace development as a transformative project, it follows that this project has to be conceived as an undertaking that requires long-term planning and also long-term support (for further discussion, see Deneckere/Hauck 2018; Culbert/Poole 2019).

This requires, among other things, flexible funding mechanisms and instruments (see also the

> Germany should take a step back in terms of promoting less the sort of crisis management, stabilization, countering violent extremism, migration management perspective and more saying how do we promote modestly sustainable solutions and more long-term, more bottom-up solutions.
>
> Andrew Sherriff, ECDPM

In other words, for all the pressure to act rapidly and deliver quick results, in fragile contexts, it is vital to keep an eye on long-term goals and to consider expectation management from the start.

In this context, as experience has shown time and again, it is particularly important that support is not withdrawn suddenly after the conclusion of a peace treaty (see Chapter 3.1.3). However, that has too often been the case, as Vasu Gounden (ACCORD) observes: A peace agreement is not the same as peace "but many donors pull out of a country when in fact it is precisely the time when they should be in the country". Nor should mediators pull out of a country after a peace deal but rather remain to support the implementation (see also Delgado et al. 2019:12). Short-term, crisis-focused approaches appear even

recommendations on funding mechanisms in Box 6 on → page 47). This is not a new discovery. The Charter for the Future published by the BMZ in 2014 already acknowledged the need to "develop flexible courses of action and instruments to fund peace-building measures to address dynamic conflict situations" (BMZ 2014b: 40). Thania Paffenholz (GIIDS) notes, however, that little has so far been done to act on this insight. She calls for a greater openness to innovation in German development cooperation:

> "My recommendation to the German development community: Support other creative and innovative players. Germany has not been innovative enough so far, but it can scale up innovative projects and should enter into partnerships with countries such as Sweden and Switzerland to enable this."

### 4.1.2 Be Aware of Risks and Be Willing to Take Them

A second conclusion of the experts we interviewed was that engagement in contexts affected by violence requires both a solid awareness of risks and a certain willingness to take them. This is because, in regions affected by conflict and violence, the modus operandi of classical development cooperation changes, as Rachel Scott (OECD) points out:

> "Violent conflict changes the way development actors need to operate on the ground. Development actors are timid in violent conflict situations; they generally stay in the capital; the scope and scale what they can do is certainly and significantly reduced. But you have to have some kind of risk tolerance, risk assessment, risk acceptance, which is often difficult for development actors to have."

For all that many development actors work in risky environments on a daily basis, not every project is designed to take account of these risks – and, above all, to communicate them. It is vital that methods, goals and expectations – including the associated risks – are communicated effectively from the start of a project. In this regard, Dirk Messner (UNU-EHS) comments that:

> "Politicians frequently suggest that there are simple solutions. We should be wary of this, because – especially in fragile situations – these are complex processes that take time. We should speak of 'risky investments' here – they sometimes fail."

> Politicians frequently suggest that there are simple solutions. We should be wary of this, because – especially in fragile situations – these are complex processes that take time. We should speak of 'risky investments' here – they sometimes fail.
>
> Dirk Messner, UNU-EHS

Nexus-oriented development cooperation inevitably faces greater risks. But this does not mean that it should pull back based on fear. Vasu Gounden (ACCORD) outlines the consequences that this may have: "Disengagement doesn't help to solve anything. That inevitably has a negative impact on the poorest of the poor." Jörn Grävingholt (GDI) stresses that there have been recent gains in knowledge:

> "With regard to post-conflict settings, a number of research findings in recent years have shown clearly that a lack of assistance following civil wars is no solution – far from it. That came as a surprise. In countries that have received too little external assistance, civil war has returned. Regardless of what form the assistance took, the successful cases that there have been all received substantial support. This is an interesting result that should certainly give cause to think again to anyone who thinks that 'better to leave well alone than get involved'."

For development cooperation, this willingness to take risks not only entails continuing to work in challenging conflict situations and to accept responsibility for the security of everyone involved in development work. It also entails entering into new partnerships that go beyond classical cooperation with state agencies. As Simon Gill (ODI) observes:

> "Most of the status-quo approaches by development agencies and state security isn't working. We need to look at some alternative ways of tackling and addressing the problem. So my message is: Try out alternative, less conventional approaches to partnerships instead of proforma partnership with national governments."[1]

At the same time – and this was also stressed several times by the interviewees – a greater willingness to take risks must not come at the cost of basic principles of development policy. In view of the sometimes unintended consequences of development cooperation in conflict situations (see chapter 3.1.3), this particularly concerns the do-no-harm principle and – with a view to the work of development cooperation itself – issues around the security of personnel. With regard to the principle of accountability, Andrew Sherriff (ECDPM) stresses that the need to be willing to take risks in such situations cannot mean "that we are throwing a lot of money and don't ask any questions what we are achieving". It is also vital here that normative principles such as do-no-harm and accountability are not only respected at

the lowest project level. These issues cannot simply be delegated to the ground operations while being simultaneously neglected at the strategic and diplomatic levels. In Sherriff's words: It is questionable whether "conflict-sensitive development in a sea of non-conflict-sensitive diplomatic action" can ever achieve much: "I think it's not necessarily helpful to bang the drum for more project level conflict sensitivity when you don't have it higher up the chain."

This balance between context-sensitive risk-taking and upholding basic principles of development cooperation is hard to achieve, but it is necessary if the implementation of development activities is to take account of the reality of (post-)conflict areas. Avoiding engagement in such (post-)conflict regions altogether is certainly not an answer.

### 4.1.3 Strengthening Analytic Capabilities

In its 2017 guidelines, the German federal government committed to "put special emphasis on improving the knowledge base for involvement in fragile contexts and for shared learning processes" (Federal Government 2017: 140). Many German ministries have indeed invested in expanding capacities and systems for early crisis recognition in recent years. This includes the Federal Foreign Office's (AA) PREVIEW project, which carries out computer-based evaluation of data in the public domain, and a system currently being developed by the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) that aims to enable "early global recognition of developing crises in militarily relevant contexts" starting in 2021 (Bundestag 2019: 14). Since 2001, the BMZ has had the capability to produce regular expert analyses "in order to identify future potential for crises and needs for preventive action in cooperation countries" (Bundestag 2019: 14). Analyses from the various ministries are compiled by an interministerial Horizon Scanning working group. However, these various information systems provide only limited situation-specific conflict analysis that can be used to guide development cooperation in affected states.

It is indeed a huge challenge for conflict analyses to comprehend the dynamic, complex and ever-changing situations in states affected by conflicts. Simon Gill (ODI) sees an overarching issue in the ongoing tendency for development cooperation actors to look for the easiest solution, thereby failing to take account of the complexity of development and peace processes (see chapter 3.1.3). Ketut Erawan (IPD) draws out the need for more nuanced analysis that arises from this complexity: "There is a lack of analysis: Conflicts often have different layers. You need to understand that in order to address the different conflicts accordingly." An important means of enabling this is to closely interlink the analyses generated by the various programmes. Yet this does not always take place, as Emma Leslie (CPCS) complains: "Development agencies often do not connect their analysis to their programming. We need to link the intervention to this analysis and not just go ahead with what we planned." Especially in extremely volatile and fragile contexts, according to Leslie, it is vitally important to undertake regular follow-up analyses in order to be able to respond in a timely and effective manner to conditions on the ground, which often change very rapidly (see also SIPRI 2019).

> Development agencies often do not connect their analysis to their programming. We need to link the intervention to this analysis and not just go ahead with what we plannedar.
>
> Emma Leslie, CPCS

A particular challenge for the analysis of fragile contexts is the major significance of informal power relationships at the local level. While there has been some progress in understanding local circumstances and their informal structures, there is often a failure to integrate politico-economic analyses of local power structures (for more, see also Denny 2016):

> "We now have a profusion of empirical knowledge about how local actors and institutions can work in stabilizing and transformative ways. We know that, seen in historical terms, the local is also changeable and hybridized, and this has led to considerable progress in research regarding how to deal with the local. Nonetheless, we have still not done enough to include local and national power structures in our analyses in an integral way." (Tobias Debiel, INEF)

One reason for this deficit is that the analysis of power relationships requires the application of specific resources, and particularly the involvement of experts from countries and world regions affected by conflicts (Interview with Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, IPCS).

There is also a need to do more to analyse the unintended consequences of development projects in fragile situations (on "risk awareness", see chapter 3.1.2; on the ambivalent consequences of development cooperation in conflict situations, see Box 4 on → page 34). Andrew Sherriff (ECDPM) is clear that there has been a lack of attention to these issues so far: There is "a lot of anecdotal and meta evidence" but a lack of solid studies on unintended consequences, and hence "a real lack of real good evidence".

Finally, it is important to draw attention to a contested area that was addressed from several angles in the interviews. On the one hand, the experts were deeply sceptical about all kinds of "best practice" analyses, which are fundamentally unable – this was the gist of their remarks – to take account of the complexity and variety that exists "on the ground". At the same time, however, they called for the consolidation and synthesis of existing experiences on the nexus as well as better institutional-learning processes. The following

> Neither development nor peace policy can wait until the relationship between them has been fully understood; rather they have to carry out their work in partial ignorance of this relationship while research into the matter continues in parallel.
>
> Lothar Brock, PRIF

One reason for this, according to Sherriff, is that no-one considers themselves responsible for funding this work. Caroline Hughes (Kroc Institute) argues similarly that one aspect of the nexus, namely the possibility of unintended consequences, is often under-researched:

> "There is an entrenched habit in seeing violence as threat to development, but there is insufficient willingness to recognize violence as an outcome of development. But development processes, especially large-scale ones, do exploit, displace, and marginalize people. This is just what they do. That's a real problem. There is an attempt to grapple with this big picture trend in the policy world, but I think they haven't sort of gone there because they are not prepared to accept the idea that development is not a public good – rather, that development is inherently conflictual."(For more, see chapter 3.1.3)

The fact that development processes can also have the (unintended) effect of intensifying conflict should be duly noted and anticipated. This includes the above-mentioned need for systematic (meta-)evaluations of the context dependence and ambivalence of external interventions in conflict situations (see-chapter 3.1.3).

statement by Andrew Sherriff (ECDPM) is typical of the experts' scepticism regarding best-practice analyses:

> "We have to ask: What works in what circumstances? The best practice in Bosnia may well not be best practice in Somalia. We must try to find out what works in what circumstances, and live and navigate this complexity. We need more research not so much on best practices but on where outcomes have been creatively and innovatively achieved even with the caveat that they may not turn out to be success stories."

In addition to this, there is often a lack of institutional procedures for the consolidation of existing knowledge. Jean-Paul Moatti (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, IRD) explains that no institutional mechanisms currently exist "to synthesize the main research evidence" on the nexus. The same is true, according to Patricia Justino (Institute of Development Studies, IDS), of the large volume of diverse data on the nexus that exists but has never been made available in a consolidated form: "A lot of data" exists, but it has been collected by researchers in a variety of formats. This data needs to be brought together, but "the consolidation process is very difficult and expensive".

### BOX 6: OECD RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPLEMENTING THE NEXUS

In the "DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus" (OECD-DAC 2019a), the OECD's development committee recommends measures including the following:

#### BETTER COORDINATION

- Joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of the causes and structural drivers of conflicts
- Identifying collective outcomes combining humanitarian, development and peace-related activities
- Providing of adequate resources to enable cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture
- Political engagement at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.

#### BETTER PROGRAMMING

- Prioritising prevention, mediation and peacebuilding
- Investing in development cooperation while continuing to ensure that immediate humanitarian needs are met
- Putting people at the centre, tackling all forms of exclusion and promoting gender equality
- Applying the do-no-harm principle to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach
- Avoiding unintended consequences
- Aligning joined-up programming with the risk environment
- Strengthening local and national capacities
- Investing in learning efforts across humanitarian, development and peace efforts

#### BETTER FUNDING

- Developing evidence-based financing strategies for humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding
- Using predictable, flexible, multi-year financing instruments
- Identifying financing mechanisms that make it possible to bring together stakeholders from humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding.

Regardless of the fact that the relationship between peace and development has not been adequately researched in detail or that the knowledge that exists is fragmentary, there is no avoiding the need to develop policies and programmes. Lothar Brock from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) puts it as follows:

> „Neither development nor peace policy can wait until the relationship between them has been fully understood; rather they have to carry out their work in partial ignorance of this relationship while research into the matter continues in parallel."

Overall, situation-specific conflict analyses are extremely important as the basis for nexus-oriented development cooperation interventions. Conflict analyses of this kind should be the basis for the design of development programmes, but they also need to be regularly renewed and updated to serve as the basis for the adaptation of programmes and projects. Conflict analyses need to take account of the particular significance of power dynamics – both local and national – in violent conflicts. Furthermore, an increase in the number of conflict analyses produced or commissioned by groups of bilateral and multilateral donors would be an excellent basis for coherent development cooperation "on the ground" (see chapter 4.2.2). Ideally, conflict analyses should be participatory with the maximum involvement of both local and international experts (as partners).

For the triple nexus, the OECD recommends the performance of joint conflict analysis as the basis for collective programme planning (OECD-DAC 2019a: 7; see also Box 6 (→ page 47) and Delgado et al. 2019: 23–24). The consolidation of data from different sources by means of standardisation but above all via mechanisms for exchange and synthesis is a key precondition for this.

## 4.2 Implementing Findings and Goals

Alongside the call to take peace development seriously as a transformation project, the second central recommendation of the interviewed experts is to make more effective use of existing research findings and previously formulated policy goals with respect to the nexus. While the knowledge gaps and the need to set strategic goals at the nexus of development and peace do exist, as noted above, the interviews made clear that the problem with international peace development efforts is in many ways less a lack of appropriate strategies and policies than a matter of their consistent implementation. Key insights, some of which have been established and politically acknowledged for years if not decades, are simply not being implemented effectively. There may be a number of reasons for this, including the complexity of the nexus, shifting geopolitical conditions (see chapter 2) or conflicting foreign policy interests, political pressures and bureaucratic inertia. But none of this removes the fact there exist relatively well established and broadly accepted basic findings that development cooperation should take seriously and implement to the best of its ability. This applies in particular to two mantras of the debate around peace and development, which are discussed in the following section:

- the primacy of prevention, and
- the postulate of coherence.

### 4.2.1 Taking the Focus on Prevention Seriously

The significance of prevention as a central building block and leitmotif of international peace development has already been discussed in chapter 3.2.2. However, it also became evident during this discussion that the frequently repeated call to give a central role to prevention (cf. United Nations/World Bank 2018) has so far been inadequately implemented – particularly in funding terms. Asako Okai (UNDP Crisis Bureau) stresses this issue:

> "More decisive and dedicated efforts must be placed in preventing conflict and violence. If we are to achieve the Agenda 2030, we need to invest more and decisively in a targeted way in prevention. The DAC report clearly says that out of the earmarked ODA which is allocated to fragile states only two percent of total ODA went to conflict prevention. More prevention funding should be in place. The development community needs to ensure that it strengthens prevention action and better peace-promoting programming."

Implementing existing policies relies not least on sufficient political support and innovative funding mechanisms. Asako Okai recommends that German and international development cooperation "work out appropriate and timely, flexible, sustained multi-year quality financing that spans across the nexus and prioritizes prevention".

However, the availability of adequately funded and flexible financing mechanisms is only one component in the implementation of a nexus-oriented prevention agenda. Prioritisation is another – otherwise the scope of prevention could be unlimited. On this question, the interviewees recommend a continuous process of review and the examination of each individual case, to be conducted in close coordination with the findings of early-warning mechanisms. Tobias Debiel (INEF) calls for greater concentration on those areas where German development cooperation can make a real contribution. He sees positive potential for a more actively engaged Germany, particularly in secondary prevention and prevention in conflict situations – in other words, preventive measures that focus on areas where concerns are already known to exist and which seek to prevent further escalation of conflict dynamics. Though the scope for development cooperation activities is narrower here, they are no less essential. However, successful secondary prevention can only be built on continuous monitoring of potential trouble spots (early recognition) and the flexible and rapid deployment of development capacities.

In this regard, Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS) identifies the need to act to prevent new outbreaks of violent conflicts that have apparently abated and calls for greater investment in sustained reconstruction efforts in post-conflict settings: She claims efforts to address the question of relapse into conflict have so far been inadequate. Håvard Hegre (PRIO) makes a very similar appeal: We should not forget "the countries that

are fairly non-violent at the moment but might need preventive action to not relapse into conflict soon".

Despite the challenges laid out here, Natascha Zupan (FriEnt) sees prevention as a topic that offers many opportunities for Germany to raise its international profile. Since relatively few donors have attempted to present themselves as "champions of prevention", this field provides Germany with "a major chance to position itself in the international context". Yet it is also clear that positioning of this kind is only credible when it is based not only on words but on concrete actions and resources. Prevention is potentially cost-intensive and requires the combination of early-recognition mechanisms, a willingness to take risks and flexible instruments for development cooperation. It also requires different types of quality assurance, evaluation and political communication: The success of preventive mechanisms in conflict situations is hard to demonstrate. Yet according to our interviewees, this should not stand in the way of efforts to raise the profile of prevention, not only rhetorically but also via concrete action.

A key policy field that has a powerful preventive character is "women, peace and security" and the strengthening of gender justice in states affected by conflict. The implementation of UN Resolution 1325 plays a central role in this. Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé Institute) notes, for instance, how important it is to establish and strengthen networks of women mediators and women in peacebuilding functions. One of the priorities of Germany during its current membership of the UN Security Council is to strengthen and implement the "women, peace and security" agenda. Consultations on a new national action plan have recently commenced. The 2017 guidelines of the Federal Government and the subsequent strategies for promoting the rule of law, security-sector reform and dealing with the past produced in 2019 contain important commitments to a gender-sensitive foreign, development and security policy. The need now, however, is to implement them. The BMZ, which has committed itself to a gender-transformative approach to development cooperation, can play a key role in encouraging the necessary steps within the various ministries. It is essential that this goes

### BOX 7: PREVENTION IN THE PATHWAYS FOR PEACE REPORT

The Pathways for Peace report produced jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations contains several key statements about prevention.

Drawing on 20 case studies, the report identifies the central characteristics of successful conflict prevention:

- Preventive measures were "nationally led", i.e. promoted by actors in the affected societies.
- They addressed critical, immediate risks.
- They addressed grievances by changing the incentives of actors, investment, and institutional reforms.
- They were based on broad coalitions – combining the local, national, regional and global levels, governments, and the public and private sectors.
- They required individual commitment on the part of leaders, including in overcoming opposition to unpopular measures (United Nations/World Bank 2017: 23).

These findings were summarised in three guiding principles. According to these principles, prevention must be:

- *sustained* in order to effectively address structural issues, strengthen institutions and adapt actor incentives;
- *inclusive* in order to identify and address drivers of conflicts on the basis of broad partnerships;
- *targeted* in order to directly address patterns of exclusion and institutional weakness (United Nations/World Bank 2018: xxv).

Conclusion: Development actors should provide targeted, flexible and sustained support for national and regional prevention strategies. Prevention strategies should be "integrated into development policies and efforts, because prevention is cost-effective, saves lives, and safeguards development gains" (United Nations/World Bank 2018: xviii).

beyond merely encouraging women's participation and engages with questions around the role of gender in conflict dynamics and peacebuilding generally (according to Dan Smith, SIPRI).

It is clear what the experts are calling for: Now that prevention has been recognised as a key focus, implementation needs to follow. This has to include the provision of adequate financial resources, better integration of early recognition measures with the ongoing analysis of prevention efforts and greater flexibility in evaluating the effectiveness of prevention. With respect to funding, for instance, this could mean adopting the goal of systematically raising the proportion of ODA dedicated to conflict prevention and its analysis. The need for this is all the more urgent since climate change is likely to raise demand for conflict prevention activities – potentially by an enormous amount (see chapter 2.2).

### 4.2.2 Ensuring Coherence at all Levels

As with prevention, the mantra of coherence has been invoked in all kinds of nexus debates, in recent years and decades, as a key aspect of successful implementation. Yet here, too, many calls for actual implementation are still awaiting attention. Rachel Scott from the OECD considers this again to be a problem less of the existing policies than of their application:

> "We have enough policies, we have the right type of policy, but what we have to do now is to deliver better on the ground. We need to focus much more on changing the way we structure ourselves, changing the way we work together and to coordinate, changing the way we make our expectations and run our programming on the ground, rather than writing endless policies."

The issue of policy coherence arises on three interrelated levels: the national level (intra- and interministerial coherence), among international donors and on the ground in states affected by conflicts where development actors are present.[2]

Turning to the national level in Germany, the Federal Government took a step towards better coordination and joint ministerial action with the publication of its guidelines in 2017.3 This has resulted in some institutional changes, such as the establishment of an interministerial Horizon Scanning working group in charge of early warning (Federal Government 2017, 2019; Bundestag 2019). The principle of coordinated government action also needs to apply on the ground in conflict regions and to involve the agencies charged with organising implementation (Federal Government 2017: 108). It also concerns every stage of the political process – from crisis recognition, via strategy and programme planning, to evaluation (Federal Government 2019). The aim of this is not only to avoid conflicts but, in the best case, to create complementarities and mutually reinforce planned results. This is particularly relevant given that overlapping areas of operation and responsibility are already an everyday reality for government agencies engaged in states affected by conflicts.

Yet experience shows that implementing this is difficult, not least because of the tendency towards departmental siloisation and rivalries among the various ministries (Deneckere/Hauck 2018; see also Strohscheidt 2016). In addition, economic, trade, environment and agricultural policy at times also contribute ODA and – in fact more importantly – indirectly influence peace and development in the partner countries for development cooperation (cf. Bohnet 2019: 250–251).4 In his interview, Jörn Grävingholt (GDI) noted that there is already a "dichotomy" in the BMZ's prioritisation, leading to a lack of intraministerial coherence:

> "This dichotomy takes the following form: while in some forums and contexts, the issues of peace and conflict resolution are strongly emphasised in connection with refugees, there is a parallel agenda that appears unaffected by this, namely when it comes to economic development in Africa."

In a similar way, Dirk Messner (UNU-EHS) calls for closer links between the nexus debate and the sustainability agenda as outlined in the SDGs.

At the international level, the norms of policy coordination and coherence are also firmly embedded in development policy discourses. The idea of "policy coherence for development" has its origins in the 1990s and has been adopted by both the OECD and the EU.[5] In the OECD, policy coherence has been a central issue in the debate on aid effectiveness. The SDGs have helped to make "Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development" (target 17.14) a central concept. Finally, the strengthening of cooperation, coherence and complementarity is one of the key goals in the debate on the humanitarian-peace-development nexus (OECD-DAC 2019a).

Nevertheless, there is still little evidence of coherent nexus-based approaches either at the international level or "on the ground", as Dan Smith from SIPRI crit-

### i BOX 8: COHERENCE ON THE GROUND – THE CASE OF SOMALIA

The international community's engagement in Somalia, which has lasted so many years and taken so many forms, illustrates both the need for better coordination on the ground and the problems that remain regarding the practical implementation of the axiom of coherence. A study by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) concludes that the universal rhetorical commitment to integrated approaches in Somalia has so far not been adequately accompanied by resources and practical efforts: precisely on the ground, there is little evidence of the coordination of humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding efforts. Consequently, funding by donors continues to be provided according to a silo mentality, as implementation organisations insist on specialising in specific sectors (Medinilla et al. 2019).

Medinilla et al. (2019: 10) characterise the landscape of international donor organisations in Somalis as a "a thick maze of bilateral and multilateral support, coupled with a huge variety of non-governmental donors and organisations". Alongside the usual suspects, new donor states including Turkey and the Gulf states play a significant role in Somalia (see also chapter 2.3). Coordination efforts have led to the proliferation of working groups, meetings and reporting formats, which the non-traditional donor countries, however, have tended to avoid. For many years, the difficult security situation also created enormous problems for these efforts at coordination, while the relative political stability of the last ten years has created new opportunities at both national and, particularly, local level. Yet precisely at the subnational level, instances of coordinated international engagement continue to be few and far between.

According to the authors of the study, a significant opportunity exists to introduce a more coordinated approach at the subnational level: Instead of coordination on a sector-by-sector basis, as has been the case so far, the study calls for an "area-based approach". The aim here is "to seek to create a bottom-up dynamic" in a specific territorial entity, "involving a range of local stakeholders, including public officials, the private sector and traditional leaders". This creates a range of opportunities for the cooperation and coordination of humanitarian, development and peace measures (Medinilla et al. 2019: 25). Nonetheless, an approach based on local coordination is not without risks (for details, see chapter 4.1.2). It is important, for instance, that territorial initiatives of this kind do not contribute to the fragmentation of the state or cause people to lose sight of national development goals.

icises: "No one owns the whole problem. But all institutions are used to taking their part of the problem and running with it. There is a lot of siloization!" There is also said to be rivalry among many international actors over prestige, ideas and funding. Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS) observes that competition among the various development organisations makes coordination and cooperation harder: "It seems like everyone is pursuing his or her own agenda." In those areas where competition has negative consequences, more cooperation is needed: According to Rachel Scott (OECD), cooperation among the actors who are responsible for the implementation of the nexus in practice is hampered by "a lot of mistrust", and instead of opening up their domains for cooperation with other actors, they often practice "self-defence". It is therefore high time, according to Franck Bousquet (World Bank), to talk about implementation in concrete terms:

> "The international community made some good improvements in terms of the conceptual framework and approach over the past few years, now it's more about the question of the how – how to make a difference on the ground? It's good to talk about the nexus but it's even better to operationalize it."

Here it is already apparent that coherence on the ground has to be the ultimate criterion for evaluation (see also Box 8 on → page 51). This is something that

the interviewed experts stress several times, for instance, Rachel Scott (OECD):

> "What we actually focused on for a long time was having organizations that were coherent inside themselves. The difference now is that we are focusing on the coherence on the ground, among everybody who is playing e.g. in the South Sudan space."

Partnerships represent an innovative means of implementing the nexus and solving the problem of coherence (World Bank 2019d; OECD-DAC 2019a). Franck Bousquet from the World Bank lists partnerships with UN agencies and missions, with multilateral frameworks (e.g. the Sahel Alliance) and international NGOs (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross) as examples that seek to go beyond joint analysis to encompass joint programme planning and implementation. As a result of the joint Pathways for Peace report, the World Bank has significantly expanded its partnerships with UN agencies:

> "We are not operating in silos, but we have significantly scaled up our partnership with the UN at all levels, especially at the country level where it makes sense. We need to refocus collectively on areas where the support of the international community is the most critical: more selectivity, more partnership at the country level with actors with different mandates to be more effective on the ground and for the most marginalized groups."

In the draft of the World Bank's new strategy for fragility, conflict and violence, partnerships with various actors working in humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, peacebuilding and security play a correspondingly prominent role. The aim is to establish and intensify partnerships not only with bilateral and multilateral donors but also with civil society and the private sector (World Bank 2019d: 41–43).

For the interviewees, partnership contains a particular potential to overcome the frequent dominance of silo thinking and to improve the coordination of measures. There is a broad spectrum of partners to choose from in this regard, not just bilateral and multilateral donors, but also non-state – civil society and private sector – actors. In view of the constantly shifting environments in which development activities are carried out in conflict-affected states, and particularly given the rising significance of new donors (see chapter 2.3), partnerships "off the beaten path" should also be considered, even when the agendas of the actors involved only partly overlap. For instance, partners may pursue varying goals and have different levels of ambition. In the first instance, such partnerships could be restricted to the exchange of information and good practices or joint analysis. More ambitious forms of cooperation, which require deeper agreement in terms of goals and values, might include the development and evaluation of common strategies and programmes (cf. Jones/Mazzara 2018).

> We have enough policies, we have the right type of policy, but what we have to do now is to deliver better on the ground. We need to focus much more on changing the way we structure ourselves, changing the way we work together and to coordinate, changing the way we make our expectations and run our programming on the ground, rather than writing endless policies.
>
> Rachel Scott, OECD

Regardless of which local partners are considered or selected for cooperation, it is vital that projects are led by local partners of one kind or another. This is especially the case in fragile contexts, as Michelle Ndiaye (IPSS) observes:

> "My key message is: Support projects that are nationally or regionally owned or driven – to guarantee success. I believe 'ownership' is what will make development cooperation successful in the future."[6]

However, there is a certain tension between calls for national ownership and appeals for broad partnerships (including those with the participation of the local society), at least when the former refers to the government. For Vasu Gounden (ACCORD), "ownership must reside with the public elected government" and, accordingly, development cooperation needs to

be "aligned to the development priorities of a government". Yet in the absence of a functioning government, development cooperation "must look to other partners, that might be the private sector, that might be the public sector – who in many cases are still operating and delivering services in conflict. Working with those partners – not for the sake of showing that there is development – but for having a tangible impact on the ground to alleviate the conditions that are driving conflict. Otherwise you are just going into a vicious circle of conflict."

Overall, the creation of coherence at all levels is of vital importance for the implementation of the nexus: In the first place, this entails joined-up interministerial action at the national level on the part of the donor states. Germany has taken key steps in this direction at the level of policy in recent years (Federal Government 2017, 2019), which need to be put into action both in Germany and on the ground. Second, coordination with bilateral and multilateral donors at international and local levels in states affected by conflicts is extremely important. The OECD-DAC guidelines on the triple nexus (OECD-DAC 2019a) and the new World Bank draft strategy (World Bank 2019d) have formulated key targets for enhancing cooperation and coherence among nexus-relevant actors. The development of partnerships on the ground – together with expanding the spectrum of partners – plays a key role in this. The inclusion and ownership of national and local partners certainly does not come without tension but is nonetheless decisive to raising the effectiveness of peace-oriented development cooperation in states affected by conflict.

1 *For more on the topic of partnerships, see chapter 4.2.2.*

2 *Regarding coordination of the three levels, Jones/Mazzara (2018: 5) note that the central obstacle to good coordination is the disconnect between centrally steered ("headquarters driven"), frequently abstract interpretations of the nexus and "the reality on the ground" in the context of specific (protracted) conflict situations: "Such disconnects risk creating parallel processes and duplicating efforts, or even bringing progress achieved in some instances back to square one."*

3 *Among other sources, the guidelines draw upon the interministerial guidelines on policy coherence towards fragile states that the BMZ, Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) published in 2012, as well as the 2016 White Book that envisaged close coordination of Germany's foreign, security and development policy activities via an integrated approach.*

4 *This has already been recognised as a policy goal, at least by the BMZ: "Development, climate and trade policy are therefore aspects of a comprehensive security and peace policy." (Müller 2019) In practice, however, only the Federal Foreign Office, the BMZ, the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) are involved in the consultation process under the guidelines.*

5 *See, for instance, the EU's New European Consensus on Development (European Union 2017: 38) and, for a critical view of efforts by EU institutions and member states to enhance coordination and coherence, Jones/Mazzara (2018).*

6 *Steven Gruzd (SAIIA) expressed a similar view in his interview. For a general overview, see Jones/Mazzara (2018). At policy level, these calls are reflected in the "New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States" (2011), which aims at enabling "inclusive, country-led transitions out of fragility" for fragile states and states affected by conflict.*

# 5. Concluding Remarks

On the one hand, this report has demonstrated the significance of the development-peace nexus. At the same time, it has identified the areas where this produces a need for action on the part of German and international development cooperation. Working in the context of political violence is established development cooperation practice, and there are good reasons to continue to be involved in conflict environments in the future – not least with a view to the historical, contemporary, and, in the context of climate change, growing responsibility of the Global North for conflict in the Global South.

At the level of strategy, development cooperation has already made most of the necessary course adjustments. However, as this report shows, these are often lacking sufficient operational detail: What do the primacy of prevention, calls for greater coherence and a recognition of the central importance of inclusion actually entail? On the one hand, the report makes concrete proposals on these issues that focus on the financing of these strategies. At the same time, it recommends overhauling currently dominant priorities (prioritising stabilisation of the status quo ahead of transformation) and rethinking basic patterns of activity (more risk awareness, more willingness to take risks) and organisational arrangements (coherence) and then putting these impulses into practice. In view of the complex interplay of development and peace processes, there are no simple solutions. Indeed, it is often necessary to settle for the next-best solution – even though this is not always easy to communicate. While doing this, it is important to continuously reflect upon the general limits to external influence on development and conflict processes within a given society. Development cooperation, as Jochen Hippler notes (2018: 63), can influence the underlying conditions that affect the risk of violence and the ability to act of those who are seeking to promoting peace, but it cannot "directly avoid or combat" dynamics of violence (see also Bohnet 2019: 237; Grävingholt 2019: 360).

Although the nexus between development and peace is now generally recognised, knowledge gaps and a need for research remain as far as the concrete interlinkages and mechanisms of action are concerned. This is particularly true regarding the constant changes to which global and local conflict situations are subject and the non-linearity of the dynamics of violence. For all the progress made, there remains a lack of both the ability and the capacity to perform analysis. This applies to the general relationship between development and peace but also to the concrete formation of country strategies and their implementation, amongst other things. The aim of this report was merely to give a rather general overview of the state of knowledge on the development-peace nexus. But the present analyse already indicates how valuable a global, structured and ongoing dialogue among experts active in development-related research and analysis can be for continually informing and questioning established practices and strategic orientations. Such a dialogue could benefit from a monitoring mechanism capable of gathering the globally available expertise on the topic in a regular and systematic way. The nexus between peace and development and the contribution of development cooperation in this regard will certainly remain a significant topic for the foreseeable future. The German Government is in a good position to push this forward – but it is even more important that Germany's high-profile commitment to taking on a greater share of responsibility in the world is matched by action, particularly in the field of development policy with a focus on the relationship between peace and development.

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